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JURISDICTION OF COURT
Defendants,

Union

Pacific

Railroad

Company

("Union

Pacific") and Paul Kleinman, hereinafter sometimes referred to
jointly as "Union Pacific" agree with plaintiffs' jurisdictional
statement.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Union Pacific

accepts plaintiffs'

statement

of the

issues.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Section 54-4-14, et seg., U.C.A. (1990).
23 U.S.C. § 101, et seg. (Highway Safety Act.)
23 U.S.C. § 409.
45 U.S.C. § 421, et seg. (Rail Safety Act).
23 C.F-R. Parts 646, 655(f), 924
23 C.F.R. § 1204.4
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD).
For the sake of brevity portions of the above statutes
and regulations and relevant provisions from the MUTCD are set
forth in full in the Addendum, as provided for in Rules 24(a)(6)
and (f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF TEE CASE
Nature of the Case
Union Pacific
nature of the case.

accepts plaintiffs'

statement

of the

Course of Proceedings Below
Union

Pacific

takes

exception

to

and/or

supplements

plaintiffs' statement of the course of the proceedings below as
follows:
1.

Discovery - By their statements at p. 3 of their

brief, plaintiffs would have the court believe that they were
actively engaged in conducting discovery.

To the contrary, it is

important to note that after filing the Complaint in May 1984,
plaintiffs

conducted

Interrogatories
February

and

no

discovery

Request

for

until

they

filed

Production

1986, nearly two years later.

of

a

set

of

Documents

in

It was not until

the

State and Union Pacific filed their motions for summary judgment
in December 1986 and February 1987, respectively, that plaintiffs
made any further efforts at discovery by filing another set of
Interrogatories

in March

1987.

Such was

the

full

extent

of

plaintiffs' efforts at discovery (no depositions were taken) by
the time defendants filed their Motions for Summary Judgment.
2.

Substance

Abuse

Issue

-

Defendants

produced

evidence (police reports, toxicology reports and affidavit of Dr.
Michael

A.

Peat)

(R.

436,

426,

423,

421,

372,

324-321)

of

ingestion of marijuana and impairment of driving capacity by the
driver,

Patrick

Duncan,

accident, and intended
argue

that

accident.

Duncan's
Prior

to

prior

to

and/or

at

the

time

of

the

to rely on such evidence, in part, to
negligence
the

was

hearing

the
on

sole

cause

defendants'

of

the

motions,

plaintiffs

filed

affidavits

from

a

medical

doctor,

Charles

Becker, which, while not denying the ingestion of marijuana by
Duncan and some resulting degree of impairment, raised an issue
of fact as to whether Duncan was "impaired in any substantial
manner"

(emphasis

added)

at

the

time

of

the

accident.

Accordingly, defendants did not argue Duncan's alleged driving
impairment as the cause of the accident at the hearing on the
motions, and it was not so considered by the District Court. (R.
485. )
3.

Extra Hazardous Crossing Issue - In the courts

below Union Pacific relied primarily upon photographs (R. 370,
364, 339-337), to argue that the crossing was not more than
ordinarily hazardous as a matter of law.

Except in rebuttal to

plaintiffs' misstatements of the evidence, Union Pacific did not
rely on the affidavits of the Utah Department of Transportation
("UDOT") surveillance

team

because

information

much

of

the

submitted

by

the

contained

State,

therein

largely
and

the

exhibits attached thereto are inadmissible pursuant to 23 U.S.C.
§ 409.
4.

The

Crommelin

Affidavit

-

Plaintiffs'

only

evidence to counter what the physical facts showed concerning the
wide-open nature of the crossing, was a single affidavit from an
expert witness named Robert Crommelin (R. 00191); however, the
District Court considered

and then disregarded

the Crommelin

Affidavit on the grounds that it was premised upon erroneous and
inadmissible facts.
5,

(R. 481-479).

District Court Decision - The Court not only held

that Union Pacific had no duty to improve the warning devices
because

of

state

law

preemption,

it

also

specifically

and

separately ruled that as a matter of law Union Pacific had no
duty because the crossing was not more than ordinarily hazardous
at the time of the accident.
6.

(R. 479-478.)

Court of Appeals Decision - The Court of Appeals

did not agree, as against Union Pacific, that "plaintiffs had
stated a prima facie case of negligence,

. . . ."

To the

contrary, the court specifically found "that plaintiffs failed to
show negligence in operating the train or in entrusting its
operation to Kleinman."

The court also fully understood that the

Crommelin Affidavit was plaintiffs' only evidence of negligence
on the extra hazardous crossing issue, that the District Court
had

concluded

that

the

affidavit

should

be

disregarded

on

foundational grounds, and that the Court had additionally ruled
that even if the affidavit were considered, the case should still
be

dismissed

on

its

merits.

It

was

because

of

this

understanding, and in order to address the merits of the issue,
that the Court of Appeals opted to take "Crommelin's opinion at
face value."

By doing so, the Court was hardly agreeing that

plaintiffs had stated a prima facie case of negligence against
Union Pacific.

The court was just finding a way to address the

merits of the issue by agreeing, arguendo, that the affidavit had
created a question of material fact.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Union

Pacific

makes

the

following

corrections

and

additions to plaintiff's Statement of Facts which Union Pacific
believes to be incomplete and/or inaccurate in several material
respects.
The Accident
1.

The investigating Utah Highway Patrol Trooper,

Terry C. Smith, reported that the weather was "clear or cloudy,"
rather than "raining" or "foggy."

(R. 373, 431.)

Plaintiffs'

statement at page 5 of their brief, that the "weather was cloudy
with a light rain falling," is incorrect.

Neither should it be

taken to imply that visibility, or the lack thereof (other than
that which is incident to nighttime hours) was a factor in
causing the accident.
Smith's

testimony)

The only evidence

concerning

(other than Trooper

visibility,

is

from

Engineer

Kleinman who testified that he had no difficulty in observing
automobile traffic, including the plaintiffs' car, approach the
crossing.

(R. 450-449.)

plaintiffs'

contention

There is no support in the record for
that

it was

raining

or

that weather

created visibility problems.
2.

Neither is there any evidentiary support for the

contention that Patrick Duncan was unfamiliar with the crossing.
There is nothing in the record to indicate how long Duncan had

been living in Utah, nor whether he had ever driven over the
crossing before.
3.

The only eyewitnesses to the collision were the

train crew members.

Engineer Kleinman's unchallenged testimony

is that the train was travelling 40 m.p.h., 20 m.p.h. under the
maximum speed allowed for the track and 10 m.p.h. under the
maximum speed allowed for the train; the train's whistle and bell
were sounding; and the train's double-sealed beam headlights (two
headlights) and a flashing yellow strobe light on top of the
leading engine were operating.
for

approximately

crossing.

Kleinman observed the automobile

one-quarter

mile

prior

to

reaching

the

He believed that the automobile could stop for the

crossing.

At

the

point

where

he

first

realized

that

the

automobile was not going to stop, the train was so close to the
crossing that it was not possible to avoid the accident. (R.
451-448.)
4.

The

train's

signal

devices

headlights, strobe light) were manufactured

(whistle,

bell,

and installed to

perform at levels which substantially exceeded the standard set
by the Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA") in 49 C.F.R. §
229.125, et sea.

Significantly, the candle power of the engine's

headlight was three times more powerful

than that which is

required by the FRA standard (600,000 candle power versus 200,000
candle power).

(R. 447-446.)

5.

There

is evidence

that the

automobile's AM/FM

stereo and tape deck was turned up to a high decibel level.
According to Trooper Smith's incident report, the volume knob was
"adjusted to approximately three-quarters of the way to full
volume" at the time he inspected the car following the accident.
(R. 434, 429.)
6.

Neither Trooper Smith nor Tooele County Deputy

Sheriff Dennis Andrews, an expert accident reconstruction!st who
also investigated the accident, could find evidence that the
automobile left skid marks.

(R. 373, 335.)

Based upon such

evidence, the evidence indicating the tremendous force with which
the automobile and train collided (Incident Report, beginning at
R.

429), and

Engineer

Kleinman's

testimony

concerning

his

observation of the automobile's approach to the crossing (R.
451),

the

conclusion

seems

inescapable

that plaintiffs made

little if any effort to stop for the train.
The Railroad Crossing
1.

The uncomplicated, unobstructed, and rural nature

of the crossing is best exemplified by the photographs taken
following

the

accident

(R.

370,

337-339),

and

the

aerial

photograph attached to the Affidavit of Joseph F. Varoz.
365.)

(R.

These photographs clearly show a total absence of any

obstructions to view as well as any other factors which might
have confused or distracted plaintiffs and prevented them from

perceiving the existence and location of the crossing and the
train's hazardous proximity thereto.
2.

The open, greater than 90° nature of the crossing

angle (approximately 136°) (R. 367) should have made it easier
for plaintiffs to observe the train.

Plaintiffs should have been

able to view the train's approach in their peripheral vision with
little or no need to turn their heads.
3.

Reflectorized

place at the crossing.

railroad

crossbuck

signs were

in

A reflectorized railroad crossing advance

warning sign was also located on Droubay Road, approximately 305
feet south of the crossing (R. 410.), in accordance with the
distance standards set forth at §§ 8B-3 and 2C-3 of the Manual on
Uniform Traffic Control Devices.
4.

The

investigation

(R. 250-249, 480, Appendix.)
of Trooper

Smith

and Deputy

Sheriff Andrews shows how plainly visible the warning signs, the
crossing

location

and

the

substantial distance away.

approaching

train

were

from

a

(R. 373, 335). As stated in Trooper

Smith's incident report (R. 435):
Testing was conducted on 13 and 14 day of April, 1983.
Testing was done with and without trains present.
Driving at dark with no moon and stars partially
covered by clouds. At 3/4's mile the yellow crossing
sign is plainly visible. The two white crossing signs
are visible but appear to be round. At 1/2 mile all
signs are clearly visible. These tests were done with
vehicle lights on low beam. Time was approximately
20:30 hours. With headlights on, high beam, signs are
clearly visible from a mile back from the intersection.

Test No. 2:

Terrain

I drove up and down Droubay Bay Road to see if there
was any place in the road that would obstruct the view
of the train. There is one mound of dirt at 400 feet
from the intersection to the east of the roadway. I
drove slowly toward the intersection as the train
approached from the east. At no point in time was the
train out of view. Even at the highest portion of the
mound of dirt. Test 14 April 1983, 1:00 a.m.
5.

As acknowledged by plaintiffs at pp. 6-7 of

their brief, Union Pacific brought to the attention of
Tooele County authorities in September 1979 the possibility
that warning devices at the crossing may need to be improved
at sometime in the future if and when the county widened
Droubay Road and generated an increase in traffic over the
crossing.

Union Pacific suggested that the County share

this concern with the State.

(R. 232.)

However, as pointed

out at p. 9 of plaintiffs' brief, the road was not widened
by Tooele County until sometime after the accident occurred.
6.

As shown by the affidavits and exhibits submitted

by the State and plaintiffs (R. 363-351, 313-309, 307-296, 176),
the

crossing

was

inspected

by

UDOT

in November

1981.

The

inspection revealed no hazards then existing which indicated
improvement of the crossing warning devices was in order.

The

inspection report dated November 10, 1981, specifically states
"No sight dist. restrictions." (R. 302.)

The inspection team did

recommend, based upon a predicted future significant increase in
vehicular traffic, that upgrading take place "at such time as
federal funding became available."

(R. 305, 312.)

Specifically,

only 100 cars per day were using the crossing as of the November
1981

inspection

(R.

176); however,

based

upon

information

received from Tooele County, the inspection team projected that
1,500 vehicles per day were "expected" to use the crossing in the
future.

(R. 176, 305, 312, 359.)

This projection had not,

however, come to fruition by the time the accident occurred.
UDOT reviewed

the issue again

in June

1982

and

consciously

decided against making the crossing a "high priority."
351, 358.)

(R. 352,

According to UDOT and Federal Highway Administration

("FHWA") officials, the crossing was not ranked high enough on
the State's "Hazard Index," which was the priority ranking system
being used then, to warrant making any improvements at that time
(R. 356-357, 317-315).
1983,

some

UDOT made another inspection on June 3,

seven weeks after the accident.

This inspection

determined that daily usage (at least on the day of the count)
was up to only 580 vehicles per day, far short of the 1500
vehicles per day projected in 1981. (R. 301.)
7.
federal

In

authorities

early

1983,

approved

just

a new

prior

to

the

accident,

formula

for prioritizing

crossings for crossing warning improvements.

This new formula

gave greater weight to the actual accident experience at a given
crossing.
formula

Following the June 1983 inspection, using the new
and

including

the

statistics

from

the

accident

in

question, UDOT determined the Droubay Road crossing was qualified

- 10 -

for federal funding, and the improvements were recommended and
eventually installed.
8,
at

the

Review of reports for the three prior accidents

crossing

circumstances.
221,

(R. 318-315, 358-359.)

show

that

none

of

them

have

"similar"

In the first accident, on November 11, 1980 (R.

220), the

automobile

was

travelling

in

the

opposite

direction creating a much more difficult angle for observation of
the approaching train; however, the driver was able to see the
train in time to "stop just short of the train tracks."

The

train apparently nicked the bumper of the vehicle and no injuries
resulted.
218),

In the second accident, on March 29, 1981 (R. 219,

the

automobile

was

also

travelling

in

the

opposite

direction and, additionally, the police officer reported the
accident was caused "due to poor visibility because of a heavy
snow storm."

(R. 218.)

In the third accident, on October 24,

1981, (R. 217, 216), the automobile stalled and stopped on the
track directly in front of the train.
9.

Plaintiffs incorrectly imply, without reference

to any support in the record, that Union Pacific paid for the
costs of the subsequently installed warning device improvements.
To the contrary, consistent with federal guidelines [see, e.g. »
23 C.F.R. § 646.210(b)(1)] (Addendum), governmental authorities
paid the complete cost with Union Pacific assuming the continuing
maintenance expenses, which traditionally far exceed installation
costs.

The portion of the record to which plaintiffs refer (R.

303,

298-299) merely

indicates

the

fact

that Union

Pacific

forces, under UDOT's direction, did the actual construction work.
The costs of such installation, both for materials and labor,
were either paid for up front or reimbursed later by or through
UDOT.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:
It is the public policy of federal and state governments
that

responsibility

for

regulating

the

installation

and

modification of warning devices at public railroad crossings be
lodged exclusively with the state.

Thus, both federal and state

laws preempt negligence lawsuits against railroads for failing to
install or modify such devices.

Such a holding does not alter

the railroads' common law duty of reasonable care with respect to
matters under their control.

The Court of Appeals decision in

this respect is in harmony with Utah statutory and case law, and
is supported by the majority of recent decisions from other
jurisdictions.
POINT II:
The crossing in question is located in a rural area, is
totally

unobstructed

and

has

none

of

the

confusing

or

complicating features normally found in extrahazardous crossings.
It was appropriate, therefore, for the District Court, based upon
its examination of the nature of the crossing itself, to rule as
a matter of law that it was not more than ordinarily hazardous.

Union

Pacific

had

no

duty,

therefore,

to

take

additional

precautions to reduce the risks at the crossing with respect to
approaching motorists.
Furthermore,

the

Crommelin

Affidavit

was

fundamentally

flawed in that it relied for its conclusion on misinformation and
inadmissible

evidence.

The

affidavit,

therefore,

was

not

persuasive in raising a general issue of material fact concerning
the extrahazardous crossing issue.
POINT III:
It would be inappropriate to burden Union Pacific with a
duty for which it has no corresponding right to control and
implement,

and

where

it

has

no

expertise

in

prioritizing

crossings and obtains no benefit from projects which install or
improve crossing warning devices.

Public policy considerations

support the dispositions of plaintiffs' claim thus far.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERROR IN ASSESSING UNION
PACIFIC'S DUTIES TO IMPROVE WARNING DEVICES AT PUBLIC
RAILROAD CROSSINGS.
A.

Utah Law Vests Exclusive Jurisdiction In State
Agencies For Regulating the Travel of Motorists at
Public Railroad Crossings.

Union Pacific could not have been negligent in failing
to improve the warning devices at the crossing because it had no
authority

or

duty

to

install

or

modify

such

devices.

Governmental agencies have the exclusive authority over public

roads and over the signs and warning devices placed on those
roads.
1.

The Statutory Framework,

The Utah
responsibility

Legislature

(and

the Courts) has

for safety at public

involved parties.

divided

railroad crossings among

Railroads are statutorily required to provide

crossing surfaces that are in a proper state of repair so that
they can be safely driven over [§ 10-7-26, «et seq. ; § 56-1-11;
Denkers v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah 18, 171 P. 999 (1918);
Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific R.R., 112 Utah 189, 186 P.2d 293
(1947)];

have

their

trains

sound

approaching public crossings

bells

(§ 56-1-14);

or

whistles

when

and cooperate with

governmental agencies in investigating the safety of crossings
and in the installation and maintenance of whatever crossing
warning

systems

construction.

UDOT

deems

necessary

and

(§ 54-4-14, et, seq. ) (Addendum. )

approves

for

Additionally, as

explained by the Court of Appeals in this case (790 P.2d at 599)
(Addendum), railroads have the common law duty

to take such

reasonable steps as would be within their authority to alleviate
hazards at crossings, such as by removing obstructions to view on
their right of way or reducing train speed.
Rio Grande W. R.R.

Co.,

749 P.2d

660

Gleave v. Denver &
(Utah

App.

1988).

Adjacent property owners are required to remove vegetation or
other

obstructions

to view

or which

otherwise

constitute

a

"traffic hazard,"

(§ 41-6-19);

motorists

are

responsible

to

recognize the train's right of way, and take special precautions
when

approaching

and

stopping

at

railroad

41-6-46, 41-6-93, 41-6-95, and 41-6-97.)

crossings.

(§§

UDOT has been delegated

the responsibility for regulating the safe travel of motorists on
roads and highways, including those which pass over and across
railroad tracks.

§ 54-4-14, est seg. ; Gleave v. Denver & Rio

Grande W. R.R. Co., supra, at 664.
A series of Utah statutes has established the exclusive
authority of UDOT to decide

on and install

traffic

control

devices at public railroad crossings, subject only to review by
the Public Service Commission of Utah ("PSCU").

Under § 54-4-14,

state authorities are specifically charged with the overall,
exclusive responsibility to regulate the installation of warning
devices
crossing

at

public

cannot

be

grade

crossings.

built

"without

Under
the

§

54-4-15(1),

permission

of

a

the

Department of Transportation having first been secured," and UDOT
"shall have the right to refuse its permission or to grant it
upon

such

terms

and

conditions

as

it

may

prescribe."

Furthermore, § 54-4-15(2) provides that UDOT "shall have the
power to determine and prescribe the manner

. of .

protection of each crossing . . . and to alter or abolish any
such crossing

. . . ."

Under § 54-4-15(4), the PSCU "shall

retain exclusive jurisdiction for the resolution of any dispute

upon petition by any person aggrieved by any action of [UDOT]"
taken

pursuant

to

§

54-4-15.

Moreover,

Section

54-4-15.3

provides that UDOT "shall apportion the cost of the installation,
maintenance, reconstruction or improvement of any signals or
devices described in § 54-4-15.1 between the railroad or street
railroad

and

the

public

agency

involved."

Section

54-4-15

separately requires UDOT to provide in its annual budget for the
cost of installing signals or other safety devices at railroad
crossings.
2.

The Legislative History.

In 1917, the Utah Legislature enacted the forerunner of
the current § 54-4-14, et seq., under which the predecessor of
the PSCU was granted
prescribe

the manner

"the exclusive power to determine

and

. . . and the terms of installation,

operation, maintenance, use and protection . . . of each crossing
of a public road or a highway."

Laws of Utah, 1917, § 47-4-14.

This court has held that this language means just what it says in
The

Denver

& Rio

Grande

Western

R.R.

v.

Public

Utilities

Commission of Utah, 51 Utah 623, 172 P. 479 (1918); and Provo
City v. Department of Business Regulation, et al., 118 Utah 1,
218 P.2d 675 (1950).

On both of these occasions, the court held

that the power of the designated state agency to "determine and
prescribe" railroad crossings was exclusive.
Section

54-4-14, .et seq. , was

amended

in

1975

in

conjunction with the creation of UDOT, which assumed most of the

PSCU's duties regarding railroad crossing safety.

The amendment

substituted references to UDOT for the prior references in the
statutes to the PSCU.

Subsection (4) in § 54-4-15 was added to

retain ultimate supervisory jurisdiction in the PSCU to review
the actions of UDOT.

As a result, a single state agency no

longer had "exclusive" power over crossing safety -- two agencies
now shared that power.

Therefore, Legislature had to delete the

word "exclusive" as it referred to UDOT's authority.

However,

the State (UDOT and the PSCU together) still retains exclusive
jurisdiction over the installation of traffic signs and control
devices on public roads at railroad crossings, and a private
party, such as a railroad, has no more right to change the
traffic warning devices on such roads than it would to change any
other regulatory signs on any other public highways.
3.

Interpretation by Utah Courts.

Although the Utah Supreme Court has not interpreted
these

statutes

since

the

1975 Amendment,

there has been a

considerable amount of Utah litigation on this issue.

State and

federal trial court judges and now the Utah Court of Appeals,
have uniformly interpreted Utah law to preclude railroads and
local governments from having any authority or duty to install
initially or modify traffic warning devices at public railroad
crossings.

In addition to Judge Hansen's decision in this case,

see, e.g., the Order of Judge Dennis Frederick in Anderson v.
Whittle v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., Civ. No. C 81-3189

(3rd Dist. Ct., March 1987)(R. 161); the Order of Judge David K.
Winder in Harsin v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., Civ. No.
C 83-0993W (D. Utah, January 1985)(R.157); the Order of Judge
Aldin J. Anderson in Bellon v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R,,
Civ. No. C 83-088A (D. Utah, Sept. 1984) (R. 152); and the Order
of Chief Judge Bruce S. Jenkins in Denver & Rio Grande Western
R.R. v. West Jordan Municipal Court, Civ. No. C 81-0344J (D, Utah,
May 1982).

(R. 150.)

As stated in Gleave:

UDOT is statutorily empowered to 'provide for the
installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving
of automatic and other safety appliances, signals or
devices at grade crossings,'
and to apportion
costs of such projects among public and private
entities. . . . the government alone must consistently
regulate
safety
devices
at
railroad
crossings,
determine which devices at which crossings should be
recommended for federal funding, rank crossings in
order of need for upgrading in light of limited funds
for that purpose, and apportion signal installation
costs between public and private entities.
As a
practical matter, the private sector cannot perform
these functions.
Accordingly, we hold that the
regulation of public safety needs and the evaluation,
installation, maintenance and improvement of safety
signals or devices at railroad crossings is a
governmental function. . . .
(Citations omitted), 749 P.2d at 667-68.
4.

The Vesting of Exclusive Authority in State
Agencies
Serves
the
Important
Purpose
of
Establishing Uniformity Throughout the State.

Presumably, in the early days of railroading when only
horse drawn vehicles and early "horseless carriages" crossed over
railroad
signs

tracks, the

they

chose

at

railroads
crossings.

_

io

themselves
One

can

installed
safely

whatever

assume

the

crossing protection signs of that era offered little consistency
to the highway traveler but, of course, the speed and range of
highway travel was substantially different from what it is today.
In

Utah,

as

elsewhere,

government

has

become

increasingly involved in the regulation of highway traffic as the
number

and

speed

of

vehicles

increased.

The

legislature's

decision to reserve to state agencies the exclusive authority
over railroad crossing protection establishes efficiency as well
as uniformity in safety regulation.

The purpose of any traffic

control system is to promote safety while preserving efficiency
of traffic flow.

The goals of safety and efficiency are, to some

extent, inherently conflicting.

For example, if the speed limit

on interstate highways were reduced from 55 to 25 m.p.h., there
would no doubt be a reduction in accidents, but the reduction in
traffic flow efficiency would be drastic.

The balance between

safety and efficiency would be upset.
In order to strike an acceptable balance between safety
and efficiency at railroad crossings, an entity with traffic
regulation expertise and decision making authority must have an
overview of the safety requirements and traffic flow needs of
both the communities and the railroad companies involved.

If

railroad companies had decision making authority, they would
undoubtedly close as many railroad-highway grade crossings as
possible so as to prevent potential hazards.

This would not, of

course, serve the interest of the community residents who want to

avoid detours and other impediments to their free travel.

The

Utah state agencies that have been given exclusive authority over
railroad crossing protection are uniquely qualified to make the
necessary traffic control decisions.
Railroad companies also lack the engineering expertise
and overview of community traffic flow needs required to make
decisions about what traffic control devices should be installed
at railroad crossings.
make those decisions.

The UDOT has the necessary expertise to
In doing so, UDOT considers a variety of

factual data not even available to railroad companies, including
highway

speed

limits, the density

of vehicular

traffic, the

density of pedestrian traffic, and the desired traffic

flow

patterns.

(See, Affidavit of Ross D. Wilson with attachments, R.

362-353.)

For these reasons, as well as for the purposes of

safety and efficiency, the exclusive authority for determining
what

traffic

control

devices

will

be

installed

at

railroad

crossings has been vested in UDOT, subject to PSCU review.
Since state agencies have exclusive authority over the
installation

of

railroad

crossing

protection

devices,

it

necessarily follows that Union Pacific had neither the authority
nor the duty to install any such devices at the crossing in
question.

_ on -

B.

Plaintiffs Misinterpret the Court of Appeals'
Decisions in the Gleave and Duncan Cases.

A close reading of the Court of Appeals decisions in
the Gleave and Duncan cases clearly shows that the decisions are
in harmony on the issue of the respective responsibilities of
state agencies and railroads with respect to crossing safety.
Both cases specifically

reaffirmed the long

standing

common law duty that railroads are required to take the actions
of

a reasonable

crossings
Gleave

man

in

alleviating

as are within their power

specifically

identified

the

such hazards

at

and authority
wild

railroad

to remove.

vegetation

which

the

railroad allowed to grow on its right of way to the point where
it obstructed the motorist's view, and reducing train speed, as
the type of hazards the railroad could alleviate.
P.2d at 664.)

(Gleave, 749

The court acknowledged the existence of this duty

in Duncan, but pointed out that "there is nothing to indicate
what could have made Union Pacific's right of way any safer to
motorists crossing Droubay Road."
Indeed,

plaintiffs

make

anywhere in their brief.

no

such

(Duncan, 790 P.2d
suggestions

in

at 599.)

this

regard

In fact, there were no railroad created

or controlled obstructions either on or off the right of way, and
the train was travelling 20 miles per hour under the speed limit.
Accordingly, it is incorrect for plaintiffs to assert that Duncan
insulates railroads "from any concerns of negligence for unsafe
conditions at crossings . . . ," or that the Court of Appeals has
in any way changed Utah

law in this respect.

Railroads have

always been and continue to be subject to the reasonable man
standard with respect to those hazards over which they have
control or responsibility.
C.

Plaintiffs
Misinterpret
Application § 56-1-11.

the

Meaning

and

Plaintiffs apparently interpret § 56-1-11 as imposing
on railroads a duty to install and improve warning devices at
crossings, and in doing so argue that the statute is, therefore,
inconsistent with the statutory scheme set forth at § 54-4-14 et
seq., as interpreted by the Court of Appeals.
Plaintiffs misunderstand the meaning and application of
§ 56-1-11.

This Court has discussed the application of this

statute to a railroad's duty

in crossing

accident

cases in

Denkers v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah 18, 171 p. 999 (1918),
and Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific R.R.. 112 Utah 189, 186 P.2d 293
(1947).

In both cases the statute was discussed and applied in

terms of the railroad's responsibilities to maintain the crossing
surface in a "good and sufficient" state of repair so that
travellers can pass safely thereover.

There were no discussions

that it imposed a duty to signalize crossings.
Indeed, there are no Utah decisions which interpret the
statute as placing a duty upon railroads to install or improve
warning devices at railroad crossings.

That responsibility was

specifically addressed and delegated to the State in § 54-4-14,
et seq.

Section 56-1-11, as part of the statutory scheme enacted

by

legislature

the

to

delegate

safety

responsibilities

at

railroad crossings, gives to railroads the responsibility to
maintain a "good and sufficient" crossing surface.
impose a duty to construct warning devices.
is

no

"potential

inconsistency"

between

It does not

Consequently, there
this

statute

and

§ 54-4-14, et seq.
D.

Federal Enactments are Supportive of the Court of
Appeals Decision.

The federal Rail Safety Act of 1970 ("FRSA"), 45 U.S.C.
§ 421, et seq., covers all areas of railroad safety.

Of the

numerous areas of railroad safety addressed by the Act, only one
area is afforded specific treatment and that is the area relating
to the problem of railroad grade crossing safety, to which a
specific section of the Act is devoted.

In 45 U.S.C. § 433(a),

the Secretary was required to study and report to Congress on the
problem of protecting railroad grade crossings, and at the same
time, he was required (under § 433(b)) to undertake a coordinated
study towards solving the grade crossing problem, not only under
his FRSA authority, but also under his authority pursuant to
other federal laws dealing with highway traffic, safety, and
construction, thus bringing

into play the provisions of the

federal Highway Safety Act (23 U.S.C. § 101, et seq.), various
sections of which directly require the states (not the railroads)
to survey and identify those crossings which require automatic
warning devices.

When

the

Secretary

filed

his

mandated

report

to

Congress on the solution of the grade crossing problem, Congress
then amended (in 1973) the federal Highway Safety Act so as to
require the states (not the railroads) to conduct and maintain a
survey of all grade crossings to identify those in need of
protective devices and to implement a schedule of projects to
accomplish the same.

(See, e.g.. 23 U.S.C. §§ 130 and 152.)

Conditioning

the

distribution

of

federal

highway

funding on the state's compliance therewith, the Secretary then
issued appropriate orders, standards and regulations requiring
the states to adopt various plans for implementation of projects
to

increase

grade

crossing

safety.

This

federal

regulatory

scheme incorporated the requirement that any determination of
need for grade crossing warning^ devices be made on the basis of
an

engineering

judgment

by

the

public

authorities

having

jurisdiction over the roadway at the crossing.
Pursuant to his statutory authority to condition the
grant of federal highway funding for the states (23 U.S.C. § 402;
23 C.F.R. § 1251.2), the Secretary issued regulations (23 C.F.R.
§ 655.601[a])(Addendum) which
Traffic

Control

Devices

for

adopted
Streets

the
and

"Manual

on Uniform

Highways"

as

the

"national standard for all traffic control devices installed on
any street, highway . . . open to public travel . . . " (23 C.F.R.
§ 655.603[a])(Addendum).
for

rail-highway

grade

More specifically, it is the standard
crossing

- ?4 -

improvements

pursuant

to 23

C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(Addendum). Part VIII of the MUTCD is devoted
to "traffic control systems for railroad-highway crossings," and
is specific in its requirement that the state authorities (not
railroads)

are

responsible

determination

of

rail-highway

grade

need

for

crossings.

for

surveying

upgrading

and

making

protection

(See, e.g.,

§§ 8A-1

the

at

all

and 8D-1

(Addendum), which specifically state that the determination of
need and selection of warning devices at a grade crossing is to
be "made by the public agency having jurisdictional authority.")
The national MUTCD (or a state's version, which must be
in substantial conformity therewith)(See, e.g., § 41-6-20 UCA) is
required under 23 C.F.R. § 655.603 (Addendum).

The same section

also requires [in Subsection (d)] the states to adopt the program
provided

for in Highway

Safety Program

Standard No. 13

(as

contained in 23 C.F.R. § 1204.4) which in turn requires that the
states "analyze potentially hazardous locations, such as . . .
railroad

grade

crossings

countermeasures."

Similarly,

and
23

develop

C.F.R.

appropriate

§ 924.9

(Addendum)

details multiple requirements and standards involved in state
planning for the identification of hazardous grade crossings, as
well

as

state

elimination.

programs
Other

for

improvement

subsections

of

projects

Part

924

for
detail

their
the

requirements for the implementation and evaluation components of
the safety program,

as well

as the requirements

reporting to the Federal Department of Transportation.

for annual
Moreover,

under

23

C.F.R.

specifically

§ 646.210

determined

that

(Addendum),

the

"[pjrojects

for

Secretary
grade

has

crossing

improvements are deemed to be of no ascertainable net benefit to
the railroads and there shall be no required share of the costs."
Finally, any doubts as to the preemptive shifting of
duty and responsibility to public agencies for improving grade
crossing safety were removed in 1987, when Congress exercised its
preemptive authority so as to protect the grade crossing data and
other information gathered by the states, by amending the Highway
Safety Act with the addition of 23 U.S.C. § 409 (Addendum), which
precludes the use, in both federal and state courts, of such data
compiled for use by the states in complying with the requirements
of the various highway safety acts.

Its enactment demonstrates

that Congress fully appreciated the fact that the federal laws
and regulations required the states to gather such data in order
to determine whether and to what extent grade crossings were in
need of additional warnings.

To ensure that responsibility was

carried out fully, and without fear of lawsuits, Congress enacted
that statutory prohibition in order to protect the reports and
data upon which the states make their required determinations.
E.

Recent Case Law Supports
Preemption Argument.

the

Public

Agency

Virtually all recent cases which address the issue of
the duty to regulate grade crossing warning devices hold that
public agencies, and not railroads, are responsible to determine

- 26 -

the need for and direct the installation of such devices.

For

instance, in Sisk v. The National R.R. Passenger Corp., 657 F.
Supp. 861 (D. Kan. 1986), the court stated as follows:
Then, in the 1970s, Congress, recognizing a need for
uniform safety standards, enacted the Railroad Safety
Act which imposed nationwide standards, reserving
authority to the states for further regulation only
under special circumstances.
In conjunction with
railroad
safety,
Congress
determined
that
grade
crossing
improvements
were
a
governmental
responsibility rather than the responsibility of the
railroads and increased funding to the federal aid
program.
647 F. Supp. at 863.

See, also, Easterwood v. CSX, 742 F. Supp.

676 (N.D. Ga. 1990); Tiley v. B. & 0. R. Co. (Miami County Court
of

Common

Burlington

Pleas

1990)(copy

Northern

Ry.

attached

in

Mont.

1988)

(D.

Addendum);
(copy

Nixon

v.

attached

in

Addendum); Singer v. Southern Railway Co. (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1989)
(copy

attached

in Addendum);

Flynn v. Howard

(copy attached in Addendum); Armijo v. ATSF

(D.C.N.D.

1989)

(D. N. Mex. 1990)

(copy attached in Addendum); Carpenter v. Conrail

(Ohio Ct. of

Common Pleas 1990)(copy attached in Addendum); Case v. Norfolk &
Western

(Ohio

Court

Addendum);

Mahoney

Addendum);

Kalthoff

(copy

attached

of

v.

Common

CSX

v.

Pleas

1990)

(copy

attached

in

(N.D. Ga.

1990)

(copy

attached

in

Burlington

in Addendum);

Northern

Bauqhman

v.

(D.

Conrail

Minn.

1990)

(Mich. App.

1990) (copy attached in Addendum).
The
considered

the

only

two

question

federal

appellate

whether

the
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cases

federal

which

grade

have

crossing

regulations preempt state law claims against railroads which are
predicated upon negligence in selecting or providing additional
highway warning devices have reached opposite conclusions.
decision
Northern,

of
720

now-Justice
F.2d

1149,

Kennedy
1154

in

Marshall

(9th

Cir.

v.

1983)

The

Burlington
held

that

preemption occurred when the state authorities approved the level
of protection at the crossing, whereas in Karl v. Burlington
Northern, 880 F.2d 68, 76 (8th Cir. 1989), the court ruled there
was no such preemption under such circumstances.
An analysis of the Karl decision clearly shows it to be
aberrational, as it ignores not only the preemption under the
express terms of the FRSA (when the Secretary issues regulations
covering the subject matter),
Congress

in enacting

but also the express intent of

the FRSA.

A careful

analysis

of Karl

clearly demonstrates that:
(a)

It is the only federal circuit decision which

holds that where the Secretary has issued regulations,
they are not preemptive under the FRSA;
(b)

Its citation of Marshall as authority for the

proposition that the FRSA "did not occupy the field of
railroad

safety

governance"

demonstrates

misunderstanding of the Marshall holding.

its

basic

The cited

portion of Marshall merely held that the FRSA did not
affect existing preemptive federal railroad laws (e.g.,
the Boiler Inspection Act).

In point of fact, Marshall

held the FRSA was preemptive
warning

devices

determination

when

as

to

as to grade crossing

the

state

agency

what

level

of

required for the crossing.

makes

the

protection

(720 F.2d at 1154.)

is

Since

the Karl crossing warnings had been improved by the
local agency (as Karl noted at 880 F.2d at 76), Karl
stands in direct conflict with Marshall* s holding as to
grade crossing preemption under the FRSA.
(c)

Karl* s comment on the absence of any "case

law or legislative history to support the theory that
Congress intended to completely occupy the field of
railroad

safety

governance,"

is

surprising,

as

it

demonstrates that the court completely overlooked the
express provisions of the FRSA, whether considered in
general, or considered with specific reference to grade
crossing safety.
circumstance

Moreover, its statement that "Neither

[expressed

or

implied

preemption]

is

present in this case" ignores the express preemption
provision

of

the

FRSA,

as

well

as

the

several

expressions of Congressional intent contained in the
legislative history of the FRSA.
Accordingly, with
submit is an aberration

the

exception

in the case

of Karl

(which we

law), recent decisions

uniformly hold that damage suits under state law which seek
recovery on the theory of railroad negligence in failing to

install adequate grade crossing warning devices are preempted by
federal and/or state law.
Therefore, Union Pacific submits that because the prior
state

law basis

for plaintiffs' claim

that Union Pacific

was

negligent in failing to provide additional warning devices has
been preempted by federal and state laws, which by statute and
regulation vest that duty in the state, plaintiffs' claim is not
actionable against the Railroad.
F.

The State of Utah, In Conformity With the Federal
Requirements, Has Effectuated a Shift of the Duty
to Provide Grade Crossing Warnings From the
Railroad to the Public Authorities.

As shown above, the State of Utah, in conformity with
federal

requirements,

determination

of

need

has
for

enacted

warning

laws

devices

concerning
at

railroad

the
grade

crossings, requiring the public authorities with jurisdiction of
the roadway (and not the railroad) to make such determination.
Not only do these laws conform with and complement the federal
requirements, they

constitute

a statutory

confirmation by

the

legislative branch, binding upon the courts, that such legal duty
has been allocated to the appropriate public authorities.
Moreover, UDOT has acknowledged its duty, as evidenced
by the affidavits of the UDOT officials submitted by the State in
the District Court proceedings.
state receives federal highway

Such officials confirm that the
funding provided

pursuant to the Highway Safety Act.

to the

states

They acknowledge that UDOT

performs the duties required of the state to survey railroad
crossings,

identify

those

crossings which

require protective

devices and implement a schedule for the installation of such
devices, as required under federal law.

Such affidavits likewise

show that the State of Utah, in accordance with § 41-6-20, has
adopted

the

Manual

on

Uniform

Traffic

Control

Devices

to

determine the type of warning devices to be used at railroad
grade crossings, and the MUTCD expressly delegates to the public
agencies having jurisdiction over the roadway the duty to make
the determination as to the adequacy of warning devices at any
railroad grade crossing.
In this situation, numerous courts, recognizing the
shift or assumption of duty pursuant to similar state statutes
enacted in response to the federal requirements, have held that
railroads

cannot

be

liable

for

failing

to

upgrade

additional warning devices at railroad crossings.

or

add

Callis v. Long

Island R. Co. , 372 F.2d 422 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 389
U.S. 827 (1967); Herold v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 761 F.2d
1241 (8th Cir. 1985); McNiff v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 560
S.W.2d 46

(Mo. App. 1977); South v. National R.R. Passenger

Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819 (N.D. 1980); Harrison v. Grand Trunk W. R.
Co., 413 N.W.2d 429 (Mich. App. 1987); Edington v. Grand Trunk W.
R Co., 418 N.E.2d 415 (Mich. App. 1987).
In McNiff, a wrongful death

action arising from a

railroad crossing collision, the court approved as a correct

statement of law, the following instruction which was given to
the jury:
The court further instructs the jury . . . that only
the Missouri Public Service Commission has the
exclusive authority to indicate when and where crossing
gates should be installed and erected and it is the
exclusive responsibility and exclusive authority of the
Missouri Public Service Commission to make that
determination.
560 S.W.2d at 48.
A similar issue faced the North Dakota Supreme Court in
South v. National R.R. Corp., supra., in which the court approved
the

following

instruction

regarding

the

railroad's

duty

to

install additional crossing protection:
You are instructed that the court finds as a matter of
law that the mere fact that Barrett Street intersects
the railroad does not raise any duty whatsoever on the
part of the railroad or any of the defendants to take
upon themselves the responsibility for installing
flagmen, gates, electric or automatic crossing signals,
stop
signs,
advanced
railroad
warning
signs,
modification of the crossing in any manner, or a
closure thereof. You are instructed that the court
finds as a matter of law that, with the exception of
the obligation upon the railroad to install and
maintain crossbucks, only the Public Service Commission
of the State of North Dakota can find a crossing extra
hazardous or unusually dangerous to life and property
requiring additional protection beyond the crossbuck.
290 N.W.2d at 826-827.
In a more recent case, Herold v. Burlington Northern,
Inc.,

supra.,

the

8th

Circuit

implicitly

upheld

the

South

decision.

In Herold, one of the contentions on appeal was that

the

District

U.S.

Court

erred

in

allowing

testimony regarding automatic crossing signals.

-

T?

_

certain

expert

The railroad

argued that from the testimony, the jury might have been given
the impression that the defendant railroad had a duty to employ
automatic signals.

The court rejected the argument by noting the

jury instructions expressly declared that the railroad had no
obligation to install any safety devices other than a crossbuck;
that only the state authorities could authorize additional safety
devices, and thus the jury could not hold the railroad liable for
negligence in failing to modify or close the crossing.
Other courts have similarly interpreted various state
statutes which provide that the state, and not the railroad,
shall determine the need for warning devices at railroad grade
crossings.

In Harrison v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., supra. , the

court, relying upon state statute, held that the railroad could
not be liable for its failure to install additional warning
devices where

there were no outstanding

authority to do so.

orders by

a public

The court further noted that the railroad

could not erect additional warning devices without permission by
the state.
The U.S. District Court, Northern District of Ohio,
reached the same conclusion in Nice v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,
168 F. Supp. 641 (1959) and held that the railroad had no duty to
install

automatic

signal

crossing

devices

or

flagmen

at

a

crossing in the absence of an order from the Public Utilities
Commission.

Thus, it is clear that the statutory scheme set forth
at § 54-4-14, et

seq. , vesting in UDOT the decision as to the

need for warning devices at railroad crossings, like those of the
various other states in the cases discussed above, confirms that
which is required under federal law and places the legal duty in
the state to make such decision so as to preempt actions against
railroads for failure to select and install such devices.
POINT II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO UNION PACIFIC ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE
CROSSING WAS MORE THAN ORDINARILY HAZARDOUS.
A.

The District Court was Correct in Ruling as a
Matter of Law that the Crossing was not
Extrahazardous.

If the crossing was not more than ordinarily hazardous
as of the date the accident happened, no duty existed to take
added precautions such as by installing automatic flashing lights
and/or gates.
This
whether

Court

a crossing

has

provided

guidance

is extrahazardous.

for

determining

In Bridges v. Union

Pacific R.R., 488 P.2d 738 (1971), followed in Hobbs v. Denver &
Rio Grande Western R.R., 677 P.2d 1128 (1984), the court stated
that if there are: (1) obstructions to view; (2) heavy vehicular
traffic; and

(3) "other conditions" which make the existing

protection devices "inadequate to warn the public of the danger,"
then a more than ordinarily hazardous crossing may be present
which

may

measures.

require

the

taking

of

additional

precautionary

The kinds of obstructions, traffic problems and "other
conditions" which might render a crossing extrahazardous are
described in earlier cases decided by this Court.

For example,

in Pippy v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 11 P.2d 305 (1932), and
Toomer^s Estate v. Union Pacific R.R., 239 P.2d 163 (1951), the
crossings were found to be more than ordinarily hazardous because
(1) the

railroads

oncoming

trains on an adjacent

crossing;

had

(2) there

created

were

obstructions
track

electrical

to view

of the

right up next to the
signals

present

at the

crossings which the drivers relied upon and which failed to work;
(3) the trains were speeding greatly in excess of a city-imposed
speed limit; (4) there was excessive noise being emitted by
adjacent

railroad

operations

which

tended

to

drown

out

any

warning signals being emitted by the oncoming train; and (5)
there were other circumstances which the courts held tended to
confuse the motorist into thinking it was safe to cross when it
was not, or made it impossible for the drivers to safely make
such a determination.
Obviously

none

of

these

factors

circumstances are present in this case.

or

confusing

It is undisputed that

the crossing was located in wide open country rather than in a
city or a populated area; that there were no obstructions to view
of any kind; that the train was not speeding and there were no
speed ordinances or restrictions violated; that the location of
the

trackage

and

the

approach

of

the

train

were

readily

observable from a substantial distance away from the crossing;
and

that

occurred.

the projected

increase

in vehicular

traffic

never

In short, there was absolutely nothing

"in the configuration of the land, or in the structures
in the vicinity, or in the nature or amount of travel
on the highway, or in other conditions, which
render[ed] the warning devices employed at the
[crossing] inadequate to warn [the occupants of the
accident vehicle] of the danger."
Bridges, 488 P.2d at 739.
The

determination

of

whether

a

crossing

is

extrahazardous is, in the appropriate case, initially for the
Court to make as a matter of law.

As state in Bridges, at p.

739,

a

the

Court

may

"authorize"

jury

to

consider

the

extrahazardous crossing issue only after it first determines that
there is probative, admissible evidence showing the existence of
such a crossing.
evidence,

it may

If the Court concludes that there is no such
rule

that

the

crossing

ordinarily hazardous as a matter of law.

is not more

than

This appears to be the

accepted rule which is followed in a number of jurisdictions,
e.g.,

Lerner

v.

Seaboard

Coastline

R.R.,

594 F.

Supp. 963

(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Sargent v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,
504 P.2d 729 (Ore. 1972); Walker v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.,
674 F.2d 1130, 1133 (5th Cir. 1982; Richards v. Southern Pacific
Transportation Co., 666 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1982); Missouri Pacific
R.R. v. Cooper, 563 S.W.2d 233 (Texas 1978); Seaboard Coastline
R.R. v. Sheffield, 194 S.E.2d 484 (Ga. 1972); Still v. Hampton &

Branchville R.R., 189 S.E.2d 15 (S.C. 1972); Chicago, Rock Island
& Pacific R.R. V. Gray, 453 S.W.2d 54 (Ark. 1970); Poole v.
Southern Ry. Co., 150 S.E.2d 175 (S.C. 1967); Hammarmeister v.
Illinois Central R.R., 117 N.W.2d 463 (Iowa 1962); Carlson v.
Southern Pacific Co., 346 P.2d 381 (Ore. 1959); and Union Pacific
R.R. v. Snyder, 220 F.2d 388, 390-1 (10th Cir. 1955) (applying
Colorado law).
Accordingly, it was proper for the District Court,
after reviewing the evidence and based upon its own evaluation of
the crossing itself, to rule as a matter of law that reasonable
minds could not differ that the crossing was not more than
ordinarily hazardous.

As stated by the Court at pp. 10-11 of its

Memorandum Decision (R. 479-478).
"While any railroad crossing can be hazardous, it is
hard to imagine a crossing that presents a smaller
hazard than the one in question before the Court.

probative

B,

The Crommelin Affidavit Does Not Raise Any Genuine
Issue of Material Fact.

The

Crommelin

evidence

Affidavit

because

it

cannot
relies

be
upon

considered
misstated

as
and

inadmissible facts in reaching the conclusion that the crossing
was extrahazardous, to wit:
1.

Volume of Vehicular Traffic.

The first and apparently most critical fact relied upon
by Crommelin is that "field study reports" (the UDOT surveillance
reports) show that "as many as 1,500 vehicles traversed the

railroad

crossing

distortion

of

the

per

day"

facts.

(R.
As

189).

This

explained

in

is

a

serious

detail

under

defendants' Statement of Facts, the UDOT records clearly show
that the 1,500 vehicles per day number was only an "expected" or
anticipated increase which never materialized.

The actual count

that Crommelin should have relied upon was closer to 580 vehicles
per day, or nearly two-thirds

less than the figure used in

arriving at this conclusion.
2.

Placement of the Advance Warning Sign.

As explained in Union Pacific's Statement of Facts,
Crommelin's interpretation of the MUTCD erroneously represents
the Manual as mandating that the advance warning sign should have
been placed 750 feet away from the crossing instead of the 305
feet where it was actually located.

A simple reading of the

MUTCD's applicable sections (§§ 8B-3 and 2C-3)(Addendum) clearly
shows that 750 feet is only a suggested distance and that the
actual distance may appropriately be less as long as such lesser
distance allows the driver enough time and distance to react and,
if necessary, maneuver.

The stopping tests performed by Trooper

Smith and Newell Knight clearly show that the lesser distance of
305 feet was more than adequate for such purposes.

Accordingly,

the sign was not misplaced or placed in violation of any federal
standard, and it was incorrect for Crommelin to so state and to
rely upon
conclusion.

such an incorrect

assumption

as a basis

for his

In any event, as noted by the District Court at p. 9 of
its Memorandum Decision (R. 450), placement of the sign at 305
feet

as opposed

to

750

feet

could

not possibly have been

a

proximate cause of the accident, since the undisputed facts show
that plaintiffs

totally

ignored

the warning

signs which were

clearly and readily noticeable at a distance of up to one mile
away from the crossing.
placement

of

the

sign

Plaintiffs offer no explanation of how
an

additional

445

feet

away

from

the

crossing would have made any difference with respect to how the
accident vehicle was operated as it approached the crossing.
3.

Other Accidents at the Crossing,

As

also

explained

above,

and

as

can

be

readily

concluded from even a cursory review of the accident reports, the
prior "similar" accidents at the crossing are, in fact, totally
dissimilar

in

their

material

aspects.

Accordingly,

if

Crommelin's conclusion was based in any material degree on such
an

erroneous

assumption,

the

conclusion

is

without

proper

foundation and, therefore, inadmissible.
4.
In
foundational

Inadmissibility
of
UDOT
Surveillance
Pursuant to 23 U.S.C. § 409.
addition

to

facts, the

the

above-mentioned

affidavit

also

Report

misstatement

improperly

of

relies upon

evidence which is statutorily inadmissible pursuant to 23 U.S.C.
§ 409 (Addendum).

The obvious public policy intent of 23 U.S.C. § 409 is
to promote candor between governmental officials and railroads
regarding applications submitted by state and local governments
for federal funds to enhance safety at railroad grade crossings.
If state

and

local highway

officials

and railroads must be

concerned that statements which they make and which can be used
in making applications for federal funds to upgrade crossings, or
in supporting data, will be used against them, either as direct
evidence or by way of an expert's opinion, as admissions in civil
damage

suits

based

upon

accidents

at

such

crossings,

such

officials will be inhibited in making any such statements or
applications or in preparing the underlying data used by the
federal officials in passing upon such applications.
Obviously, the rationale underlying 23 U.S.C. § 409 is
the same as that behind other evidentiary "privileges," such as
the privilege set forth in Rule 407, Utah Rules of Evidence,
which

precludes

the

admission

of

evidence

of

post-accident

remedial measures in personal injury cases, lest the remedial
measure be deemed an admission that the pre-accident, conduct,
product or condition was negligent or unsafe.
Plaintiff may argue that § 409 does not exclude use of
the evidence by an expert witness.

For the above same reasons,

Union Pacific submits that use of the phrase "for any purpose" in
23 U.S.C. § 409 ought to be held to refer to use of such reports
by an expert in formulating his opinion as well as to use of the

_

An

_

reports as direct evidence.

In view of the clear remedial

purpose for which the 23 U.S.C. § 409 was enacted, it doesn't
make sense to allow a party to get into evidence through the
"back door" of an expert's opinion what the statute prohibits
from coming in as direct, factual evidence.

The public policy

arguments against admissibility are just as valid in the former
case as in the latter.
The Crommelin Affidavit
upon

the

UDOT

reports

extrahazardous.

in

relies, albeit erroneously,

concluding

that

the

crossing

is

There is no question that the UDOT reports

reflect the results of an investigation which was undertaken to
determine

the

additional

appropriateness

and

feasibility

of

installing

crossing warning devices through use of available

federal funding.

Accordingly, neither the reports nor any of the

data contained therein can be relied upon either by way of
evidence

or

argument,

by

plaintiffs

in

support

of

their

contention, that the crossing was extrahazardous and/or that
Union

Pacific

was negligence

in not upgrading

the

crossing

warning devices.

POINT III. PLAINTIFFS MISUNDERSTAND THE PUBLIC POLICY AND
LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN THIS CASE.
A.

It is

axiomatic

"public

policy"

that not all

damages caused by the act of another have, or even should have, a
remedy, and that "accidents frequently occur, the consequences of

which the sufferer must bear alone."
Accordingly,

for

instance,

the

74 Am.Jur.2d Torts, § 13.

law

recognizes

unavoidable

accidents; a claimant is required to prove the elements of his
cause of action —

the mere showing of damages is not enough to

warrant recovery; and the State of Utah may not be sued without
its consent.
The fact that this tragic accident occurred and that
plaintiffs have undeniably suffered damages obviously does not by
itself make them legally

"worthy" to recover.

In fact, the

passengers' heirs have not been denied recovery for their loss,
since they earlier pursued their remedy against Patrick Duncan's
Estate, obtaining a substantial six figure settlement.
Pacific

submits

that

"public

policy"

considerations

Union
support

completely the disposition of this case thus far.
B.
intend §

Plaintiffs

argue

that

the Legislature

did not

54-4-14, et seg., to "abrogate the common law duties

imposed upon railroads to make and maintain
(plaintiffs' brief, p. 10).

safe crossings"

To the contrary, § 68-3-2 U.C.A.

(1986), specifically states otherwise:
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation
thereof are to be strictly construed has no application
to the statutes of the state. The statutes establish
the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which
they relate, and their provisions and all proceedings
under them are to be liberally construed with a view to
effect the objects of the statutes and to promote
justice. . . .

-

AO

-

C.
policy

in

Plaintiffs
defining

consideration:

Can

ignore

the
you

the

practicalities

railroad's
give

a

duty

party

a

corresponding right to control and implement?

must
duty

which

a

take

into

without

the

That is precisely

the dilemma the railroads would be placed in should the court
adopt the argument that Union Pacific had a duty to signalize the
crossing but no authority to implement that responsibility.
D.

On the other hand, if plaintiffs are arguing that

Union Pacific has the power to actually make changes in crossing
warning devices, regardless of the State's position, they are
also at the same time arguing for defeat of the very system of
uniform

traffic

regulation by UDOT which they admit is the

declared policy of this State.
E.

Union Pacific

submits

it would be bad public

policy to burden railroads with the duty of accurately predicting
accidents

at

crossings

(the

primary

basis

for

prioritizing

crossings for upgrading), and/or the duty of subsidizing the cost
of constructing warning device improvements at such crossings.
If the state is unable to always prioritize accurately, why
should the railroads, with less expertise and knowledge in the
area, be held to a higher standard?

Additionally, plaintiffs

overlook the official findings of the Secretary of Transportation
(23 C.F.R. § 696.210) that railroads do not benefit from such
upgrading projects, thus they should not have to bear the burden
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of paying

for them, especially

since they

already bear the

greater expense of paying for the ongoing maintenance costs.
F.

It is good public policy to impose a duty upon

railroads to operate trains and maintain rights of way safely,
and upon UDOT a duty to protect and regulate traffic at railroad
crossings.

This is so because railroads have expertise in train

operations and UDOT in traffic control, not visa versa; because
uniformity of traffic regulation is fostered thereby; and because
the limited funding that is available is thereby prioritized to
offer the greatest benefit to the public by being assigned to the
crossings which need the most attention.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Court
of Appeals should be affirmed on the grounds that:
1.

The Droubay Road crossing was not extrahazardous,

as a matter of law; therefore, Union Pacific had no duty to
install additional or different warning devices at the crossing;
and
2.

Union Pacific had no duty to install additional or

different warning devices because such responsibility is lodged
exclusively with the State of Utah pursuant to § 54-4-14, et
seq., and plaintiffs' claims of negligence against Union Pacific
for failing to make such installations or changes are thereby
preempted by both state and federal laws.
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STATUTES

(3) Whenever the department shall find that public convenience and necessity demand the establishment, creation or construction of a crossing of a
street or highway over, under or upon the tracks or lines of any public utility,
the department may by order, decision, rule or decree require the establishment, construction or creation of such crossing, and such crossing shall thereupon become a public highway and crossing.
(4) The commission shall retain exclusive jurisdiction for the resolution of
any dispute upon petition by any person aggrieved by any action of the department pursuant to this section.
History- L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 4, § 14; C.L.
1917, § 4811; R.S. 1933, 76-4-15; L. 1939, ch.
$4, $ 1; C. 1943,76-4-15; L. 1975 (1st S.S.), ch.
9, § 17.
Cross-References. — Change of grades and
crossings. § 10-8-34.

Cities, power to regulate tracks, $ 10-8-33.
Fences, cattle guards and street crossings,
§ 10-8-35.
Flagmen, grade crossings and drains,
§ 10-8-36

54-4-15.1. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Duty of
transportation department to provide.
The Department of Transportation so as to promote the public safety shall
as prescribed in this act provide for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of automatic and other safety appliances, signals or devices at grade crossings on public highways or roads over the tracks of any
railroad or street railroad corporation in the state.
History: L. 1973, ch. 118, S 1; 1975 (lit
S.S.), ch. 9, i 18.
Meaning of Nthis act*'. — The term "this

act," referred to in this section, means L. 1973,
ch. 118, §§ 1 through 4, which appear at §§
54*4-15.1 through 54-4-15.4.

54-4-15.2. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Funds
for payment of costs.
The funds provided by the state for purposes of this act shall be used in
conjunction with other available moneys, including those received from federal sources, to pay all or part of the cost of the installation, maintenance,
reconstruction or improvement of any signals or devices described in
§ 54-4-15.1 at any grade crossing of a public highway or any road over the
tracks of any railroad or street railroad corporation in this state.
History: L. 1973, ch. 118, { 2.
Meaning of "this act". — See note under
this catchline following § 54-4-15.1.

54-4-15.3. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Apportionment of costs by transportation department
— Liability of cities, towns and counties —
Claims for payment of costs.

STATUTES

54*4*14. Safety regulation.
The commission shall have power, by general or special orders, rules or
regulations, or otherwise, to require every public utility to construct, maintain and operate its line, plant, system, equipment, apparatus, tracks and
premises in such manner as to promote and safeguard the health and safety of
its employees, passengers, customers and the public, and to this end to prescribe, among other things, the installation, use, maintenance and operation
of appropriate safety or other devices or appliances including interlocking and
other protective devices at grade crossings or junctions, and block or other
system of signaling, and to establish uniform or other standards of construction and equipment, and to require the performance of any other acts which
the health or safety of its employees, passengers, customers or the public may
demand, provided, however, that the department of transportation shall have
jurisdiction over those safety functions transferred to it by the Department of
Transportation Act.
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art 4, $ 13; C.L.
1917, ( 4S10;R.S. 1933 AC. 1943. 76-4-14; L.
1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 9, i 16.
Cross-References. — Transportation department, § 63-49-1 et seq

Department of Transportation Act. —
The Department of Transportation Act, referred to in this section, is located mainly at
§$ 63-49-1 through 63-49-15

54-4-15. Grade crossings — Transportation department —
Commission — Regulation.
(1) No track of any railroad shall be constructed across a public road, highway or street at grade, nor shall the track of any railroad corporation be
constructed across the track of any other railroad or street railroad corporation at grade, nor shall the track of a street railroad corporation be constructed across the track of a railroad corporation at grade, without the permission of the Department of Transportation having first been secured; provided, that this subsection shall not apply to the replacement of lawfully
existing tracks. The department shall have the right to refuse its permission
or to grant it upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe.
(2) The department shall have the power to determine and prescribe the
manner, including the particular point of crossing, and the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection of each crossing of one railroad by another railroad or street railroad, and of a street railroad by a
railroad and of each crossing of a public road or highway by a railroad or
street railroad, and of a street by a railroad or vice versa, and to alter or
abolish any such crossing, to restrict the use of such crossings to certain types
of traffic in the interest of public safety and is vested with power and it shall
be its duty to designate the railroad crossings to be traversed by school buses
and motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire, and to require, where in its
judgment it would be practicable, a separation of grades at any such crossing
heretofore or hereafter established, and to prescribe the terms upon which
such separation shall be made and the proportions in which the expense of the
alteration or abolition of such crossings or the separation of such grades shall
be divided between the railroad or street railroad corporations affected, or
between such corporations and the state, county, municipality or other public
authority in interest.

The Department of Transportation, in accordance with the provisions of
§ 54-4-15, shall apportion the cost of the installation, maintenance, reconstruction or improvement of any signals or devices described in § 54-4-15.1
between the railroad or street railroad and the public agency involved. Unless
otherwise ordered by the department, the liability of cities, towns and counties to pay the share of maintenance cost assigned to the local agencies by the
department shall be limited to the funds provided under this act. Payment of
any moneys from the funds provided shall be made on the basis of verified
claims filed with the Department of Transportation by the railroad or street
railroad corporation responsible for the physical installation, maintenance,
reconstruction or improvement of the signal or device.
History: L. 1973, ch. 118. f 3; 1975 (1st
S.S.), fch. 9, i 19.

Meaning of "this act". — See note under
this catchline following I 54-4-15.1.

54-4-15.4. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Transportation department to provide costs in annual
budget.
The Department of Transportation shall provide in its annual budget for
the costs to be incurred under this act.
History: L. 1973, ch. 118. t 4; 1975 (1st
S.S.), ch. 9, I 20.

Meaning of "this mcT. — See note under
tame catchhne following § 54-4-15.1.
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NOTES OF DECISIONS
Costs of construction 1
R2d 424, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct 790,
Ferries 2
102 LEd.2d 782.
2. Ferries
1. Costs of construction
The establishment of ferries across
Insurance proceeds and interest to streams and on navigable waters, for
which state had title and which state normal transportation purposes as distransferred to Federal Highway Admin- tinguished from sightseeing, amusement
istration to obtain federal emergency re- and the like, is not a matter of purely
lief funds to reconstruct bridge were private right and function, but is a pub"cost of construction" within meaning of lie function permitted only by the constatute allowing state to collect tolls up sent, express or implied, of sovereign
to amount necessary to recoup state's authority. U.S. v. Washington Toll
contribution toward cost of construction Bridge Authority, D.CWash.1960, 190
of federally funded bridge. Clallam FiSupp. 95, reversed on other grounds
County v. Department of Transp., of 307 F.2d 330, certiorari denied 83 S.Ct
State of Wash., C.A.9 (Wash.) 1988, 849 724, 372 VS. 911, 9 LEd^d 71.

§ 1 3 0 . Railway-highway crossings
(a) Except as provided in subsection (d) of section 120 of this title
and subsection (b) of this section, the entire cost of construction of
projects for the elimination of hazards of railway-highway crossings, including the separation or protection of grades at crossings,
the reconstruction of existing railroad grade crossing structures,
and the relocation of highways to eliminate grade crossings, may be
paid from sums apportioned in accordance with section 104 of this
title. In any case when the elimination of the hazards of a railwayhighway crossing can be effected by the relocation of a portion of a
railway at a cost estimated by the Secretary to be less than the cost
of such elimination by one of the methods mentioned in the first
sentence of this section, then the entire cost of such relocation
project, exceot as provided in subsection (d) of section 120 of this
title and subsection (b) of this section, may be paid from sums
apportioned in accordance with section 104 of this title.
(b) The Secretary may classify the various types of projects involved in the elimination of hazards of railway-highway crossings,
and may set for each such classification a percentage of the costs of
construction which shall be deemed to represent the net benefit to
the railroad or railroads for the purpose of determining the railroad's share of the cost of construction. The percentage so determined shall in no case exceed 10 per centum. The Secretary shall
determine the appropriate classification of each project.
(c) Any railroad involved in a project for the elimination of
hazards of railway-highway crossings paid for in whole or in part
from sums made available for expenditure under this title, or prior
Acts, shall be liable to the United States for the net benefit to the
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railroad determined under the classification of such project made
pursuant to subsection (b) of this section. Such liability to the
United States may be discharged by direct payment to the State
highway department of the State in which the project is located, in
which case such payment shall be credited to the cost of the project.
Such payment may consist in whole or in part of materials and
labor furnished by the railroad in connection with the construction
of such project. If any such railroad fails to discharge such liability
within a six-month period after completion of the project, it shall be
liable to the United States for its share of the cost, and the Secretary
shall request the Attorney General to institute proceedings against
such railroad for the recovery of the amount for which it is liable
under this subsection. The Attorney General is authorized to bring
such proceedings on behalf of the United States, in the appropriate
district court of the United States, and the United States shall be
entitled in such proceedings to recover such sums as it is considered
and adjudged by the court that such railroad is liable for in the
premises. Any amounts recovered by the United States under this
subsection shall be credited to miscellaneous receipts.
(d) Survey and schedule of projects.—Each State shall conduct
and systematically maintain a survey of all highways to identify
those railroad crossings which may require separation, relocation,
or protective devices, and establish and implement a schedule of
projects for this purpose. At a minimum, such a schedule shall
provide signs for all railway-highway crossings.
(e) Funds for protective devices.—At least Vi of the funds authorized for and expended under this section shall be available for the
installation of protective devices at railway-highway crossings.
Sums authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section shall
be available for obligation in the same manner as funds apportioned under section 104(b)(1) of this title.
(f) Apportionment.—Twenty-five percent of the funds authorized
to be appropriated to carry out this section shall be apportioned to
the States in the same manner as sums are apportioned under
section 104(b)(2) of this title, 25 percent of such funds shall be
apportioned to the States in the same manner as sums are apportioned under section 104(b)(6) of this title, and 50 percent of such
funds shall be apportioned to the States in the ratio that total
railway-highway crossings in each State bears to the total of such
crossings in all States. The Federal share payable on account of
any project financed with funds authorized to be appropriated to
carry out this section shall be 90 percent of the cost thereof.
(g) Annual report.—Each State shall report to the Secretary not
later than December 30 of each year on the progress being made to
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implement the railway-highway crossings program authorized by
this section and the effectiveness of such improvements. Each
State report shall contain an assessment of the costs of the various
treatments employed and subsequent accident experience at improved locations. The Secretary shall submit a report to the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate and the
Committee on Public Works and Transportation of the House of
Representatives not later than April 1 of each year, on the progress
being made by the State in implementing projects to improve
railway-highway crossings. The report shall include, but not be
limited to, the number of projects undertaken, their distribution by
cost range, road system, nature of treatment, and subsequent accident experience at improved locations. In addition, the Secretary's
report shall analyze and evaluate each State program, identify any
State found not to be in compliance with the schedule of improvements required by subsection (d) and include recommendations for
future implementation of the railroad highwayl crossings program.
(h) Use of funds for matching.—Funds authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section may be used to provide a local
government with funds to be used on a matching basis when State
funds are available which may only be spent when the local government produces matching funds for the improvement of railwayhighway crossings.
(Pub. L. 85-767, Aug. 27,1958, 72 Stat. 903; Pub.L. 100-17, Title I, § 121(a),
Apr. 2, 1987, 101 Stat. 159.)
1

So in original. Probably should be "railroad-highway".

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports Demonstration Project, Railroad-High*
1958 Act. Senate Report No. 1928, see
way Crossings; Reports to President
1958 U^.Code Cong, and Adm.News, p.
and Congress; Appropriations Autho3942.
rization; Highway Safety Study; Re1987 Act Senate Report No. 100-4
K ^ T ^ o ^ S f T t u T S I*I A,., II

iS£wJT« l S
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Adm.News, p. 66.
Amendments
1987 Amendment Subsecs. (d) to (h).
Pub.L. 100-17 added subsecs. (d) to (h).
Demonstration Project Railroad-Highway Crossings; Inclusion of Projects
at Terre Haute, Indiana
Pub.L 94-387, Tide I, § 101, Aug. 14,
1976, 90 Stat. 1176, provided in part:
That section 163 of Public Law 93-87
[set out as a note under this section] is
hereby amended to include projects at
Terre Haute, Indiana".

l975 88 Stat

'

p^^
^
9Ar2ZQ
TiUc
§ HOfcMe). Ma* 5, 1976, 90 Stat 444;
f l * i ; . 9 " 9 2 r TltlcJJ ll4^}m(c)' N2X'
£ }97*> MSttL 2709;; PubJL 96^70,
Title II, § 209(b). Oct 19, 1980, 94 Stat
2245; Pub.L 97-424, Title I, § 151, Jan.
6, 1983, 96 Stat 2132; Pub.L 100-17,
Title I, §§ 133(c)(3), 148, Apr. 2, 1987,
101 Stat. 172, 181; Pub.L 100-202,
§ 101(0 [Tide III, § 346], Dec 22, 1987,
101 Stat 1329-358, 1329-388, provided
that
"(a) (1) The Secretary of Transportation shall enter into such arrangements
2282;
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by Pub.L 100-17. Tide I, § 125(a). Apr.
2. 1987. 101 Stat 166.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
American Digest System
Highway funds, see Highways **99XA.
Power and duty to maintain and repair, see Bridges *»21(1).
Encyclopedias
Federal aid for highways, see CJ.S. Highways § 176.
Power and duty to maintain and repair, see CJS. Bridges §§ 35 to 42.

WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH
Highways cases: 200k[add key number].
See. also. WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this volume.

§ 1 5 2 . Hazard elimination program
(a) Each State shall conduct and systematically maintain an engineering survey of all public roads to identify hazardous locations,
sections, and elements, including roadside obstacles and unmarked
or poorly marked roads, which may constitute a danger to motorists and pedestrians, assign priorities for the correction of such
locations, sections, and elements, and establish and implement a
schedule of projects for their improvement.
(b) The Secretary may approve as a project under this section any
highway safety improvement project.
(c) Funds authorized to carry out this section shall be available
for expenditure on any public road (other than a highway on the
Interstate System).
(d) The Federal share payable on account of any project under
this section shall be 90 percent of the cost thereof.
(e) Funds authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section
shall be apportioned to the States as provided in section 402(c) of
this title. Such funds shall be available for obligation in the same
manner and to the same extent as if such funds were apportioned
under section 104(b)(1), except that the Secretary is authorized to
waive provisions he deems inconsistent with the purposes of this
section.
(f) Each State shall establish an evaluation process approved by
the Secretary, to analyze and assess results achieved by highway
safety improvement projects carried out in accordance with procedures and criteria established by this section. Such evaluation
process shall develop cost-benefit data for various types of corrections and treatments which shall be used in setting priorities for
highway safety improvement projects.
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(g) Each State shall report to the Secretary of Transportation not
later than December 30 of each year, on the progress being made to
implement highway safety improvement projects for hazard elimination and the effectiveness of such improvements. Each State
report shall contain an assessment of the cost of, and safety benefits
derived from, the various means and methods used to mitigate or
eliminate hazards and the previous and subsequent accident experience at these locations. The Secretary of Transportation shall
submit a report to the Committee on Environment and Public
Works of the Senate and the Committee on Public Works and
Transportation of the House of Representatives not later than April
1 of each year on the progress being made by the States in
implementing the hazard elimination program (including but not
limited to any projects for pavement marking). The report shall
include, but not be limited to, the number of projects undertaken,
their distribution by cost range, road system, means and methods
used, and the previous and subsequent accident experience at improved locations. In addition, the Secretary's report shall analyze
and evaluate each State program, identify any State found not to be
in compliance with the schedule of improvements required by
subsection (a) and include recommendations for future implementation of the hazard elimination program.
(h) For the purposes of this section the term "State" shall have
the meaning given it in section 401 of this title.
(Added Pub. L. 93-87, Title II, § 209(a), Aug. 13, 1973, 87 Stat. 286, and
amended Pub. L. 94-280, Title I, § 131, May 5, 1976, 90 Stat 441; Pub. L.
95-599, Title I, § 168(a), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2722; Pub. L. 96-106,
§ 10(b), Nov. 9, 1979, 93 Stat. 798; Pub. L. 97-375, Title II, § 210(b), Dec.
21, 1982, 96 Stat. 1826; Pub. L. 97-424, Title I, § 125, Jan. 6, 1983, 96 Stat.
2113; Pub.L. 100-17, Title I, § 133(b)(12), Apr. 2, 1987, 101 Stat. 172.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
1982 Act House Report No. 97-804,
1973 Act. House Report No. 93-118 see 1982 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News,
and Senate Conference Report No. p. 3435.
93-355 see 1973 ILS.Code Cong, and
1 9 g 3 AeL
H o u s c R c p o r t N o 97 -555
Adm.News, p. 1859.
a n d H o u s c Conference Report 97-987,
1976 Act. House Report No. 94-716 see 1982 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News,
and House Conference Report No. p. 3639.
94-1017, see 1976 U^.Code Cong, and
i 9 8 7 Act. Senate Report No. 10CM
Adm.News, p. 798.
^ d House Conference Report No.
1978 Act. House Report No. 95-1485 1W-27, see 1987 U.S.Code Cong, and
and House Conference Report No. Adm.News, p. 66.
!^7'Seel«,8eU-S-C°deC0ngand
Adm-News.p.6575.
1979 Act Senate Report No. 96-333,
see 1979 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News,
p. 1813.

Amendment,
1987 Amendment.
Subsec (g).
Pub.L. 100-17 substituted "the Committee on Environment and Public Works of
the Senate and the Committee on Public
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§ 409* Admission as evidence of certain reports and surveys
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reports, surveys,
schedules, lists, or data compiled for the purpose of identifyingl
evaluating, or planning the safety enhancement of potential accident sites, hazardous roadway conditions, or railway-highway crossings, pursuant to sections 130, 144, and 152 of this title or for the
purpose of developing any highway safety construction improvement project which may be implemented utilizing Federal-aid highway funds shall not be admitted into evidence in Federal or State
court or considered for other purposes in any action for damages
arising from any occurrence at a location mentioned or addressed
in such reports, surveys, schedules, lists, or data.
(Added Pub.L. 100-17, Title I, § 132(a), Apr. 2, 1987, 101 Stat. 170.)
1

Probably should have a comma inserted.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
1987 Act. Senate Report No. 100-4
and House Conference Report No.

100-27, see 1987 U.S.Code Cong, and
Adm.News, p. 66.

LIBRARY REFERENCES
American Digest System
Power to regulate or prohibit, see Automobiles ^5(1) to 6.
Encyclopedias
Power to regulate or prohibit, see CJS. Motor Vehicles §§ 14 to 25.

WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH
Automobiles cases: 48ak [add key number]
See, also, WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this volume.

§ 4 1 0 . Drunk driving prevention programs
(a) General authority.—Subject to the provisions of this section
and to the extent provided in advance in appropriation Acts, the
Secretary shall make basic and supplemental grants to those States
which adopt and implement drunk driving prevention programs
which include measures described in this section to improve the
effectiveness of the enforcement of laws the purpose of which are to
discourage individuals from operating motor vehicles while under
the influence of alcohol. Such grants may only be used by recipient States to implement and enforce such programs.
(b) Maintenance of effort—No grant may be made to a State
under this section in any fiscal year unless such State enters into
such agreements with the Secretary as the Secretary may require to
ensure that such State will maintain its aggregate expenditures from
all other sources for drunk driving prevention programs at or above
406
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which the employer has its principal executive office, or for the District of
Columbia, to compel the Secretary to issue an order under this section.
The failure of the Secretary to seek relief under subsection (a) of this
section shall be reviewed solely under the standards of section 706 of Title
5.
(Pub.L. 91-458, Tide II, § 203, Oct 16,1970, 84 Stat 972; PubX. 96-423, § 3, Oct 10,
1980, 94 Stat 1811.)
Historical Note
1980 Amendment. Pub.L. 96-423 designated existing provisions as subsecs. (a) and (b),
substituted references to unsafe conditions or
practices or combinations of unsafe conditions
or practices or both for former references to
facilities or pieces of equipment in unsafe condition in subsec. (a) as so designated, and
added subsecs. (c), (d), and (e).
Effective Date of 1980 Amendment
Amendment by PubX. 96-423 effective Oct.

10, 1980, see section 17(a) of PubX. 96-423,
set out as a note under section 431 of this title.
Legislative History. For legislative history
and purpose of PubX. 91-458, see 1970 VS.
Code Cong, and AdmJfcws, p. 4104. See, also,
PubX. 96-423, 1980 U^.Codc Cong, and Adm.
News, p. 3830.

Code of Federal Regulations
Rules of practice—Federal Railroad Administration, see 49 CFR 211.1 et seq.
Special notice and emergency order procedures—Railroad track, locomotive and equipment see
49 CFR 216.1 et seq.

Notes of Decisions
Construction with other laws 1
Standards and procedures for relief

are enforceable only by the United States attorney. United Transp. Union v. Lewis, CA.
Ala.1983, 699 F2d 1109.

1. Construction with other laws
In light of the legislative history of the 1980
amendments to this section, practical interpretation of the broad phrase "conditions or practices," the need for flexibility in response to
life-threatening emergency situations, and the
lack of conflict between the exercise of the
Secretary of Transportation's emergency powers under this section and the United States
attorney's enforcement of the Hours of Service
Act, section 62 of this title, the Secretary's
emergency powers under this section to abate
unsafe conditions or practices extend to emergency situations involving a hazard of death or
injury to persons with respect to sleeping quarters for employees, even though the prescriptions of the Service Act, section 62 of this tide,
with respect to crew sleeping accommodations

2. Standards and procedures for relief
Order of Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration placing 30-mile-per-hour
speed limit on all trams carrying hazardous
materials over railroad's tracks, requiring that
railroad double the frequency of track inspections, and directing that railroad inspect on
foot all of track over which it transported
hazardous material violated due process
clause of U.S.CA.Const. Amend. 5 because of
its failure to specify the precise corrective
steps which railroad had to take to eliminate
unsafe condiuon in its trackage and thus obtain relief from order, and violated provision
of this section requiring that such an order
relate solely to a facility or piece of equipment
in unsafe condiuon. Louisville ii NJL Co. v.
Sullivan, D.C.D.C.1979, 471 F.Supp. 469.

§ 433.

Grade crossings and railroad rights-of-way; comprehensive study and recommendations of means of elimination and protection
(a) The Secretary shall submit to the President for transmittal to the
Congress, within one year after October 16, 1970, a comprehensive study of
the problem of eliminating and protecting railroad grade crossings, including a study of measures to protect pedestrians in densely populated areas
along railroad rights-of-way, together with his recommendations for appropriate action including, if relevant, a recommendation for equitable allocation of the economic costs of any program proposed as a result of such
study.
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(b) In addition the Secretary shall, insofar as practicable, under the
authority provided by this subchapter and pursuant to his authority over
highway, traffic, and motor vehicle safety, and highway construction,
undertake a coordinated effort toward the objective of developing and
implementing solutions to the grade crossing problem, as well as measures
to protect pedestrians in densely populated areas along railroad rights-ofway.
(PubX. 91^*58, Tide II, § 204, Oct 16, 1970, 84 Stat 972.)
Historical Note
Legislative History. For legislative history
and purpose of PubX. 91-458, see 1970 VS.
Code Cong, and AdnLNews, p. 4104.
Code of Federal Regulations
Special notice and emergency order procedures—Railroad track, locomotive and equipment, see
49 CFR 216.1 et seq.
Library References
Railroads «=»239 et seq.
CJS. Railroads § 432.

§ 434.

National uniformity of laws, rules, regulations, orders,
and standards relating to railroad safety; State regulation

The Congress declares that laws, rules, regulations, orders, and standards
relating to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation,
order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject
matter of such State requirement A State may adopt or continue in force
an additional or more stringent law, rule, regulation, order, or standard
relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an
essentially local safety hazard, and when not incompatible with any Federal law, rule, regulation, order, or standard, and when not creating an undue
burden on interstate commerce.
(PubX. 91-458, Title II, § 205, Oct 16, 1970, 84 Stat 972.)
Historical Note
Legislative History. For legislative history
and purpose of PubX. 91-458, see 1970 U.S.
Code Cong, and AdnLNews, p. 4104.
Cross References
Promulgation of rules, regulations, orders, and standards, see section 431 of this title.
Code of Federal Regulations
Special notice and emergency order procedures—Railroad track, locomotive and equipment, see
49 CFR 216.1 et seq.
State safety participation regulations, see 49 CFR 212.1 et seq.
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(2) Reconstruction of existing grade or its political subdivision to share in
separations; and
the costs.
(3) Grade crossing improvements,
(3) On projects for the elimination
(b) Other railroad-highway projects of existing grade crossings at which
are those which use railroad proper- active warning devices are in place or
ties or involve adjustments to railroad ordered to be installed by a State regufacilities required by highway con- latory agency, the railroad share of
struction but do not involve the elimi- the project costs shall be 5 percent.
nation of hazards of railroad-highway
(4) On projects for the elimination
crossings. Also included are adjust- of existing grade crossings at which
ments to facilities that are jointly active warning devices are not in place
owned or used by railroad and utility and have not been ordered installed by
companies.
a State regulatory agency, or on
projects which do not eliminate an ex§646.208 Funding.
isting crossing, there shall be no re(a) Federal-aid funding for projects quired railroad share of the project
which involve the elimination of haz- cost.
ards of railroad-highway crossings
(c) The required railroad share of
may, at the option of the State, be the
cost under § 646.210(b) (3) shall be
provided through one of the following based
on the costs for preliminary enalternative methods, within the qualigineering,
right-of-way and construcfications prescribed for each:
(1) "G" funding, as provided by 23 tion within the limits described below:
(1) Where a grade crossing is elimiTLS.C. 120(d) and 130;
(2) Regular pro rata sharing as pro- nated by grade separation, the strucvided by 23 UJS.C. 120(a) and 120(c); ture and approaches required to transition to a theoretical highway profile
and
(3) Funding authorized by 23 U.S.C. which would have been constructed if
405 and section 203 of the Highway there were no railroad present, for the
number of lanes on the existing highSafety Act of 1973.
(b) The adjustment of railroad facili- way and in accordance with the curties which does not involve the elimi- rent design standards of the State
nation of hazards of railroad-highway highway agency.
crossings may be funded through reg(2) Where another facility, such as a
ular pro rata sharing, as provided by highway or waterway, requiring a
23 UJS.C. 120 (a) and (c).
bridge structure is located within the
limits of a grade separation project,
§646^10 Classification of projects and the estimated cost of a theoretical
railroad share of the cost
structure and approaches as described
(a) State laws requiring railroads to in § 646.210(c) (1) to eliminate the railshare in the cost of work for the elimi- road-highway grade crossing without
nation of hazards at railroad-highway considering the presence of the watercrossings shall not apply to Federal- way or other highway.
aid projects.
(3) Where a grade crossing is elimi(b) Pursuant to 23 UJS.C. 130(b), and nated by railroad or highway reloca49 CFR 1.48:
the actual cost of the relocation
(1) Projects for grade crossing im- tion,
project,
the estimated cost of the reloprovements are deemed to be of no as- cation project,
or the estimated cost of
certainable net benefit to the railroads a structure and
approaches as deand there shall be no required railroad
scribed
in
§
646.210(c)(1).
whichever is
share of the costs.
(2) Projects for the reconstruction of less.
(d) Railroads may voluntarily conexisting grade separations are deemed
to generally be of no ascertainable net tribute a greater share of project costs
benefit to the railroad and there shall than is required. Also, other parties
be no required railroad share of the may voluntarily assume the railroad's
costs, unless the railroad has a specific share.
contractual obligation with the State
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964&212 Federal share.
(a) General. (1) Federal funds are
not eligible to participate in costs incurred solely for the benefit of the
railroad.
(2) At grade separations Federal
funds are eligible to participate in
costs to provide space for more tracks
than are in place when the railroad establishes to the satisfaction of the
State highway agency and FHWA that
it has a definite demand and plans for
installation of the additional tracks
within a reasonable time.
(3) The Federal share of the cost of
a grade separation project shall be
based on the cost to provide horizontal
and/or vertical clearances used by the
railroad in its normal practice subject
to limitations as shown in the Appendix or as required by a State regulatory agency.
(b) "G" Funds. (1) The Federal
sfoax*. ot t\\fc cask oi *. "G" fcuuted
project may be up to 100 percent of
the cost of preliminary engineering
and construction and 75 percent of the
cost of right-of-way and property
damage, except that the Federal share
shall be reduced by the amount of any
required railroad share of the cost.
(2) Projects for the elimination of
hazards of railroad-highway crossings,
either by crossing elimination, improvement, or the reconstruction of
existing grade separations, as described in § 646.206(a) are eligible for
"G" funding subject to the following
limitations:
(i) For a new or reconstructed grade
separation, the entire structure or
structures and necessary highway and
railroad approaches to accommodate
both vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
(11) Where another facility, such as a
highway or waterway requiring a
bridge structure, is located within the
limits of a grade separation project,
the estimated cost and limits of work
IOT & \,YteOT€ttoa\ starvrctottfe an& necessary approaches as in §646.212
(b) (2) (i) without considering the presence of the waterway or other highway.
(ill) For railroad or highway relocation the actual cost of the relocation
project or the estimated cost of a theoretical structure and necessary approaches to eliminate the grade

crossings) as in } 646.212(b) (2) (1),
whichever is less.
(iv) Grade crossing improvements in
(he vicinity of the crossing and related
work, including construction or reconstruction of the approaches as necessary to provide an acceptable transition to existing or improved highway
gradients and alignments, and advance
yarning devices.
(40 FR 16059, Apr. 9.1975, as amended at 47
f R 33955, Aug. 5, 1982; 53 FR 32218, Aug.
24,19881
$ 646*214 Design.

(a) General (1) Facilities that are
the responsibility of the railroad for
maintenance and operation shall conform to the specifications and design
standards used by the railroad in its
normal practice, subject to approval
py the State highway agency and
(2) Facilities that are the responsibility of the highway agency for maintenance and operation shall conform
to the specifications and design standards and guides used by the highway
agency in its normal practice, subject
to approval by FHWA.
(b) Grade crossing improvements.
(1) All traffic control devices proposed
shall comply with the latest edition of
the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways
supplemented to the extent applicable
W State standards.
(2) Pursuant to 23 UJS.C. 109(e),
^here a railroad-highway grade crossing is located within the limits of or
near the terminus of a Federal-aid
highway project for construction of a
Dew highway or improvement of the
existing roadway, the crossing shall
not be opened for unrestricted use by
traffic or the project accepted by
fHWA until adequate warning devices
for the crossing are installed and func(3)(i) "Adequate warning devices",
under § 646.214(b) (2) or on any project where Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the devices
*re to include automatic gates with
flashing light signals when one or
inore of the following conditions exist:
(A) Multiple main line railroad
tracks.
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(B) Multiple tracks at or in the vicinity of the crossing which may be occupied by a train or locomotive so as to
obscure the movement of another
train approaching the crossing.
(C) High Speed train operation combined with limited sight distance at
either single or multiple track crossings.
(D) A combination of high speeds
and moderately high volumes of highway and railroad traffic.
(E) Either a high volume of vehicular traffic, high number of train movements, substantial numbers of schoolbuses or trucks carrying hazardous
materials, unusually restricted sight
distance, continuing accident occurrences, or any combination of these
conditions.
(F) A diagnostic team recommends
them.
(ii) In individual cases where a diagnostic team justifies that gates are not
appropriate, PHWA may find that the
above requirements are not applicable.
(4) For crossings where the requirements of § 646.214(b) (3) are not applicable, the type of warning device to be
installed, whether the determination
is made by a State regulatory agency,
State highway agency, and/or the railroad, is subject to the approval of
FHWA.
(c) Grade crossing elimination. All
crossings of railroads and highways at
grade shall be eliminated where there
is full control of access on the highway (a freeway) regardless of the
volume of railroad or highway traffic.

(ii) An engineering consultant selected by the State after consultation with
the railroad, and with the State administering the contract; or
(ill) An engineering consultant selected by the railroad, with the approval of the State and with the railroad administering the contract.
(2) Where a railroad is not adequately staffed. Federal-aid funds may participate in the amounts paid to engineering consultants and others for required services, provided such
amounts are not based on a percentage of the cost of construction, either
under contracts for individual projects
or under existing written continuing
contracts where such work is regularly
performed for the railroad in its own
work under such contracts at reasonable costs.
(c) Rights-of-way. (1) Acquisition of
right-of-way by a State highway
agency on behalf of a railroad or acquisition of nonoperating real property from a railroad shall be in accordance with the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition
Policies Act of 1970 (42XLS.C. 4601 et
seq.) and applicable rnwA right-ofway procedures in 23 CFR, Chapter I,
Subchapter H. On projects for the
elimination of hazards of railroadhighway crossings by the relocation of
railroads, acquisition or replacement
right-of-way by a railroad shall be in
accordance with 42 UJS.C. 4601 et seq.
(2) Where buildings and other depreciable structures of the railroad (such
as signal towers, passenger stations,
depots, and other buildings, and equipment housings) which are integral to
operation of railroad traffic are wholly
or partly affected by a highway
project, the costs of work necessary to
functionally restore such facilities are
eligible for participation. However,
when replacement of such facilities is
necessary, credits shall be made to the
cost of the project fon
(i) Accrued depreciation, which is
that amount based on the ratio between the period of actual length of
service and total life expectancy applied to the original cost.
(ii) Additions or improvements
which provide higher quality or increased service capability of the facili-

[40 FR 16059, Apr. 9.1975. as amended at 47
FR 33955. Aug. 5.1982]
§ 646.216 General procedures.

(a) General Unless specifically modified herein, applicable Federal-aid procedures govern projects undertaken
pursuant to this subpart.
(b) Preliminary engineering and engineering services. (1) As mutually
agreed to by the State highway agency
and railroad, and subject to the provisions of § 646.216(b) (2), preliminary
engineering work on railroad-highway
projects may be accomplished by one
of the following methods:
(i) The State or railroad's engineering forces;
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§655.603 Standards.
(a) National MUTCD. The MUTCD
Subpart F—Traffic Control Dovicas on approved by the Federal Highway AdFodarol-Aid and Othor Stroots ministrator is the national standard
for all traffic control devices installed
and Highways
on any street, highway, or bicycle trail
80UBCC 48 FR 46776, Oct. 14,1983, unless open to public travel in accordance
with 23 UJS.C 109(d) and 402(a). The
otherwise noted.
national MUTCDis specifically approved by the FHWA for application
§655.601 Purpose.
on any highway project in which FedTo prescribe the policies and proce- eral highway funds participate and on
dures of the Federal Highway Admin- projects in federally administered
istration (FHWA) to obtain basic uni- areas where a Federal department or
formity of traffic control devices on all agency controls the highway or superstreets and highways in accordance vises the traffic operations.
with the following references that are
(b) State or other Federal MUTCD.
approved by the FHWA for applica- (1) Where State or other Federal
tion on Federal-aid projects:
agency MUTCDs or supplements are
(a) Manual on Uniform Traffic Con- required, they shall be in substantial
trol Devices for Streets and Highways, conformance with the
national
FHWA, 1988, as of March 1989. (This MUTCD. Changes to the national
publication is incorporated by refer- MUTCD Issued by the FHWA shall be
ence and is on file at the Office o! the adopted by the States or other Federal
Federal Register in Washington, DC. agencies within 2 years of issuance.
It may be purchased from the Super- The FHWA Regional Administrator
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- has been delegated the authority to
ment Printing Office (GPO), Washing- approve State MUTCDs and suppleton, DC 20402 and has Stock No. 050- ments.
001-81001-8. It is available for inspec(2) The Direct Federal Program Adtion and copying as prescribed in 49 ministrator has been delegated the auCFR Paii; 7, Appendix D).
thority to approve other Federal
(b) Standard Alphabets for Highway agency MUTCDs with the concurrence
Signs, FHWA, 1966 Edition, Reprinted of the Office of Traffic Operations.
May 1972. (This publication is incorpo- States and other Federal agencies are
rated by reference and is on file at the encouraged to adopt the national
Office of the Federal Register in MUTCD as their official Manual on
Washington, DC. This document is Uniform Traffic Control Devices.
(c) Color specifications. Color deteravailable for inspection and copying as
provided in 49 CFR Part 7, Appendix minations and specifications of sign
and pavement marking materials shall
D).
the
(c) Traffic Surveillance and Control, conform to requirements of
FHWA Color Tolerance Charts.2 An alFHWA, 23 CFR Part 655, Subpart D.
(d) Motorist Aid Systems, FHWA, 23 ternate method of determining the
color of retroreflective sign material is
CFR Part 655, Subpart G.
in the Appendix.
(e) Pavement Marking Demonstra- provided
(d)
Compliance—<1)
Existing hightion Program, FHWA, 23 CFR Part ways. Each State, in cooperation
with
920.
[51 FR 16834. May 7,1986, as amended at 53 agencies shall have a program as reFR 8626. Mar. 16, 1988: 54 FR 3004. Jan. 23, quired by Highway Safety Program
1989:55 FR 2374. Jan. 24,1990]
Standard Number 13, Traffic Engineering Services (23 CFR 1204.4)
§655.602 Definitions.
The terms used herein are defined in
'Available for inspection from the Office
accordance with definitions and usages of Traffic Operations, Federal Highway Adcontained in the MUTCD and 23 ministration. 400 Seventh Street. SW.,
Washington, D.C. 20590.
U.S.C. 101(a).
Subpart E—[Rasorvod]
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which shall include provisions for the
jvstematic upgrading of substandard
traffic control devices and for the installation of needed devices to achieve
conformity with the MUTCD.
(2) New or reconstructed highways.
Federal-aid projects for the construction* reconstruction, resurfacing, restoration, or rehabilitation of streets
and highways shall not be opened to
the public for unrestricted use until
all appropriate traffic control devices,
either temporary or permanent, are
Installed and functioning properly.
Both temporary and permanent devices shall conform to the MUTCD.
(3) Construction area activities. All
traffic control devices installed in construction areas using Federal-aid
funds shall conform to the MUTCD.
Traffic control plans for handling
traffic and pedestrians in construction
zones and for protection of workers
shall conform to the requirements of
23 CPR Part 630, Subpart J, Traffic
Safety in Highway and Street Work
Zones.
(4) MUTCD changes. The FHWA
may establish target dates for achieving compliance with changes to specific devices in the MUTCD.
(e) Specific information signs.
Standards for specific information
signs are contained in the MUTCD.
[48 FR 46776, Oct. 14, 1983, as amended at
51 FR 16834. May 7,1986]
§ 655.604 Achieving basic uniformity.

(a) Programs. Programs for the orderly and systematic upgrading of existing traffic control devices or the installation of needed traffic control devices on or off the Federal-aid system
should be based on inventories made
in accordance with 23 CFR 1204.4,
Highway Safety Program Standards.
These inventories provide the information necessary for programming
traffic control device upgrading
projects.
(b) Inventory. An inventory of all
traffic control devices is required by
Highway Safety Program Standard
Number 13, Traffic Engineering Services (23 CFR 1204.4). Highway planning and research funds and highway
related safety grant program funds
may be used in statewide or systemwide studies or inventories. Also, met-
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ropolitan planning (PL) funds may be
used in urbanized areas provided the
activity is included in an approved unified work program.
§ 655.605 Project procedures.
(a) Federal-aid highways. Federalaid projects involving the installation
of traffic control devices shall follow
procedures as established in 23 CFR
Part 630, Subpart A, Federal-Aid Programs Approval and Project Authorization. Simplified and timesaving procedures are to be used to the extent
permitted by existing policy.
(b) Off-system highways. Certain federally funded programs are available
for installation of traffic control devices on streets and highways that are
not on the Federal-aid system. The
procedures used in these programs
may vary from project to project but,
essentially, the guidelines set forth
herein should be used.
§ 655.606 Higher cost materials.

The use of signing, pavement marking, and signal materials (or equipment) having distinctive performance
characteristics, but costing more than
other materials (or equipment) commonly used may be approved by the
FHWA Division Administrator when
the specific use proposed is considered
to be in the public interest.
§655.607 Funding.
(a) Federal-aid highways. (1) Funds
apportioned or allocated under 23
U.S.C. 104(b) are eligible to participate
in projects to install traffic control devices in accordance with the MUTCD
on newly constructed, reconstructed,
resurfaced, restored, or rehabilitated
highways, or on existing highways
when this work is classified as construction in accordance with 23 UJS.C.
101(a). Federal-aid highway funds for
eligible pavement markings and traffic
control signalization may amount to
100 percent of the construction cost.
Federal-aid highway funds apportioned or allocated under other sections of 23 UJS.C. are eligible for participation in improvements conforming to the MUTCD in accordance with
the provisions of applicable program
regulations and directives.
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jU4^ Planning.
(g) The planning component of the
lilghway safety improvement program
Itudl incorporate:
(X) A process for collecting and
maintaining a record of accident, trafgc and highway data, including, for
railroad-highway grade crossings, the
characteristics of both highway and
train traffic;
(2) A process for analyzing available
data to identify highway locations,
lections and elements determined to
be hazardous on the basis of accident
experience or accident potential;
(3) A process for conducting engineering studies of hazardous locations,
sections, and elements to develop
highway safety improvement projects
is defined in 23 UJS.C. 101(a); and
(4) A process for establishing priorities for implementing highway safety
improvement, projects, considering:
(i) The potential reduction in the
number and/or severity of accidents,
(ii) The cost of the projects and the
resources available,
(iii) The relative hazard of public
railroad-highway
grade
crossings
based on a hazard index formula,
(iv) Onsite inspection of public grade
crossings,
(v) The potential danger to large
numbers of people at public grade
crossings used on a regular basis by
passenger trains, school buses, transit
buses, pedestrians, bicyclists, or by
trains and/or motor vehicles carrying
hazardous materials, and
(vi) Other criteria as appropriate in
each State.
(b) In planning a program of safety
improvement projects at railroadhighway grade crossings, special emphasis shall be given to the legislative
requirement that all public crossings
be provided with standard signing.
(c) The planning component of the
highway safety improvement program
may be financed with funds made
available through 23 U.S.C. 402,
307(c), and, where applicable, 104(f).
§924.11 Implementation.
(a) The implementation component
of the highway safety improvement
program in each State shall include a

process for scheduling and implementing safety improvement projects in accordance with (1) the procedures set
forth in 23 CFR Part 630, Subpart A
(Federal-Aid Program Approval and
Project Authorization) and (2) the priorities developed in accordance with
§ 924.9. The States are encouraged to
utilize the timesaving procedures incorporated in FHWA directives for the
minor type of work normal to highway
safety improvement projects.
(b) Funds apportioned under 23
U.S.C. 152, Hazard Elimination Program, are to be used to implement
highway safety improvement projects
on any public road other than Interstate.
(c) Funds apportioned under section
203(b) of the Highway Safety Act of
1973, as amended, Rail-Highway Crossings, are to be used to implement railroad-highway grade crossing safety
projects on amy public road. At least
50 percent of the funds apportioned
under section 203(b) must be made
available for the installation of grade
crossing protective devices. The railroad share, if any, of the cost of grade
crossing improvements shall be determined in accordance with 23 CFR Part
646, Subpart B (Railroad-Highway
Projects).
(d) Highway safety improvement
projects may be implemented on the
Federal-aid system with funds apportioned under 23 U.S.C. 104(b), and
with funds apportioned under section
104(b)(1) of the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1978 and section 103(a) of the
Highway Improvement Act of 1982, if
excess to Interstate System needs.
(e) Funds apportioned under 23
U.S.C. 219, Safer Off-System Roads,
may be used to implement highway
safety improvement projects on public
roads which are not on a Federal-aid
system.
(f) Major safety defects on bridges,
including related approach improvements, may be corrected as part of a
bridge rehabilitation project on any
public road with funds apportioned
under 23 U.S.C. 144, if such project is
considered eligible under 23 CFR Part
650, Subpart D (Special Bridge Replacement Program).
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yellow background. There are specific exceptions to this rule, some of
which are noted in the following sections. The allowance of these
exceptions shall not be construed as permitting deviations from the
standard messages where standard messages are applicable.
All warning signs having significance during the hours of darkness shall
have a fully reflectorized background or be illuminated.
The standard size for each warning sign prescribed herein is shown with
the illustration accompanying the specification. Where conditions of
speed, volume, or special hazard require greater visibility or emphasis,
larger signs should be used, with symbol or legend enlarged approximately
in proportion to outside dimensions. Sign sizes for various type facilities
can be found in Standard Highway Signs.*
To carry proper emphasis among large signs for other purposes, all
warning signs on expressways should be not less than 36 x 36 inches.
To permit the use of standard dies and templates the outside dimens.ons
of warning sign should ordinarily be in multiples of 6 inches. Letter
heights should be rounded to the nearest inch that will best fit the plate
used for legibility and appearance.
For use of educational plaques with symbol signs see section 2A-13.

2C-3 Placement of Warning Signs
Warning signs shall be erected in accordance with the general
requirements for sign position as described in Section 2A-21 to 29.
Since warning signs are primarily for the benefit of the driver who is
unacquainted with the road, it is very important that care be given to the
placement of such signs. Warning signs should provide adequate time for
the driver to perceive, identify, decide, and perform any necessary
maneuver. This total time to perceive and complete a reaction to a sign is
the sum of the times necessary for Perception, Identification/understanding, Emotion/ decisionmaking, and Volition/ execution of decision,
and is here referred to as the PIEV time. The PIEV time can vary from
about 3 seconds for general warning signs to 10 seconds for high driver
judgment condition warning signs. Table II-1 lists suggested minimum
sign placement distances that may be used for three conditions:

* Available from GPO. see page u.
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TABLE II—1—A Guide For Advance Warning Sign Placement Distance1
Posted or
85 percentile
speed MPH

20.
25.
K).
35.
40
45.
50.
55.
60.

Condition
A high
judgCondition
ment
B—Stop
needed* condition
(10 sees.
PIEV)
0
%

175
250
325
400
475
550
625
700
775

5

(44)
()

100
150
225
300
375
450
550

General warning signs1
Condition C—Deceleration condition to listed
advisory speed—MPH for desired speed at condition)
10

20

30

40

50

(4)

MOO
150
200
275
350
425
500
575

5

100 .
175 .
250
300
400
475
550

1

175
250 ..
325
'225
400
300
500
400

5

300

Typical Signs for the Laued Conditions in Table 11-1, Condition A—Merge. Right Lane Ends, etc; Condition B—Cross
Road, Stop Ahead. Signal Ahead, Ped-Xing, etc.. Condition C—Turn, Curve, Divided Road. Hill, Dip, etc.
1 Distances shown are for level roadways. Corrections should be made for grades. If 48-«nch signs are used, the legibility
distance may be increased to 200 feet. This would allow reducing the above distance by 75 feet.
2 In urban areas, a supplementary plate underneath the warning sign should be used specifying the distance to the
condition if there is an in-between intersection which might confuse the motorist.
3 Distance provides for 3-second PIEV, 123 feet Sign Legibility Distance. Bra km g Distance for Condition B and
Comfortable Braking Distance for condition C as indicated m A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets, 1984,
AASHTO. Figure 11-13.
4 No suggested mmmum distance provided. At these speeds, sign location depends on physical conditions at sue.
5 Feet

Condition A—a higher driver judgment condition which requires the
driver to use extra time in making and executing a decision because of a
complex driving situation; i.e., lane changing, passing, or merging.
Condition B—a condition in which the driver will likely be required to
stop; and Condition C—a condition in which the driver will likely be
required to decelerate to a specific speed. The table is provided as an aid
for determining warning sign location. The values contained in the table
are for guidance purposes and should be applied with engineering
judgment. The placement of temporary warning signs used at highway
construction and maintenance sites is covered in Part VI of this Manual
and the suggested minimum sign placement distances given in Table II-1
may not apply to that group of signs.
Other miscellaneous warning signs that advise of potential hazards not
related to a specific location may be installed in the most appropriate
locations since they are not covered in Table II-1. These include DEER
CROSSING and SOFT SHOULDER signs. Minimum spacing between
warning signs with different messages normally should be based on the
PIEV times for driver comprehension and reaction.
The effectiveness of the placement of any warning sign should be tested
periodically under both day and night conditions. Figure 2-5 (page 2A-17)
shows typical installations of standard warning signs.
2C-4 Turn Sign (Wl-1)
The Turn sign (W1-1R or 1L) is intended for use where engineering
investigations of roadway, geometric, and operating conditions show the
2C-2a
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Part VIII. TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR
RAILROAD — HIGHWAY GRADE CROSSINGS
A.

8A-1

GENERAL

Functions

Traffic control systems for railroad-highway grade crossings include
all signs, signals, markings, and illumination devices and their supports
along highways approaching and at railroad crossings at grade. The
function of these systems is to permit safe and efficient operation of rail
and highway traffic over crossings. Traffic control devices shall be consistent with the design and application of the standards contained
herein. For the purpose of installation, operation, and mainu iance of
devices constituting traffic control systems at railroad-high vay grade
crossings, it is recognized that any crossing of a public road and a railroad is situated on right-of-way available for the use of both highway
traffic and railroad traffic on their respective roadways and tracks.
With due regard for safety and for the integrity of operations by
highway and railroad users, the highway agency and the railroad company are entitled to jointly occupy the right-of-way in the conduct of
their assigned duties. This requires joint responsibility in the traffic
control function between the public agency and the railroad. The determination of need and selection of devices at a grade crossing is made by
the public agency with jurisdictional authority. Subject to such determination and selection, the design, installation and operation shall be in
accordance with the national standards contained herein.
8A-2

Use of Standard Devices

The grade crossing traffic control devices, systems, and practices
described herein are intended for use both in new installations and at
locations where general replacement of present apparatus is made, consistent with Federal and State laws and regulations. To stimulate effective reaction of vehicle operators and pedestrians, these devices, systems, and practices utilize the five basic considerations: design,
placement, operation, maintenance, and uniformity employed generally
for traffic control devices and described fully in section 1A-2.
8A-3

Uniform Provisions

All signs used in grade crossing traffic control systems shall be reflectorized to show the same shape and color to an approaching motorist
8A-1

both by day and by night. Reflectorization may be by one of the methods
described in section 2A-18.
Normally, where the distance between tracks, measured along thfc
highway^exceedsf 100 feet, additional signs or other appropriate traffic
confrof devices*8hould be used.
No sign or signal shall be located in the center of an undivided roadway except in an island with barrier curbs installed in accordance with
the general requirements of Part V with minimum clearance of 2 feet
from the face of each curb.
Where it is practical, equipment housing should provide a lateral
clearance of 30 feet from the roadway. Adequate clearance should also
be provided from tracks in order to reduce the obstruction to motorists
sight distance and to reduce the possibility of damage to the housed
equipment.
8A-4

Crossing Closure

Any highway grade crossing for which there is not a demonstrated
need should be closed.
8A-5

Traffic Controls During Construction and Maintenance

Traffic controls for street and highway construction and maintenance
operations are discussed in Part VI of this manuaL Similar traffic control methods should be used where highway traffic is affected by construction and maintenance at grade crossings.
Public and private agencies should meet to plan appropriate detours
and necessary signing, marking, and flagging requirements for successful operations during the closing. Pertinent considerations include
length of time for crossing to be closed, type of traffic affected, time of
day, materials and techniques of repair. Inconvenience, delay, and accident potential to affected traffic should be minimized to the extent
practical Prior notice should be extended to affected public or private
agencies before blockage or infringement on the free movement of vehicles or trains.
Construction or maintenance techniques should not extensively prolong the closing of the crossing. The width and riding quality of the
roadway surface at a grade crossing should, as a minimum, be restored
to correspond with the approaches to the crossing.

8A-2

8B-3 Railroad Advance Warning Signs (W10-1, 2, 3, 4)
A Railroad Advance Warning (W10-1) sign shall be used on each roadway in advance of every grade crossing except:
1. On low-volume, low-speed roadways crossing minor spurs or other
tracks that are infrequently used and which are flagged by train crews.
2. In the business districts of urban areas where active grade crossing
traffic control devices are in use.
3. Where physical conditions do not permit even a partially effective
display of the sign.
Placement of the sign shall generally be in accordance with Section 2C-3
and Seaions 2A-21 to 2A-27, normally 750 feet or more in advance of the
crossing in rural areas and 250 feet in advance of the crossing in urban
areas, except that in a residential or business district where low speeds are
prevalent, the signs may be placed a minimum distance of 100 feet from
the crossing. On divided highways and one-way roads, it is desirable to
erect an additional sign on the left side of the roadway.
The W10-2,3, and 4 signs may be installed on highways that are parallel
to railroads. The purpose of these signs is to warn a motorist making a
turn that a railroad crossing is ahead. Where there is 100 feet or more
between the railroad and the parallel highway, a W10-1 sign should be installed in advance of the railroad crossing and the W10-2,3, or 4 signs on
the parallel highway would not be necessary.

VIII-2 (c)

W10-1
36* Diamtter

VIII-2 (e)

W10-2

W10-3

W10-4

30" X 30"

30" x 30"

30" x 30"

8B-3
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D.

SYSTEMS AND DEVICES

8D-1 Selection of Systems and Devices
The selection of traffic control devices at a grade crossing is determined by public agencies having jurisdictional responsibility at specific
locations.
Active grade crossing traffic control systems range from
1. post mounted flashing light signals to
2. automatic gates combined with
(a) post mounted flashing light signals,
(b) cantilever flashing light signals, or
(c) combination of the above
Any of the foregoing may or may not incorporate a bell.
Due to the large number of significant variables which must be considered there is no single standard system of active traffic control devices universally applicable for grade crossings. Based on an engineering and traffic investigation, a determination is made whether any
active traffic control system is required at a crossing and, if so, what
type is appropriate. Before a new or modified grade crossing traffic
control system is installed, approval is required from the appropriate
agency within a given State.

8D-1

CASES
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DUNCAN v. UNION PACIFIC R. CO.
Cite at 790 P2d 593 (UuhApp. 1990)

tiornia court, where it found it was "dealing
with a litigant who not only has previously
failed to appear as ordered, but who up to
this very time remains a fugitive from justice. Apparently, he is unwilling to respond to a court order with which he disagrees, but seeks to obtain on appeal" a
more favorable result Tobin v. Casans,
128 CaLApp.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795
(1954).
We therefore hold that appellant has 30
days from the date of the issuance of this
opinion to bring herself within the process
of the trial court If appellant submits
herself to the trial court she should be
allowed an opportunity to offer alternatives
to the trial court to protect the judgment
Appellant may persuade the court it should
hold the disputed judgment amount in trust
until a resolution of this appeal on the
merits. However, if appellant persists in
secreting herself in violation of the trial
court's orders, her appeal will be dismissed
at the expiration of the 30-day period.
GARFF and ORME, JJ„ concur.
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Shelly Bowers; Sherry Bowers; Monica
Henwood, individually and as personal
representative of the Estate of Ramon
Henwood, deceased; Phyllis Henwood;
and Owen Henwood, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation; The State of Utah;
Paul Kleinman; and Does 1 through
100, inclusive, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 890291-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 12, 1990.
Heirs of victims of train-automobile accident brought action against railroad, Department of Transportation and railroad
engineer. The Third District Court, Tooele
County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., entered
summary judgment dismissing wrongful
death action. Heirs appealed. The Court
of Appeals, J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, held that (1) heirs failed to
establish that either engineer or railroad
were negligent, and (2) Department, having
given at least some warning or control at
railroad crossing, was governmentally immune in deciding whether to improve
means of warning or control at crossing
because of fiscal effects of decision.
Affirmed.
Jackson, J., filed a concurring opinion.

Lewis DUNCAN, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of
Patrick Duncan, deceased; Jason E.
Duncan, a minor by and through his
Guardian ad Litem; Alice Duncan: Noreen Duncan; Michael Duncan; Tim
Duncan; Kevin Duncan; Brian Duncan; Michelle Bowers, individually and
as personal representative of the Estate
of Jefrey and Nicole Bowers, deceased;
Judson Bowers; Florence Hanson;

1. Railroads <£=>348(1)
Evidence failed to support claim of
heirs of accident victims that there was
negligence in operation of train or entrusting its operation to engineer who was in
charge at time of automobile-train collision.
2. Railroads <3=>348(2)
Evidence did not support claim of heirs
of accident victims that railroad negligently
maintained railroad right-of-way at crossing with street where train-automobile collision occurred; there was nothing to indicate what could have made railroad's right-
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of-way safer to motorist crossing since
path of train was clearly visible to oncoming motorists.
3. Railroads e=>303(l)
Railroad has tort duty to maintain its
rights-of-way in condition safe to motorists
who traverse them at established crossings.
4. Railroads e»303(l)
Railroad is required to take precautions to prevent injury to motorists crossing railroad right-of-way if reasonable person in railroad's position would take such
precautions.
5. Railroads <s=*303(l)
In determining what is reasonable under the circumstances for railroad crossing,
every railroad crossing is hazardous but,
since it is not practicable to eliminate all
railroad crossings, simple existence of railroad crossing is not in itself a breach of
duty of care.
6. Railroads e»303(l)
For railroad to be liable for crossing
mishap, there must be something about
railroad's right-of-way that creates hazard
to motorist greater than hazard presented
by simple fact that railroad and street intersect
7. Railroads <3=>303(1)
Railroad is required to take every reasonable action to assure safety of motorist
who can reasonably be expected to cross
right-of-way and in determining what is
reasonable under circumstances of specific
case, trier of fact must ultimately weigh
burden on railroad, and indirectly on public,
of requiring added precautions, against
benefits that would be derived by public at
large from precautions.
8. Railroads e»307(2, 3)
It was not responsibility of railroad to
place signs and devices on public road
warning motorists of railroad crossing.
9. States e»U2(l)
Governmental immunity shields sovereign policy making and discretion from
state law damage claims by generally precluding damage liability for performance of

governmental function subject to certain
statutorily enumerated waivers.
10. Automobiles e=»277
Department of Transportation enjoyed
governmental immunity from liability in action brought by heirs of train-automobile
accident victims alleging that safety improvements at railroad crossing were inadequate. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-10.
11. Municipal Corporations <8=>724
Test for determining governmental immunity is whether activity under consideration is of such unique nature that it can
only be performed by governmental agency
or that it is essential to core of governmental activity, and under that test, court examines nature of activity itself, not identity
of person performing activity.
12. Automobiles <3=>279
Government may be held liable in tort
for failure to provide some effective warning or control for traffic at city intersection; however, duty to provide some effective warning or control must be distinguished from more than minimal maintenance and from enhancement of means of
providing warning and control.
13. Automobiles e»279
Highways e=»194
As long as warning or control signage
of clear hazard is in existence and maintained enough to give it minimal effectiveness, government is not liable in tort for
failure to better maintain or to enhance
signage.

Michael A. Katz (argued), Burbidge &
Mitchell, Salt Lake City, for appellants.
J. Clare Williams (argued), Larry A. Gantenbein, Salt Lake City, for respondents
Union Pacific R. Co. and Paul Kleinman.
Allan L. Larson (argued), Craig Barlow,
Anne Swenson, Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, R. Paul Van Dam,
State Atty. Gen., Stephen J. Sorenson,
Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent State of Utah;**"*. mwo; '
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Before BENCH and JACKSON, JJ.,
and BULLOCK,1 Senior District Judge.
OPINION

UDOT's prioritization of the State's railroad crossings to receive additional safety
improvements, such as electrified lights
and crossbars.

The heirs of the accident victims sued
J. ROBERT BULLOCK, Senior District
Union Pacific and engineer Kleinman for
Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal from a summary judg- negligent operation of the train, negligent
ment dismissing their wrongful death ac- maintenance of the railroad right of way at
tion arising out of a train-automobile colli- the Droubay Road crossing, and for entrusting operation of the train to an allegsion. We affirm.
edly unfit employee. The heirs also sued
Droubay Road is a two-lane thorough- the State, claiming that the safety improvefare running north and south in rural ments at the crossing were inadequate.
Tooele County. At one point, it intersects All of the defendants moved for summary
the Union Pacific Railroad tracks at ap- judgment, and the district court granted
proximately a 43-degree angle on the north their motions and dismissed the complaint
and a 136-degree angle on the south. Plaintiffs appealed.
Three roadside signs warn oncoming motorists of the crossing, one sign located
CLAIMS AGAINST UNION PACIFIC
about 300 feet from the crossing, and two
on either side of the road 19 feet from the
In defense against the motions for sumcrossing. There are no flashing lights or mary judgment, the plaintiffs filed an affimechanical devices at the crossing to warn davit of one Robert Crommelin, a traffic
of an approaching train, but nothing ob- safety engineer. In Crommelin's opinion,
structs a motorist's view of the tracks for "the warning signs present at the crossing
several thousand feet.
were clearly inadequate" and "the intersecOn the evening of April 9, 1983, at about tion [was] clearly 'extra hazardous/ " The
8:50 p.m., a Union Pacific train operated by district court, however, struck Crommelin's
Paul Kleinman struck an automobile and affidavit on the grounds that 23 U.S.C.
killed all four occupants of the vehicle at § 409 (Supp.1989) forbade admission into
the Droubay Road crossing. There is no evidence of the factual basis for Crommeevidence to indicate that the train was neg- lin's conclusions, and Utah Rule of Civil
ligently or improperly operated, and its Procedure 56(e) permits only affidavits
headlight, warning bells, and whistles were which state "such facts as would be admisactivated well in advance of the crossing. sible in evidencef.]" Crommelin's opinion
The engineer, Kleinman, averred that he was based partly on information gained
saw the car approach the crossing but be- from UDOT's records of the Droubay Road
lieved that it would stop. When it became crossing. To facilitate candor in adminisapparent that the car was not going to trative evaluations of highway safety hazstop, it was too late for him to stop the ards, 23 U.S.C. § 409 prevents a court from
train.
receiving records of such evaluations into
2
The Utah Department of Transportation evidence. Therefore, under this federal
(UDOT) periodically evaluated the Droubay statute, the documents from which
Road crossing in planning the allocation of Crommelin obtained a large part of the
its resources, including federal funding, for data used in reaching his conclusions were
state-wide highway improvements. Under inadmissible.
the methods used at the time, the Droubay
Road crossing did not rank high enough in

On that basis, the district court struck
Crommelin's affidavit However, the dis-

1* J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1989).

2. The legislative purpose of section 409 can be
gleaned from H.Conf.Rep. No. 100-27, 104th
Cong. 1st Sess. 172-173, reprinted in 1987 U.S.
Code Cong. & AdmiruNews 66, 156-57.
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condition safe to motorists who traverse
them at established crossings.4 However
there seems to be a \ack oi ciarity about
the standard of care required of the railroad in the observance of this duty, and
this apparent lack of clarity has led to
some criticism of the Utah standard of care
as it was understood.5 Since we must ap[1] Even if Crommelin's affidavit is con- ply a standard of care in determining
sidered, plaintiffs did not show that Union whether Union Pacific breached its duty,
Pacific breached any duty of care in the we attempt to state clearly the extent to
collision at the Droubay Road crossing. which a railroad must make its right of
Plaintiffs alleged negligence in the opera- way safe for motorists to cross.
tion of the train by Kleinman and, through
[4] The confusion concerning the stanrespondeat superior, by Union Pacific, as
dard
of care centers in the meaning of the
well as negligence by Union Pacific in emwords
"more than ordinarily hazardous,"
ploying an unfit train operator and in mainwhich
were
used in applying the standard
taining its right of way. Plaintiffs also
of
care
in
two
Utah cases, Bridges v. Unsought punitive damages from Union Pacifion
Pacific
R.R.
Co., 26 Utah 2d 281, 488
ic for willful and reckless conduct. PlainP.2d
738
(1971),
and
English v. Southern
tiffs introduced no evidence to show that
Pacific
Co.,
13
Utah
407, 45 P. 47 (1896).
the train was negligently operated, much
These
words
were
never
intended to impose
less that the collision was willfully and
a
standard
of
care
higher
than ordinary
recklessly caused, and no evidence to show
care,
the
degree
of
care
exercised
by a
that Kleinman was unfit to operate the
reasonable
person
under
the
circumstanctrain. Kleinman avers that he operated the
6
train properly. Of course, Kleinman's tes- es. Thus, the railroad is required to take
timony is biased, and there are no known precautions to prevent injury to crossing
witnesses surviving the crash other than motorists if a reasonable person in the railUnion Pacific employees. Nevertheless, road's7 position would take such precaulacking any evidence to the contrary, we tions.
conclude that plaintiffs failed to show neg[5,6] In determining what is reasonable
ligence in operating the train or in entrust- under the circumstances of a railroad
ing its operation to Kleinman.3
crossing, it is obvious that every railroad
crossing is hazardous, but, since it is not
[2] The only claim against Union Pacif- practicable to eliminate all railroad crossic on which evidence was introduced was ings, the simple existence of a railroad
the claim for negligent maintenance of the crossing is not in itself a breach of a duty
railroad right of way, which is supported, of care. Much of everyday life presents
from plaintiffs' point of view, by Cromme- hazards; driving or walking along a street
lin's affidavit We therefore proceed to are hazardous, and so are stairs, electricity,
consider this claim.
and many other things, but we tolerate
those
hazards because of the impracticabili[3] It is settled that a railroad has a
ty
of
eliminating them. In determining
tort duty to maintain its rights of way in a
trict court also ruled that, even if the affidavit were considered, the case should be
dismissed on its merits. Faced with these
alternative grounds for the same result, we
choose on appeal in this case to rest our
decision on the merits. We will thus take
Crommelin's opinion at face value.

3. See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving Co. v. 6. English, 45 P. at 50.
Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989);
Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co., 7. See Meese v. Brigham Young Univ., 639 P.2d
771 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
720 (Utah 1981); Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 16
4. Cleave v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., Utah 2d 81, 395 P~2d 918 (1964); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 283 (1965).
749 ?2d 660, 662-64 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
5. Wilde v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R. Co., No.
C-83-149J, slip op. at 16, 1985 WL17370 (D.Ut.
April 3, 1985).
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whether a mishap involving one of those The imposition of a tort duty on the railhazards is tortious, the question is not road to remove or maintain the vegetation
whether a hazard existed, but rather was therefore clearly correct.
whether, under prevailing community stan[8] In this case, there is nothing to indidards, the defendant should bear the responsibility to discover and ameliorate a cate what could have made Union Pacific's
hazard, in light of the practicability of do- right of way safer to motorists crossing on
ing so and the costs and benefits to society Droubay Road. The path of the train is
of requiring the defendant so to act.8 In clearly visible to oncoming motorists.
the case of railroad crossings, the cost of Plaintiffs suggest that Union Pacific
eliminating the hazard, such as by install- should have placed warning signs and deing overpasses at all railroad crossings, vices on Droubay Road, including automatincluding rural ones, does not warrant a ic gates blocking traffic on the Road from
duty of care so rigorous that simply having crossing the tracks when a train was apa railroad cross a street is tortious. Rath- proaching. It is not, however, the responer, for a railroad to be liable for a crossmg sibility of the railroad to place signs and
mishap, there must be something about the devices on the public road. The railroad
railroad's right of way that creates a haz- must maintain its owr right of way, but it
ard to motorists greater than the hazard is not under any dutv to place signs or
presented by the simple fact that the raildevices on the public roaa.
road and the street intersect.
The design and maintenance of state
[7] In determining what is reasonable
roads and the control of traffic on state
to require of a railroad in its tort liability
roads are UDOT's responsibilities and prefor crossings, it would thus be error to hold
rogatives.10 At common law, this responsithat the railroad right of way cannot cross
bility at railroad crossings was shared with
a street. However, for such a crossing, the
the
railroad.11 Thus, in English, the railrailroad is required to take every reasonable action to assure the safety of motor- road was found liable for failing to flag
ists who can reasonably be expected to motorists on an intersecting city street.
cross the right of way. In determining Since English, however, UDOT has been
what is reasonable under the circumstances established, and the Legislature invested
of a specitic case, the trier of fact must UDOT with "power to determine and pre. . . of ... protection of
ultimately weigh the burden on the rail- scribe the manner
12
each
crossing."
Although
that responsiroad, and indirectly on the public, of requirbility
in
no
way
reduces
the
railroad's reing added precautions, against the benefits
sponsibility
to
maintain
its
right
of way,13 it
that would be derived by the public at large
from such precautions. For example, in would nevertheless, under ordinary circumthe Gleave case,9 wild vegetation on the stances, place the railroad in the role of
right of way obscured oncoming trains meddler, trespasser, or usurper if the railfrom motorists at the crossing. The cost road were to put signs on the public road
of removing or maintaining the vegetation or forbid traffic on the public road from
was minimal compared to the enormous crossing its right of way. Union Pacific
benefit to the public of being able to see an therefore had no duty to place signs or
approaching train at a frequent crossing. roadblocking devices on Droubay Road,
ft. See Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 11. Although we hold that the railroad does not
have authority or responsibility to place signs or
31, 232 P.2d 210, 31 AXJUd 177 (1951); Wagroadblocks on the public road, we note that the
oner v. Waterslide, Inc., 744 P.2d 1012, 1013
cost of protecting users of the public road con(Utah App.1987).
tinues to be shared with the railroad pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-153 (1990).
9. Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co.,
749 ?2d 660, 662-64 (Utah 1988).
12. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15(2) (1990).
v

10. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1 (1990).

13. Gleave, 749 P.2d at 664.
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and it is not liable in tort for its failure too
do so.

Bowen came after the pathbreaking Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d
1230 (Utah 1980), but did not cite Standiford or refer to its test for "governmental
function," the threshold of governmental
immunity analysis. Standiford held that
the test for determining governmental immunity is "whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that it
can only be performed by a governmental
agency or that it is essential to the core of
governmental activity." Standiford, 605
P.2d at 1236-37. Under this test, we examine the nature of the activity itself, not the
identity of the person performing the activity. In this case, for example, the activity
in question consists of designing and maintaining a road. It would make the analysis
tautological to define the activity as designing and maintaining a public or governmental road.16

CLAIMS AGAINST UDOT
[9,10] Governmental
immunity
iss
UDOTs principal defense w against plain-tiffs. Governmental immunity shields sov-'ereign policy-making and discretion fromi
state-law damage claims by generally preeluding damage liability for performance off
a governmental function, subject to certaini
statutorily enumerated waivers.15
Resolution of the governmental immuni-.
ty question in this case is controlled byr
Gleave, which held that UDOT was govern-.
mentally immune in determining the precise method to be used in warning personsi
on a public road approaching a railroad[
crossing. We follow Gleave, and hold that:
UDOT is immune in this case. We add,
however, a few comments to address the\
particular arguments of counsel in this
As Judge Jackson points out in his sepacase.
rate concurring opinion, the absence in
[11] Plaintiffs cite Bowen v. Riverton Bowen of a reference to Standiford could
City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) in an at- simply be a result of the procedural postempt to avoid governmental immunity. In ture of the Bowen case. Possibly the only
Bowen, the Utah Supreme Court reversed issues before the court in Bowen were the
a summary judgment in favor of Riverton elements of Bowen's prima facie case, and
in a tort action. Bowen asserted that a the court did not reach the issue of governstop sign at a busy Riverton intersection mental immunity because it is a defense,
was lying on the ground as Bowen and rather than an element of the prima facie
another vehicle collided in the intersection. case. However, Bowen's emphasis on Riv-

14. We logically do not reach the affirmative
lmmumty of officials is not m issue, nor have
defense of governmental immunity without first
plaintiffs raised constitutional arguments such
determining or presuming that a plaintiff has
as those considered in Condemann v. University
established a pnma facie case. See Ferree v.
Hospital 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989).
State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989). However, while UDOTs pnma facie liability was 16. In adopting its test for governmental funcperhaps implicitly presumed in the distnet
tion, Standiford renounced the earlier governcourt's reasoning, the district court did not exmental/proprietary distinction because of inpressly review plaintiffs' pnma facie claim
consistencies that had developed over the course
against UDOT. We are reluctant to delve into
of its application.
an issue on which the trial court has not exLike the Standiford test, the governmenpressly ruled, for the reasons explained in Zions
tal/proprietary distinction was originally meant
First Natl Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co.,
to restnet the application of governmental im749 ?2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988). Therefore, we
munity. However, m time, the governmenchoose to rest our decision on governmental
tal/proprietary analysis degenerated from real
immunity and presume for purposes of arguthought of its meaning to simple categorization
ment (but do not hold) that the plaintiffs have
of the activity in question as involving a golf
stated a pnma facie case of negligence by
course, a park, a hospital, etc To some extent,
UDOT. See Kirk v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 1255
the same consequences can result from a facile
(Utah App.1989).
categorization approach under the Standiford
test. We therefore decline to make an entry in
15. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1989).
a laundry list of governmental functions per se,
The scope of the governmental immunity issue
eliminating all thought in future cases of the
in this case is limited. Plaintiffs have not sued
basic test established in Standiford.
any governmental personnel, and therefore, the
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niton's duty to maintain streets becomes
rather disingenuous lip service if Riverton
had a viable defense of governmental immunity against all liability based on that
'duty. While procedurally it is important to
observe the distinction between plaintiffs
prima facie case and defendant's defenses,
in a more basic sense, what is ultimately
important is the scope of governmental responsibility, which, in a well-pleaded case,
is a function both of prima facie liability
and available defenses. It would also seem
to be a waste of resources to reverse and
remand Bowen for a trial on the negligence
question if there was no way for Bowen to
recover due to governmental immunity.
[12,13] Bowen's emphasis on the
government's duty in tort to assure safe
streets is entirely consistent with Standiford, if we accept the premise that the
decision whether to exert any control at all
over intersecting traffic is not a governmental function giving rise to immunity
from tort liability. In other words, the
government may be held liable in tort to
provide some effective warning or control
for traffic at a city intersection. However,
the duty to provide some effective warning
or controi must be distinguished from more
than minimal maintenance and from enhancement of the means of providing warning and control. The case of Richards v.
LeawtU 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) required compliance with the notice
requirements of governmental immunity
for a claim based on allegedly inadequate
maintenance of a stop sign. From a comparison of Bowen and Richards and in
light of Gleave, we conclude that as long as
warning or control signage of a clear hazard is in existence and maintained enough
to give it minimal effectiveness, the

In this case, we are not presented with a
lack of any effective control of traffic,
since there are three signs on Droubay
Road where it approaches the railroad.
The basis asserted here for recovery
against UDOT is its failure to better warn

17. Not every governmental activity that affects
the public fisc is a governmental function.
Clearly nongovernmental functions, such as
providing utility services or recreation, or serving process, may be financed in part by funds
obtained through governmental revenue exactions, and liability incurred in performing those
functions will be satisfied out of the public
treasurv. See Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165
(Utah 1988); Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary Dtst., 676 P.2d 399 (Utah 1984); Thomas v.
Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982); Johnson v. Salt Lake city Corp., 629 P.2d 432 (Utah

1981). However, the sources of funds to conduct the activity or to pay an eventual judgment
do not determine whether the activity in question is a governmental function. In this case,
disregarding the fact that the funds for railroad
crossings may denve in part from public
sources, we are nevertheless left with an overndingly fiscal question: How much to spend on
each railroad crossing that could be improved.
We believe that the governmental budgeting and
spending involved in deciding how to improve
the safety of railroad crossings suffice to make
that decision a governmental function.

government is not liable in tort for its
failure to better maintain or to enhance the
signage. If the signage has some cognizable effect in warning or controlling traffic
at a clear hazard, its maintenance and improvement are governmental functions for
which the government is immune from suit
in Utah courts.
Highway maintenance and improvement
are predominately " fiscal matters. Every
highway could probably be made safer by
further expenditures, but we will not hold
UDOT (and implicitly, the legislature) negligent for having to strike a difficult balance between the need for greater safety
and the burden of funding improvements.
As we pointed out in Gleave, and as UDOT
emphasizes here, there are hundreds of
unelectrified railroad crossings in Utah,
and it is not fiscally feasible to equip them
all with the best possible means of assuring traffic safety. Rather, UDOT prioritizes the crossings in allocating the limited
funds available for crossing improvements.
The role of the judiciary in that prioritization and allocation process is strictly limited. In a case seeking judicial review of
that administrative process, we would exercise our reviewing function with deference
to the administrative agency under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. However, in a tort action such as this, the
deference to a governmental function is
absolute unless waived, and we do not review it at all under tort principles.
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and control traffic at the crossing. Since
we have concluded that UDOT is immune
for its failure to do more than minimal
warning and control, we hold that plaintiffs
cannot recover against UDOT or the State.
CONCLUSION
We therefore hold in this case that, even
considering the Crommelin affidavit and
considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, they failed to
show any negligence by Union Pacific in
the design and maintenance of its right of
way. Union Pacific is not responsible for
controlling traffic on state roads, and the
state, having given at least some warning
or control at this railroad crossing, is governmentally immune in deciding whether to
improve the means of warning or control at
the crossing because of the fiscal effects of
such a decision.
Thus, these plaintiffs have not shown
negligence by the railroad in the accident
at this crossing, where the oncoming train
was clearly visible from a lengthy distance
on the road toward the crossing, and the
train was not shown to have been negligently operated. Signs notified approaching drivers of the crossing, but UDOT is
not liable for not having expended more
funds in making more extensive safety improvements that might have prevented the
accident. The net effect of this holding is
that if the railroad's right of way does not
negligently obscure an oncoming train, the
train is properly operated, and if some visible warning sign age is present on the
public road, then the plaintiff is not entitled
to relief in tort for an injury at the crossing. We do not consider this outcome to be
harsh or unjust, although any tragedy in
which life is lost or impaired is regrettable,
whatever the cause.
The dismissal of the plaintiffs' case is
affirmed.
BENCH, J., concurs.
JACKSON, Judge (concurring):
Although I concur in the result reached
by the majority and in most of its analysis,
I write separately to disassociate myself

from the faulty analysis of the governmental immunity issue. Contrary to the majority's characterization, supra at 6, UDOTs
general activity in this case does not consist of "designing and maintaining a road."
It consists of the installation and improvement of traffic safety devices and signs at
railroad crossings. As for the specific,
purportedly negligent act by UDOT, plaintiffs in this case alleged that UDOT negligently failed to install a different, presumably safer, kind of traffic warning device at
a railroad crossing. The same claims were
raised by the plaintiff in Gleave v. Denver
& Rio Grande W.R., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah
CtApp.), cert denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (1988).
As the majority recognizes, the outcome in
this case is controlled by Gleave, in which
we held that (1) UDOTs general activity in
evaluating, installing, maintaining, and improving safety signals or devices at railroad crossings is a governmental function
within Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1986)
under the test set forth in Standiford v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah
1980); and (2) the specific act of UDOT
which the plaintiff claimed was negligent,
i.e., the failure to upgrade safety devices at
a particular railroad crossing, arose out of
the exercise of a discretionary function,
under the test in Little v. Utah State Div.
of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah
1983), for which immunity had not been
waived by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(l)(a)
(1986).
The majority appears unaware of the
two-step analysis—used, for example, in
Gleave and Rocky ML Thrift Stores v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989)
—that is necessary to resolve a governmental immunity claim in which the parties
contest whether, even if the general activity is a governmental function, the allegedly
negligent act arose out of the exercise of a
"discretionary function" under section 6330-10(1). If the general activity under consideration is not a governmental function
within the meaning of section 63-30-3, then
there is no immunity. If the general activity is a governmental function, then the
Little test must be applied to determine if
the specific, allegedly negligent act or
omission is purely discretionary under sec-
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tion 63-30-10<lXa) If it is purely discretionary, then immunity has not been
waived by section 63-30-10(l)(a). If it is
not purely discretionary, then immunity
has been waived by section 63-30-10(1).
The failure to appreciate the difference
between these two distinct inquiries apparently underlies the majority's confusing attempt to harmonize the results in Bowen v.
Riverton City, 656 R2d 434 (Utah 1982)
and Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276
(Utah 1985) (per curiam) with Standiford
and Gleave. Governmental immunity was
not even an issue in Bowen, a case involving the allegedly negligent failure of the
city to maintain a stop sign that had been
knocked down, so it is not really surprising
that no mention was made of Standiford.
It is the substance of the issues actually
raised and of the tacit assumptions made m
Bowen, not the case's procedural posture,
that is important The summary judgment
in favor of the city, which the supreme
court reversed in Bowen, had been granted
on the basis that the city was not negligent
as a matter of law on the undisputed facts;
the summary judgment was not granted on
the basis of any immunity. The first unspoken assumption m Bowen, which was
subsequently the express holding in Leavitt, 716 P.2d at 279, is that the maintenance
and repair of traffic signs is a governmental function. Leavitt, which also involved a
municipality's failure to maintain a traffic
control device at a highway intersection,
addressed another issue not raised in Bowen, i.e., whether immunity for the exercise
of that governmental function had been
statutorily waived. The court in Bowen
tacitly assumed that it had, or the summary judgment in favor of the municipality
could have been affirmed on the alternate
ground of immunity. The Leavitt court
concluded that the immunity provided to
the city by section 63-30-3 for its activities
in maintaining traffic control devices had
been expressly waived by section 63-30-8
"for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or
other structure located thereon.'' Relying

on its prior decision in Bigelow v. Ingersoll,
618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980), decided two years
before Bowen, the Leavitt court reaffirmed that the express waiver of immunity in section 63-30-8 is not subject to the
section 63-30-10(l)(a) discretionary function exception to the waiver of immunity.
The court thus read section 63-30-8 as
expressing the legislature's view that an
act or omission in the exercise of a governmental function that created a "defective,
unsafe, or dangerous condition" on a public
way could never involve activity at the
basic policy-making level for which immunity is preserved by section 63-3(M0(l)(a).
Unlike the plaintiffs in Leavitt and Bigelow, however, but exactly like the injured
plaintiff and appellant railroad in Gleave,
749 P.2d at 667 L n 6, the plaintiffs in this
case have never pleaded or contended that
the discretionary function analysis under
section 63-30-10(l)(a) is unnecessary and
irrelevant because the decedents' injuries
resulted from an unsafe or dangerous condition on a road within the purview of
section 63-30-8. Instead, they asked the
trial court and us to overrule one of the
two aforementioned holdings m Gleave and
conclude either that (1) UDOT's evaluation,
installation, maintenance, and improvement
of safety signals or devices at railroad
crossings is not a governmental function
withm section 63-30-3; or (2) UDOT's failure to install upgraded safety devices at
the subject railroad crossing did not arise
out of a section 63-30-10(l)(a) discretionary
function.
Since my colleagues and I have unanimously declined the invitation to abandon
Gleave, it is unfortunate that the majority
adds confusion to an already difficult area
of law m its flawed analysis of Leavitt and
Bowen, which should be disregarded as
dicta.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LEWIS DUNCAN, individually and
as personal representative of
the Estate of PATRICK DUNCAN,
deceased, et al.,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NO. 84-146

Plaintiffs,
vs.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation, et al.,
:
Defendants.

:

The above-referenced matter came before the Court for oral
argument on November 12, 1987.

Counsel for the various parties

appeared and argued their respective positions.

Prior to the

oral argument, the parties had submitted Memoranda of Points and
Authorities, as well as Affidavits and other documentary evidence
addressing the issues raised in the various Motions.

Following

oral argument, the Court ruled from the bench on portions of the
defendant

Union

Pacific

Railroad's

Motion for Summary Judgment.

(hereinafter

"Railroad")

The remainder of the Motions were

taken under advisement for further consideration of the issues
raised.
Memoranda
submitted,

The

Court

of
and

has

Points
being

Memorandum Decision.

and

since

argument,

Authorities,

fully

advised,

again
and

enters

reviewed

the

other

materials

the

following
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MOTIONS PREVIOUSLY GRANTED
As

indicated

above, the Court

granted

Railroad's Motion for Summary Judgment.

a portion

of the

From the bench, at the

conclusion of oral argument, the Court determined that there was
no evidence to support the plaintiffs1 claim that the Railroad
operated the train in a negligent manner.

To the contrary, the

only evidence presented went to the proposition that the train
was

operated

in a reasonable, safe and prudent manner.

In

addition, there was no evidence offered by the plaintiffs that
suggested

that

their

claim

Kleinman, was incompetent.
again

to

the

contrary,

that

the

engineer,

co-defendant

The only evidence before the Court is
and

establishes

that

Kleinman was a competent and qualified engineer.

the

defendant

Therefore, the

Railroad and Kleinmanfs Motions for Summary Judgment on those
issues were granted.

There was also a Motion to Strike a portion

of the plaintiffs1 Brief that contained inappropriate comments.
The plaintiff did not object, and the Motion was granted, and the
word "murdered" in plaintiffs1 Brief was stricken pursuant to
Rule 12(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arises out of an automobile/train collision that
occurred

on April

9,

1983, at approximately

8:50

p.m.

The

collision took place at the crossing of the defendants railroad
tracks, and Droubay Road in a rural portion of Tooele County.
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The train was operated by defendant Kleinman; a deceased, Patrick
Duncan, operated the automobile and, in addition to the operator,
the automobile contained three passengers.

All four occupants of

the automobile were killed as a result of the collision.

It was

dark at the time of the collision, and the weather was not a
factor.

The automobile's and the train's lights were lit.

The

train had in operation a dual headlight, and a strobe light, both
exceeding federally mandated standards.

Droubay Road crosses the

railroad tracks at an oblique angle of approximately 13 6* in the
direction
tracks.

that

the

automobile

was

planning

on

crossing

the

Considering the direction of the automobile and the

train, the train was therefore approaching the crossing to the
right front of the automobile.
observed

the

automobile

The defendant engineer, Kleinman,

approaching

the

crossing

for

some

substantial distance before the crossing, and assumed that the
automobile would stop prior to reaching the crossing.
time

the

defendant

Kleinman

was

able

to

observe

By the
that

the

automobile was not going to stop, it was not possible to stop the
train, or take other evasive action before the impact occurred.
The required whistle and bells on the train were operating for
the

prescribed

distance

prior

to the crossing.

Other than

railroad personnel on the train, there were no eyewitnesses to
the collision that survived.

Based upon the material submitted,

there is no obstruction to the observation of an approaching
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train for an automobile driver approaching, as was the Duncan
automobile in this case for some substantial distance before the
crossing (investigating officers tests).
Plaintiffs 1
approaching

counsel

the

orally

crossing

was

not

defendants, but offered no support

argued
flat

that

as

the

terrain

suggested

by

for that conclusion.

the
The

photos, submitted to show the terrain, suggests the contrary, and
there is no genuine issue of material fact that is disputed on
that point.
consisted

The signing on the road preceding the crossing
of

approximately

a

traditional

railroad

crossing

305 feet in advance of the crossing.

sign

at

Unrefuted

tests offered by the defendants show that the sign was visible at
night,

using

automobile

quarters of a mile.
itself

was

also

low beams

for

a distance

of three-

The white crossing sign at the crossing

visible

at

that

distance.

An

automobile

traveling with high beams would be able to observe the signs in
question a mile distant from the crossing.

The automobile and

the train collided front-to-front at the crossing.

There is a

disputed issue of fact regarding the effect of marijuana use by
the deceased driver Duncan.

For the purposes of this Motion, the

Court accepts the proposition that the plaintiffs assert, to wit:
that marijuana ingestion by the plaintiff driver had no effect on
his ability to operate the vehicle in any fashion, and that his
judgment was not impaired.

At the time of the accident there

DUNCAN V. UNION PACIFIC
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signals at the crossing,

nor crossing arms

prohibiting the passage of vehicle traffic onto the crossing.
RAILROAD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs claim that the Railroad was negligent
installing
crossing.

additional warning

in not

lights or other devices at the

Plaintiffs claim that the Railroad has a duty to

install such devices concurrently with the State of Utah, and
more

particularly

the

Utah

Department

of

(hereinafter referred to as "State" or "UDOT").

Transportation
The Railroad

denies this duty, and claims that the determination of need and
the decision to install signing and other warnings is the sole
and exclusive responsibility of the State.
the Court agrees.

With that proposition

Utah statutes place the responsibility clearly

upon the State for making the determination of what type of
signing and when it should be installed on railroad crossings.
This conclusion is true, even in the face of the 1975 amendment
to Section 54-4-15, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended.

The courts

that have interpreted Section 54-4-15, as amended, have held and
this Court finds those holdings persuasive, that no duty exists
in law for the Railroad to independently, or concurrently with
the State, install or maintain crossing signs, lights, and other
traffic control devices at railroad crossings.

There being no

duty to sign or place signals at railroad crossings on the part
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of the Railroadfs Motion

of the Railroad, the remainder

for

Summary Judgment should be and is hereby granted.
STATE OF UTAH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In considering the State1s Motion for Summary Judgment, it
must be considered in two phases.

First, it must be determined

if the State is entitled to immunity in this case, because of the
State 1 s

claim

that

crossing,

signing

and

signals

are

discretionary, and therefore governmental immunity is not waived
and

applies,

and

secondly,

even

if

such

activity

is

a

discretionary function, is the State still liable because of the
plaintiffs' claim that the crossing is extra hazardous.
The

process

used

by

UDOT

personnel

in

making

their

inspection of railroad crossings in this state to determine what
type of signs and signals should be used is a process requiring
both

the

use

considerations.

of

objective

and

subjective

factors

and

It must first be determined whether or not a

particular crossing requires more than just advance signing.

If

it is so determined, then it must be determined to apply for
whatever federal funding is available.
rated

by UDOT personnel

listing

for

requested

crossings

throughout

The crossing must also be

and given a position on a priority
for

the

which
state.

federal
In

funding

reaching

has
a

been

priority

evaluation, the inspection team evaluates the potential hazards
of the crossing compared to all others in the state.

This
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procedure is fully described in the State's Brief and supporting
documents.

The process is far beyond the perfunctory decisions

that government officials may make on a day-in and day-out basis,
which are not entitled to protection as discretionary decisions.
The process of evaluation

involved here embodies the classic

elements of a discretionary function, to wit:
needs

of

weighing

differing
competing

railroad
interests

crossings

balancing various

throughout

for available

the

state,

funding, balancing

potential risk versus dollar and manpower available.

The Court

finds that the decision to add additional signs or signals to
this crossing, and when to do it was a discretionary function for
which the State has not waived

immunity under Section 63-3 0-

10(1)(a), Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended.

Having determined

that the State is entitled to immunity under the exception of a
discretionary function, the Court declines to address the other
two grounds for immunity asserted by the State.
The plaintiff also claims that even if a decision to install
signs and signals is discretionary, the exemption does not apply,
because the crossing is extra hazardous.
necessarily

convinced

that

While the Court is not

the plaintiffs' proposition

is a

correct statement of the law, the Court is satisfied as a matter
of law that the crossing in question does not fall into the
category of extra hazardous.
reasons.

This conclusion is reached for two

First, the plaintiffs' expert Affidavit upon which the
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plaintiffs rely to establish their claim of an extra hazardous
crossing

is

foundation.

based

upon

inadmissible

evidence

and

a

flawed

Secondly, and more importantf the evidence presented

clearly shows that this crossing does not fall into the type of
crossing

contemplated

by the Supreme Court

in defining extra

hazardous crossings.
Plaintiffs have filed the Affidavit of Robert Crommelin in
which Mr. Crommelin opines that based, at least in substantial
part, on the inspection and surveillance reports of the State
officials at UDOT, that the crossing is extra hazardous.

That

opinion is without foundation or basis when the report relied
upon is removed from consideration, as it must be in this case.
23

U.S.C.

409

prohibits

any

court,

state

or

federal,

from

receiving into evidence reports and other information such as
UDOT surveillance reports.
action is clear.

The policy reasons behind Congress's

It is to encourage the full and free exchange

of information, and to encourage candid reports, conclusions and
evaluations by governmental officials conducting inspections at
railroad crossings and the like.

Were the reports and other

information

teams would

making

admissible,

accurate

reports

inspection
so as to

be chilled in

insure that they were not

hindsighted at a later time in liability actions by statements
and evaluations contained in those reports.

Plaintiffs1 expert's

conclusions are also based upon misinformation.

Mr. Crommelin

relies upon a "projected" traffic density of 1,500 vehicles per
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day, when in actuality the density was at most 580 vehicles per
day.

The statement that the placement of the advance warning

sign violated federal standards for distance is also misplaced.
The federal statute does not mandate a specific distance, it
provides a suggested distance.

In any event, the placement of

the sign could have no proximate effect upon the accident in any
event.

The driver either failed to see the sign, or ignored the

sign, and it makes little difference if an operator does not see,
or ignores a sign 305 feet from a railroad crossing, as opposed
to not seeing or ignoring a sign that is 750 feet from a railroad
crossing.

A careful review of the Crommelin claim of "similar

accidents" at the crossing further shows that his use of that
basis for determining that this crossing is ultra hazardous is in
error.

The three prior accidents upon which he relies are not

similar

to

the action

in question

at all.

One

involved a

collision with a train where visibility was poor in a snowstorm.
The

others

involved

automobiles

coming

from

the

opposite

direction, which substantially changes the angle at which the
train approaches the intersection, as compared to the oncoming
approaching
These

car,

and

differences

are

were

otherwise

pointed

substantially

out

in

defendant

dissimilar.
Railroad's

Memoranda, dated May 26, 1987, and the Court has received no
addition

to

conclusions

Mr.
are

Crommelin's
or

can

be

Affidavit
based

upon

to

suggest

proper

that

his

foundations.
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Considered as a whole, the opinion of Mr. Crommelin, because of
the loss of its underpinnings, cannot be considered as raising a
substantial or genuine material issue of fact on the issue of the
crossing being extra hazardous or not.
More important than the lack of plaintiff raising a genuine
issue of fact

on the nature of the crossing

Crommelin's

Affidavit,

is the

photos and

other documents

Court's

submitted

by way

evaluation

of Mr.

through the

of the crossing itself.

This crossing as a matter of law does not meet the Supreme Court
test as outlined in Bridges v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. , 488
P. 2d 378

(Utah 1971).

As noted by the Supreme Court in the

Bridges case, there must be something unusual about the crossing.
The photos and investigating officer's tests and observations all
show that the surrounding land in the area of the automobile's
approach is reasonably flat.

It is flat, at least to the extent

that the approaching train can be readily seen and observed by
the driver of an approaching automobile.

There are no buildings

or other structures in the area to divert a driver's attention,
or to otherwise confuse.

There are no other lights or unusual

noises to confuse or deceive an otherwise unsuspecting driver.
In sum, there is nothing about this crossing that could provide
notice to UDOT personnel that the warnings which were there at
the time of the accident were not adequate to warn the public.
While any railroad crossing can be hazardous, it is hard to
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imagine a crossing that presents a smaller hazard than the one in
question before the Court.

The Court therefore determines that

reasonably minds could not differ on whether or not this crossing
is extra hazardous, and concludes as a matter of law that the
crossing is not extra hazardous.
Based upon the foregoing, the State1s Motion for Summary
Judgment

is equally well-taken

as that of the Railroad, and

should therefore be, and the same is hereby granted.
Counsel

for the Railroad

and

Kleinman

are

requested

to

prepare an appropriate Order in accordance with this Memorandum
Decision granting their Motion for Summary Judgment, and counsel
for the State is likewise requested to prepare an Order granting
the State's Motion for Summary Judgment in accordance with this
Memorandum Decision, and submit the same to the Court for review
and signature in accordance with the Local Rules of Practice.
Dated this

/ 7

day of November, 1987.

IS/ ^W^
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE
RAILWAY, COMPANY, a Delaware
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No. CIV 89-293 SC
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on:
1.

Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,

2.

Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Regarding Seat Belt Defense,

3.

Defendant's Motion to Exclude Conclusory Testimony of

and

Plaintiff's Expert that Crossing was Extrahazardous.
The Court, having read the memoranda submitted by the parties,
having examined the exhibits attached thereto and being apprised
of the applicable law, reaches the following decisions for the
reasons set forth below.
This is an action for wrongful death.

On October 23, 1987,

the Defendant operated a railroad train on its railway line through
the North Gabaldon crossing in Belen, New Mexico, where a collision
occurred between the train and a motor vehicle driven by Luz
Araijo, the Plaintiff's Decedent.

Plaintiff claims the death of

Luz Armijo was the proximate result of the Defendants negligent
failure

to

provide

adequate

warnings

at

the

crossing

and

Defendant's negligent operation of its train.

Defendant claims

that Araljo's death was the proximate result of his own negligence
and that it was not negligent in any manner in operating the train
on the night of the accident.

Defendant further claims that any

state common law theory of negligence based on Defendant's duty to
install warning devices at railroad crossings has been preempted
by federal laws and regulations.

This last contention is the

subject of Defendants motion for partial summary judgment which
the Court will address first.
I.

Defendant• • Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Defendant moves the Court for an order granting it partial

summary

judgment with respect to the Plaintifffs

claims that

Defendant had a duty to install additional warning devices at the
railroad crossing at issue in this case.

As grounds therefore,

Defendant states that any state common law theory of negligence on
the part of Defendant with regard to the installation of warning
devices at railroad crossings has been preempted by federal laws
and

regulations.

Plaintiff

makes numerous arguments

against

preemption.
The following facts were submitted by Defendant in its Motion
for

Partial

Summary

Judgment

as

undisputed

material

facts.

According to 56.1b. of the Rules of the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico, all material facts set forth
in the statement of the movant shall be deemed admitted unless
specifically controverted.
not

dispute

any

of

Plaintiff in her Response Brief did

Defendants

2

undisputed

material

facts.

Therefore, the Court will consider admitted the following material
facts.
In 1970, the United States Congress enacted the Federal Rail
Safety Act (FRSA) which expressly preempted state law as to the
subject matter of any order, standard, or regulation relating to
railroad safety issued by the Secretary of Transportation.

45

U.S.C. §§ 421-444. A specific section of the FRSA was devoted to
railroad-highway grade crossing safety and required the Secretary
of Transportation to report to Congress on procedures to be
employed to develop safer grade crossings.

45 U.S.C. 1433(a).

In

1973, after the Secretary of Transportation filed his report with
Congress, Congress amended the Federal Highway Safety Act to
require the states to "conduct and systematically maintain" a list
of railroad crossings requiring improved protective or warning
devices.

23 U.S.C. §130(d). In addition, the states were required

to "implement a schedule" for the construction and installation of
improved railroad crossing protective devices. Ide
In 1983, pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Secretary
of Transportation, the Federal Highway Administration adopted and
approved the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) as
the national standard for all traffic control devices.
S 655.603 (1990).

23 C.F.R.

Consistent with federal regulations, New Mexico

adopted the MUTCD as the standard for traffic control devices in
New Mexico.

N.M.Stat.Ann. §66-7-101 (Repl. 1987).

The MUTCD

provides that "the determination of need and selection of devices
at

a

grade

crossing

is

made

3

by

the

public

agency

with

jurisdictional authority." HUTCD, Part VIII at 8A-1. Furthermore,
in 1975, the Secretary promulgated regulations mandating that
"state laws requiring railroads to share in the cost of work for
the elimination of hazards at railroad-highway crossings shall not
apply to Federal-aid projects."

23 C.F.R. 1646.210(a) (1990).

The Secretary of Transportation determined that "projects for grade
crossing improvements are deemed to be of no ascertainable net
benefit to the railroads and there shall be no required share of
the costs."

23 C.F.R. §646.210(b)(1) (1990).

Pursuant to the provisions of the Highway Safety Act, in 1984
the State of New Mexico obtained a list of all railroad-highway
grade crossings in the State, prepared by the federal Department
of Transportation with input from the American Association of
Railroads (hereinafter the DOT-AAR inventory), which listed all
public railroad crossings in New Mexico based on the likelihood of
an accident occurring at a particular crossing during a given year.
Cisneros Deposition, p. 10.1

In 1984, the North Gabaldon Road

crossing was number 197 on the DOT-AAR inventory containing a total
number of 900 public railroad-highway crossings located in New
Mexico.

Cisneros Deposition, Ex. 1.

Having obtained the DOT-AAR

inventory, the New Mexico State Highway Department (through the
Railroad & Utilities Section), with federal assistance, prioritized
and ranked the railroad crossings for warning device upgrading
based on a number of factors calculated by the State.
1

Cisneros

Lester Cisneros is the section head of the Railroad &
Utilities Section of the New Mexico State Highway and
Transportation Department.
4

Deposition, pp. 9, 10, 30.

In July,

1984, the Railroads &

Utilities Section completed its statewide study of the 900 railroad
crossings listed in the DOT-AAR inventory.
Ex. 2, p. 25.

Cisneros Deposition,

Also, in July, 1984, the Railroad & Utilities

Section narrowed the DOT-AAR Inventory to a list of 22 (later
amended to 27) projects that the Section concluded should be
considered for Federal-Aid Safety Funding.
27,

1984,

the

Railroad

& Utilities

Id* at 26-30. On July

Section

diagnostic

team

submitted its list of the 22 projects to be submitted for approval
by the Federal Highway Administration for federal railroad safety
project funding.

Id. at 25.

The July, 1984 evaluation prepared

by the Railroad & Utilities Section ranked the North Gabaldon Road
crossing with a priority number of 14 and included the crossing in
its 5 year plan.

Id. at 27-30. This report included the specific

evaluation that the type of warning device to be installed at the
North Gabaldon Road railroad crossing was "flashers and gates."
Id. at 29.
When

the Railroad

& Utilities Section determines that a

particular railroad crossing is, by virtue of its ranking, the next
to have its warning devices upgraded, it first informs the Federal
Highway Administration and then informs the railroad (through a
railroad

representative

on

the

diagnostic

team)

of

that

determination and requests a preliminary engineering report and
construction cost estimate for installing the additional warning

5

Cisneros Deposition, p. 30; San Miguel Affidavit, 16.2

signals.

Requests for an engineering report are made by the Railroad &
Utilities Section to the railroad-employee member of the diagnostic
team to provide engineering advice in terms of railroad operations
as to the installation of additional warning devices at particular
railroad

crossings.

Affidavit,

J15,

6?

Cisneros
23

§646.216(b)(i) (1990).

Deposition,

CP.R.

p.

5646.204(g)

30; San Miguel

(1990);

23

C.F.R.

As of October 23, 1987 (the date of the

accident) the State of New Mexico had not requested a preliminary
engineering report concerning upgrading the warning devices at the
North Gabaldon Road crossing.

San Miguel Affidavit, J6.

The State of New Mexico receives federal funding to upgrade
warning devices at railroad crossings and presently upgrades about
ten railroad crossings per year. Cisneros Deposition, p. 10.
of September
completed

30, 1987, the Railroad

& Utilities

As

Section had

seven of the 22 projects listed on the July, 1984

evaluation.

Cisneros Deposition, Ex. 2, p. 20.

One factor

considered by the Railroad & Utilities Section in ranking and
prioritizing
devices

is

railroad
whether

particular crossing.

crossings
previous

for the upgrading

collisions

Cisneros

have

of warning

occurred

Deposition, p. 13.

at

a

Prior to

October, 1987, there were no accidents at the North Gabaldon Road
crossing. Cisneros Deposition, Ex. 1. In November 1987, following
the accident, Mr. San Miguel was contacted by the State Railroad

Rudy San Miguel is an ATSSF employee and was a member of
the State diagnostic team in 1987.

6

& Utilities Section.

San Miguel Affidavit, J6.

The Section

requested that Defendant perform the preliminary engineering and
prepare a construction cost estimate for upgrading the warning
devices at the North Gabaldon Road crossing.

Id.

A motion for summary judgment properly may be granted only
when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotax Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317 (1986); Houston v. National General Insurance Co., 317 F.2d 83
(10th Cir. 1987). Here, there appear to be no disputed facts. The
issue before the Court is strictly a legal question.

The issue is

whether Plaintiff's claims that Defendant was negligent in failing
to install additional warning devices at the North Gabaldon Road
crossing are preempted by federal law.
State law is preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2, in three circumstances.
English v. General Electric Company,
110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990).

U.S.

, 110 S.Ct. 2270,

"First, Congress can define explicitly the

extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law."
the situation presently before the Court.3

Id.

This is

Congress included in

the FRSA a broad preemption provision excluding the states from
legislating in any area of railroad safety already covered by

The other two circumstances where state law is preempted
are: 1) where state law is in a field that Congress intended the
federal government occupy exclusively and 2) where a state law
actually conflicts with a federal law. English, supra.

7

regulations adopted by the Secretary.

C8Z Transportation, Inc. v.

Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 701 F.Supp. 608, 609 (S.D.
Ohio 1988), aff'd, 901 P.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1990),

Section 434

reads:
The Congress declares that laws, rules, regulations,
orders, and standards relating to railroad safety shall
be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State
may adopt or continue in force any lav, rule, regulation,
order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such
time as the Secretary has adopted a rule, regulation,
order or standard covering the subject matter of such
State requirement.
A state may adopt or continue in
force an additional or more stringent lav, rule,
regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad
safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an
essentially
local
safety
hazard,
and when not
incompatible vith any Federal lav, rule, regulation,
order, or standard, and vhen not creating an undue burden
on interstate commerce (emphasis added)•
The scope of preemption under the FRSA has been broadly
construed by the courts.
numerous cases.

C8Z Transportation at 612-613 citing

Section 434 expressly declares that a primary

objective of the Act is the establishment of a nationally uniform
system of regulation in the rail safety field. Thus, state adopted
regulations, vith the exception of those designated to eliminate
an essentially local safety hazard, are permitted to continue in
force only until such time as a federal regulation covering the
same subject matter

is promulgated.

national Association of

Regulatory Utility Commissioners • . Coleman, 542 F.2d 11, 13 (3rd
Cir. 1976) •
vhich

impair

The FRSA does not merely preempt those state lavs
or

are

inconsistent

vith

federal

regulations.

Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. State of Montana, 880 F.2d
1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 1989).

It preempts all state regulations

8

aimed at the same safety concerns addressed by federal regulations.
Id.
Therefore, if the Secretary acts with regard to the same
subject

matter

as a state

law,

rule, regulation,

order, or

standard, unless the state law addresses an essentially local
safety hazard, the state law is preempted.

Several courts have

dealt with the issue of whether federal regulations promulgated by
the Secretary (as set forth in the undisputed material facts) have
preempted state laws in the area of improvements at railroadhighway crossings* For example, the Federal District Court for the
District of Kansas stated:
[I]n the 1970's, Congress, recognizing a need for uniform
safety standards, enacted the Railroad Safety Act which
imposed nationwide standards, reserving authority to the
states for further regulation only under special
circumstances.
In conjunction with the national
regulation of railroad safety, Congress determined that
grade crossing
improvements were a governmental
responsibility rather than the responsibility of the
railroads and increased funding to the federal aid
program.
Sisk v. national Railroad Passenger Corp., 647 F.Supp. 861, 863
(D.Kan. 1986).
This Court is in agreement with those courts that have found
that the federal regulations in this area have preempted state law.
It is this Court's conclusion, that the Secretary has acted with
regard to the installation of warning devices at railroad-highway
crossings. The Secretary acted in this area with the promulgation
of the procedures outlined in 23 C.F.R. §646.200 et mmq. and with
the adoption of the MUTCD as the national standard.

The MUTCD

specifically states that "the determination of need and selection
9

of devices at a grade crossing is Bade by the public agency with
jurisdictional authority.11

MUTCD, Part VIII at 8A-1.

"Subject to

such detenlnation and selection, the design, installation and
operation

shall be

contained herein."

in accordance with the national
Id.

standards

By adopting this standard, the Secretary

has effectively preempted any state lav covering the same subject
matter.

The New Mexico law cited to this Court by Plaintiff

predates the Secretary's action and addresses precisely the subject
matter addressed by the MUTCD, that is, what entity is responsible
for determining the need and selection of devices at railroadhighway crossings.

As stated previously, the FRSA preempts all

state regulations aimed at the same safety concerns addressed by
the Secretary's regulations. Burlington Northern Railroad Company
• . State

of Montana,

880

F.2d

1104,

1106

(9th

Cir.

1989).

Therefore, the Court finds that any New Mexico state common law or
statutory law placing the duty of determining the need for and the
selection

of

appropriate

warning

devices

at

railroad-highway

crossings on the railroad is preempted by federal law. Federal law
delegates to the public agency having jurisdictional authority, and
not to the railroad, the responsibility and the authority for
determining the need for and the selection of appropriate railroadhighway grade crossing signals.
While this Court believes that state law was preempted when
the Secretary passed regulations dealing with the subject matter
of warning devices at railroad-highway grade crossings as discussed
above, the Court alternatively finds, that at the very least, under

10

the rationale of Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 720 F.2d
1149 (9th Cir. 1983) the present negligence claim was entirely
preempted as of July, 1984. Only two federal appellate courts have
considered

the

question

of

whether

federal

grade

crossing

regulations preempt state law claims against railroads predicated
upon negligence

in selecting

or providing

additional

warning

devices. The Ninth Circuit in Marshall held that preemption occurs
when the state authorities approve the level of protection at a
crossing, whereas the Eighth Circuit in Karl •. Burlington Northern
Railroad Co., 880 F.2d 68, 76 (8th Cir. 1989) ruled there was no
preemption.

The Ninth Circuit in Marshall stated:

The
Secretary,
through
the
Federal
Highway
Administration,
prescribed
procedures
to
obtain
uniformity in highway traffic control devices and adopted
the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices on Streets
and Highways, see 23 C.F.R. §655.601 (1981), which also
was adopted by Montana, see Mont.Code Ann. §61-8-202
(1981).
The manual prescribes that the selection of
devices at grade crossings and the approval for federal
funds is to be made by local agencies with jurisdiction
over the crossing. Thus, the Secretary has delegated
federal authority to regulate grade crossings to local
agencies.
Marshall at 1154.
The Marshall Court

found that the FRSA preempts a state

negligence claim when the responsible state agency has made a
determination regarding the type of warning device to be installed
at a crossing*

Id. Therefore, the Marshall Court held that until

a federal decision is reached through the local agency on the
adequacy of the warning device at a particular crossing, the
railroad1s duty under applicable state lav is not preempted.

Id.

If this Court follows the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, the
11

federal decision in this case was made in 1984 when the State of
New Mexico Railroad & Utilities Section made the determination,
under the KUTCD, as to the type of warning devices to be installed
at the North Gabaldon Road crossing.

So, at the very least, under

the Marshall rationale, the present negligence claim was entirely
preempted as of July, 1984.4
Thus, the Court finds that the Secretary has acted in this
case and state law is preempted.
savings

clause

under

which

However, §434 of the FRSA has a

states

are

permitted

to

adopt

regulations to eliminate essentially local safety hazards, even if
the Secretary has acted in a particular area of railroad safety.
This section reads:
A state may adopt or continue in force an additional or
more stringent law, rule, regulation, order, or standard
relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate
The Court does not find the Eight Circuits decision in
Karl to be persuasive. The Karl Court did not discuss the express
preemption provision in 45 U.S.C. §434. Rather, it focused on
generally how state laws may be preempted if they actually conflict
with an express or implied federal declaration, or if the state law
is in a field that is so pervasively controlled by federal law that
no room is left for state rulemaking. Karl at 76. The Karl Court
found that neither circumstance was present in that case. Id.
However, the Karl decision ignores the first circumstance (as
discussed by the Supreme Court in English, supra) where state law
is preempted, namely, when Congress defines explicitly the extent
to which its enactment preempts state law. As explained in the
body of this opinion, Congress explicitly defined the extent to
which its enactment would preempt state law in §434 of the FRSA.
In light of the express provision in 5434, there is no need to
determine whether state law in this case actually conflicts with
the federal law or whether state lav is preempted because it is in
a field that Congress intended the federal government to occupy
exclusively. The Court notes, however, that state lav placing the
duty to determine the need for and selection of warning devices at
railroad-highway crossings on the railroad is in direct conflict
with the MUTCD which places this duty on the public agency with
jurisdictional authority.
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or reduce an essentially local safety hazard, and when
not incompatible with any Federal law, rule, regulation,
order, or standard, and when not creating an undue burden
on interstate commerce.
45 U.S.C. §434.
Plaintiff argues that the North Gabaldon Road crossing in
question is an "essentially local safety hazard."
not agree.

The Court does

This savings clause was designed to enable states to

respond to local situations which are not statewide in character
and not capable of being adequately encompassed within uniform
national standards.

National Association of Regulatory Utilities

Commissioners v. Coleman, 542 F.2d 11, 14-15 (3d Cir. 1976).

The

exception in §434 was not intended "to permit a State to establish
Statewide standards superimposed on national standards covering the
same subject matter."

H.R. Rep. No. 91-1194, reprinted in 1970

U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 4104, 4116-4117.

Plaintiff is

asking this Court to find that the statewide common law duty of
railroads to maintain a good and sufficient crossing falls within
the local safety hazard exception of §434.
legislative

history

of

§434,

it

However, based on the

is clear to the Court that

statewide laws, such as the tort duty advanced by Plaintiff in this
case, would not constitute a law relating to a "local safety
hazard."

Plaintiff is attempting to do exactly what the House

Report specifically states that there is no intent to permit,
namely, establishing a statewide standard (a statewide common law
duty) "superimposed on national standards covering the same subject
matter."

The Court finds that the statewide system of tort law

imposing a duty on a railroad to determine the need for, select and
13

Install warning devices at railroad-highway crossings does not
constitute a law relating to a "local safety hazard."
The Plaintiff next argues that if the Court finds that the
Defendants common law duty has been preempted, the preemptive
effect of the federal acts is unconstitutional.

Plaintiff argues

the federal acts provide no right of redress to persons, such as
Plaintiff, who are the victims of the negligence of railroads.
She states this blanket eradication of the right of redress is
violative of the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Constitutions of the United States and New Mexico.

Plaintiff

states that if it is the sole responsibility of the New Mexico
State Highway Department to erect appropriate warning devices at
railroad crossings, then the sole remedy against the State falls
under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. The Plaintiff further argues
that it is unlikely that there is any remedy to be had against the
State because there is no waiver of sovereign immunity in this
situation.

Finally, the Plaintiff argues the application of the

preemption doctrine in this case would effectively deprive this
Plaintiff of any remedy because of the expiration of the statute
of limitations against both the federal and state governments for
negligent acts.
The Court agrees with Defendant's response to Plaintiff's
arguments.

Plaintiff has not been denied access to the courts or

a right of recovery.

First, the issue of whether Defendant

negligently operated the train remains in this case regardless of
the Court's finding on the preemption issue.
14

Second, the New

Mexico Tort Claims Act does not

explicitly

retain

sovereign

immunity for claims in the nature of those being made in the
present case.

The Act does not specifically address a claim for

liability based on the state1s negligence in failing to properly
prioritize

the

installation of additional warning

devices at

railroad-highway crossings. From the Court's cursory loo)c at this
issue, it appears that the State of New Mexico would probably not
enjoy sovereign immunity for these claims.5 Finally, the fact that
the statute of limitations for a claim against the state or the
responsible agency may have passed is not sufficient reason to hold
preemption unconstitutional.
Finally, the Plaintiff argues that since this is a matter of
first impression in the Tenth Circuit, judicial economy dictates
denial of the motion.
contention.

The Court does not agree with Plaintiff1s

Judicial economy dictates that if the motion is

proper, that is, if it meets the requirements of Rule 56, that it
be granted. As the Defendant states, Rule 56 contemplates motions
such as the present one as a means of streamlining trials.
Therefore, for the above reasons, Defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment with respect to the Plaintiff's claims
5

Two cases are cited in the New Mexico Statutes Annotated
that would sees to support a waiver of sovereign immunity in this
particular situation. First, in Blackburn v. stmts, 98 N.M. 34,
644 P.2d 548 (Ct. App. 1982) the Court held where the Plaintiff's
allegations, in large part, concern the placement of signals and
signs, the State of New Mexico does not enjoy immunity for such
decisions. Second, in Qrano v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 99 N.M.
227, 656 P.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1982), cert, denied, 99 N.M. 358, 658
P.2d 433 (1983) the Court held that the absence of traffic controls
is a condition of a highway and is, therefore, the subject of
maintenance, and the state is not immune from liability.
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that Defendant had a duty to install additional warning devices at
the railroad-highway

crossing

at

issue in this case will be

granted•
II.

Plaintiff9! Motion in Limine Regarding Seat Belt Defense
The Plaintiff requests that the Court exclude any evidence,

argument, or inference to be adduced by the Defendant as to the
alleged failure by the Plaintiff's Decedent to use a seat belt, and
the

consequences

flowing

therefrom.

Defendant

argues

that

N.M.Stat.Ann. S66-7-373B. (Supp. 1990) does not prohibit the jury
from apportioning fault and damages as a consequence of Armijo's
failure to use a seat belt and if it does, then the statute is
unconstitutional

as a violation

of the

separation

of powers

doctrine and the equal protection requirements of the United States
and New Mexico Constitutions.
New Mexico law is clear on this issue.

Section 66-7-373B.

(Supp. 1990) states:
Failure to be secured by a child passenger restraint
device or by a safety belt as required by the Safety Belt
Use Act [66-7-370 to 66-7-373 NMSA 1978] shall not in anv
instance constitute fault or negligence and shall not
limit or apportion damages (emphasis added)•
The words of the statute
consideration

of

the

clearly

violation

of

and unambiguously
the

Act

as

prohibit

constituting

negligence or negligence per sef as well as using evidence of the
failure to wear a seat belt to limit or apportion damages.
The Legislature was fully aware of the "seat belt defense19
when it enacted this statute.

The New Mexico Supreme Court had

just recently overruled the "seat belt defense19 created by the
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Court of Appeals in Thomas • • Hanson, 102 N.M. 417f 696 P.2d 1010
(Ct. App. 1984), aff'd in part and revfd in part, 102 N.M. 326,
327, 695 P,2d 476 (1985), saying, "ve believe that the creation of
a 'seat belt defense1 is a matter for the Legislature, not for the
judiciary."

This

decision

was handed

down

during

the

37th

Legislature which is the legislature that passed the "Safety Belt
Use Act."

Furthermore, an earlier draft of §66-7-373B. provided

for admissibility of this type of evidence,6 however, the bill
which was enacted did not.

Therefore, it is clear that the

legislature made a conscious choice to precaca evidence of the
failure to wear a seat belt to limit or apportion damages.

The

legislature undoubtedly concluded that seat belt use was desirable,
and that although the enactment of a law providing for small fines
would encourage people to wear seat belts, an injured plaintiff
should nevertheless not be denied recovery when involved in a
collision with a negligent tortfeasor.
In addition, the Court finds that Defendant's constitutional
challenges to this statute are without merit.

First, the Court

6

The earlier draft of §66-7-373B. which was rejected for
the present provision states:
B. Evidence of a violation of Subsection A of Section
3 of the Safety Belt Use Act shall be admissible
concerning mitigation of damages, apportionment of
damages or comparative fault, with respect to any person
who is involved in an accident while violating Subsection
A of Section 3 of the Safety Belt Use Act and who seeks
in any subsequent litigation to recover damages for
injuries resulting from the accident. Such evidence may
also be admissible on other issues as determined by the
court.
Senate Bill 111, 37th Legislature, 1st Session (1985), p. 2.
17

notes that legislative acts are presumptively valid and will not
be declared invalid unless the court is clearly satisfied that the
legislature

went

outside

the

constitution

in

enacting

them.

Richardson • . Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 107 N.M. 688, 693,
763 P.2d 1153 (1988).
With regard to Defendant's separation of powers argument, the
Court finds that S66-7-373B. is not, as the Defendant contends, a
legislative enactment of a rule of evidence, but rather is the
enactment of a substantive state policy.

It is true as Defendant

states that the New Mexico Constitution reposes the inherent power
to regulate all pleading, practice and procedure affecting the
judicial

branch

exclusively

in the Supreme Court.

Miller &

Associates, Ltd. v. Rainwater, 102 N.M. 170, 171-172, 692 P.2d 1319
(1985) .

However, it is also true that the Courts should not

invalidate substantive policy choices made by the legislature under
the constitutional

exercise of its police powers.

Southwest

Community Health Services v. Smith, 107 N.M. 196, 199, 755 P.2d 40
(1988).

The Court finds it is clearly within the power of the

legislature to determine whether or not to impose as a matter of
State policy an obligation on its citizens to wear a seat belt and
to establish the sanctions for non-conformity with that obligation.
The Court also finds that this statute does not violate the
equal protection provisions of the United States and New Mexico
Constitutions.

Defendant argues that this statute creates a class

of defendants who have the random misfortune of allegedly injuring
a plaintiff who fails to exercise ordinary care by not wearing a
18

seat belt where in virtually any other instance of a plaintiff's
failure to use ordinary care which leads to or contributes to the
plaintiff's injury, evidence of the plaintiff's breach of duty
would be considered by ±hm jury in apportioning fault and damages.
Defendant argues this classification works an injustice against
included defendants by making them pay for damages caused entirely
by the plaintiff's failure to exercise due care for his safety by
failing to use an available seat belt.

The problem with this

argument is that a common law duty to wear a seat belt did not
exist prior to the enactment of this statute and with the enactment
of this statute the legislature specifically declined to make
failure to wear a seat belt the basis for negligence or fault.
Therefore, the statute does not affect the substantive rights of
defendants or plaintiffs.

In New Mexico, there never was a "seat

belt defense19 and there still is not a "seat belt defense."
Alternatively,

even

if this statute can be construed as

creating statutory classifications, the Court finds that the equal
protection test to be applied in this situation is the rational
basis test because this legislation concerns social and economic
issues and does not infringe on substantial or important rights nor
involve sensitive classes.7

Richardson at 697-698.

Applying the

rational basis test to this legislation, the Court finds that

Thus far, the only classifications afforded heightened
scrutiny under the federal constitution are those based on gender
or illegitimacy.
The New Mexico Courts have also subjected
legislatively created "damage caps19 to intermediate scrutiny.
Trujillo •. city of Albuquerque, N.M.Bar.Bull, Vol. 29, No. 43, p.
917 (1990).
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§66-7-373B. is rationally related to a valid legislative purpose,
namely, encouragement of seat belt use through a fine system, while
preserving

the

right to compensation

for

injuries caused

by

negligent tortfeasors.
Therefore,

for the above

reasons, the Court will

grant

Plaintifffs Motion in Limine regarding the seat belt defense. Any
evidence regarding Plaintiff's Decedent's failure to use a seat
belt and the consequences thereof, will be excluded.
III. Defendant1* Motion to Exclude Conclusory Testimony of
Plaintiff9* Expert that crossing was Extrahasardous
Defendant requests that Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Baerwald not
be allowed to offer any testimony which reflects his conclusion
that the characteristics

of the crossing were such that the

railroad was required, as a matter of law, to install additional
signals. Because this Court granted Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Defendant's above request is moot.

This Court

has found, as a matter of law, that any prior state basis for
Plaintiff's claims that Defendant was negligent in failing to
provide additional warning devices at the North Gabaldon Road
crossing have been preempted by federal law. Thus, the motion will
be denied as moot, however, due to the disposition of the partial
summary judgment motion, Dr. Baerwald will not be allowed to
testify that the railroad, as a matter of law, was required to
install additional signals.
Therefore,
XT 18 THE ORDER OF THE COURT that Defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment should be, and hereby is, GRANTED.
20

IT 18

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion in Limine

Regarding Seat Belt Defense should be, and hereby is, GRANTED.
IT IE FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Exclude
Conclusory Testimony of

Plaintiff's Expert that Crossing was

Extrahazardous should be, and hereby is, DENIED as moot.

UNITED STA1
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6/19/90
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
MAHONING COUNTY, OHIO
Case No. 88-CV-1797

GERALD CARPENTER, et al.,

Judge Jenkins

Plaintiffs,
vs.

JUDGMENT ENTRY

CCNRAIL,
Defendant.

This matter came on for hearing to the court upon a motion
for summary judgment filed by defendant, Conrail, pursuant to
Civ. R, 56, and upon the pleadings, the affidavits filed by the
parties in support of and opposing the motion, and the briefs of
the parties.
Upon due consideration of all the material submitted, the
court finds as a matter of law that under the Federal Railroad
Safety Act of 1970

(45 U.S.C. 421, et seq.) and the Federal

Highway Safety Act of

1970

(23 U.S.C. 401, et seq.) and the

federal laws, rules, regulations, orders and standards enacted
pursuant

thereto,

that

federal

law

delegates

to

the

public

agency having jurisdictional authority, and not to the railroad,
the responsibility and the authority for determining
for

and

the selection

of

appropriate

the need

railroad-highway

grade
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reference to determination of the need for and the selection o;
traffic control devices that are installed at railroad-highwa:
crossings.
Since plaintiffs' claims are premised upon the railroad'
alleged duty "to provide crossing gates and flashing signals twarn drivers11 approaching the crossing, which the court finds i
a duty delegated by federal law to the public agency havin
jurisdictional

authority,

the court

finds

that

there

is n

genuine issue as to any material fact and defendant is entitle
to judgment.
It

is

therefore

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

and

DECREED

thfi

defendant shall be and hereby is granted judgment as a matter c
law.
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IN THE CDUHT OF CQMON PIZAS OF SXIEUSKY CCCOTY, OHIO
Case Nos. 86 CV 459
86 CV 920

Mildred G. Case, ?j±nir.istraror,
et al-r

JUDGE 2C5E3T V. FrSSKLIN
CCUHT'S ORDER 3E: PrZEZIPTICN

vs.
Norfolk and Western Saiiway Co.,
et al.,
Defendants.

)

1 ^ /L^

Defendant Sailwav's Motion m _inme re rreezstior. is crtntec.

No dansges a i ^ t o be awarded and no evidenc

acaittaa r e c

mc

additional grade crossing warning devices.
With respect to the Defendants Morion r e : Preemption, t h i s
Court specifically finds as a matter of law that under the Federal
Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 421 e t sec J and the Federal
Highway Safety Act of 1970 (23 D.S.C. 401 e t sec.) and the federal laws,
r u l e s , regulations f orders and standards enacted pursuant thereto, t h a t
federal lav; delegates to the public agency having jurisdictional
authority/ and not to the r a i l r o a d , t h e responsibility and the authority
for determining the need for and the selection of appropriate
railroad-highway grade crossing s i g n a l s , and federal law has presetted
s t a t e law with reference t o determination of the need for and the
selection of t r a f f i c control devices t h a t are installed a t
railroad-rJLghway crossings.

Cartenter v . Conrail (June 25, IS90),

Mahoning County C.P. No. 88-07-1797, unreported * / 0

•JtSLU

G'J

IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT OF MIAMI COUNTY, OHIO

TAMARA TILEY, as Executrix
of the Estate of Charles
Blodgett, Deceased, et al.,

CASE NO. 86-110

Plaintiffs,

JUDGE:

JOSEPH B. GRIGSBY BY ASSIGNMENT

v.
BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD,
COMPANY, et al. ,

ORDER

Defendants.
The several motions 111 limine are, in consideration of the
tentative and interlocutory nature of such rulings (see State v. Grubbs
(1986), 28 Ohio St. 3d 199 and State v. Spahr (1976), 47 Ohio App. 2d
221), considered as follows:
1.

Evidence of subsequent accidents at the intersection

of the B & 0 Railroad and county road 25-A are considered not relevant
to this case.
2.

The testimony of Dr. Welty, a treating physician, will

be admitted to the extent it is competent and relevant.

Evidently this

is testimony intended to substantiate the claimed emotional injuries of
Mrs. Blodgett.

Such testimony is admissible under Binns v. Fredendall

(1987), 32 Ohio St. 3d 244.

Of course his testimony cannot be used as

a conduit for inadmissible hearsay and must be judged according to Articles VII and VIII of the Evidence Rules.

3.

The motion to limit testimony concerning train speed

appears to be well taken for it seems there is no issue as to a speed
violation by the train and no duty in that regard violated by Defendant
B & 0 Railroad.
4.

The motion concerning warning devices appears to be

directed at questions other than malfunctioning.
lights is a duty of the railroad.

The maintenance of the

Any violation of a duty imposed upon

:he railroad by lawful authority would be relevant.

The preemption of

:he Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA) seems settled as a legal
.ssue in light of CSX Transporation, Inc., et al. v. The Public Utilitie^
lommission of Ohio, et al. (CA6f 1990), 901 F. 2d 497.
5.

The motion concerning the obstruction of view goes to

he question of the railroad's duty concerning further warning devices,
hich matter was discussed above.

Assuming the view is obstructed by

raffic going westerly, (extent?) what, if any, resulting duty is impo*d upon any of the defendants?

This motion (as in fact all these in

Lmine motions) can best be answered when the court is more aware of the
roposed evidence concerning its relevance to Mrs. Blodgett and the
;sues of duty and causation.
IPIES TO:
. James D. Utrecht, Esq.
ipman, Utrecht & Dixon
South Plum St.
oy, Ohio 45373
. Dwight D. Brannon, Esq.
South Patterson Blvd., Suite 300
yton, Ohio 45402
.

S a m G.

Parac.

T?err

Mr. James L. O'Connell, Esq,
1700 Central Trust Tower
201 E. Fifth St.

S T A T E

OF

COURT

M I C H I G A N

OF

A P P E A L S

MICHAEL J . BAUGHMAN, a s P e r s o n a l
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e E s t a t e o f
Santa Ramirez, d e c e a s e d ,

.„
ArK 2 5 B90

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v

No.

113816

CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION,
Defendant and ThirdParty Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
JOSE V. RAMIREZ,
Third-Party Defendant.
Before:

Michael J. Kelly, P.J., and Wahls and Sawyer, JJ.

PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff

appeals

from

evidentiary

rulings

by

the

circuit court excluding the contents of files compiled by the
Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT).
Plaintiff's decedent was killed when the car in which
she was

a passenger

railway

crossing

Consolidated

Rail

negligence,

basing

was struck

maintained

and

Corporation.
his

claims

by a train coming
controlled

Plaintiff
upon

the

sued

by

through a
defendant

defendant

company's

failure

for
to

maintain adequate warning devices or gates at the crossing to
prevent
attempted

accidents.
to

present

In

support

into

of

evidence

these
MDOT

claims,

files

crossing in order to establish a need for gates.

plaintiff

regarding

the

Defendant moved

to exclude the MDOT file from evidence, which the trial court
granted, stating:
Well my impression is that the law and apparently
ertministrative law has pretty much taken over this area
1
• .!. i -_Lr>ect to «*»^-r 5« iij^.,»5bu or «iit* ~: »< »«"«f .* •
couid be done with respect to ranroavl cio-.oir..-j. :i.d
if the government and the railroad complies v-uii U u t e
recommendations or the orders with respect to that that
» z - i» ir~ * *
{t.•.-»
* t t » ^Pl^ia
— j_ —

!! i ! !

^

there is very little room for common law negligence.
So unless there is something else that comes out during
the course of the trial about those reports and so on
those would not be admitted.
Prior to trial, plaintiff stipulated
dismissal

on

the grounds

that, given

to an order of

the court's

evidentiary

rulings, plaintiff had no viable case against defendant Conrail.
The court entered an order dismissing plaintiff's claims with
prejudice.
On

appeal,

plaintiff

argues

that

the

circuit

court

erred in ruling that the contents of the MDOT files were not
admissible.

We disagree.

Plaintiff attempted to present the contents of the MDOT
files

to

prove

that

defendants'

railroad

crossing

required

warning signals and gates, and that defendant was negligent in
falling to install these devices.

MCL 257.668(2); MSA 23.68(2)

provides in relevant part:
*
The erection of or failure to erect, replace, or
maintain a stop or yield sign or other railroad warning
device, unless such devices or signs were ordered by
public authority, shall not be a basis for an action of
negligence against the state transportation department,
county road commissions, the railroads, or local
authorities.
The terms of this statute are clear and unambiguous, and preclude
liability

for

failure

to

install

ordered by a public authority.

warning

devices

unless

so

Edington v Grand Trunk Western RR

Co., 165 Mich App 163, 168-169; 418 NW2d 415 (1987), lv den 430
Mich 890 (1988).

There was no order to install gates at the

crossing in question prior to the accident, thus defendant cannot
be held

liable for negligence in falling to install gates or

other warning devices.

Plaintiff may not use the MDOT files to

prove a theory of liability which is barred by the statute.

The

court properly excluded the files from evidence.
Plaintiff also argues that the court erred in holding
that the blood alcohol content of the car's driver, third party
dcfon.if.ni: Jose Ramirez, was aJ...i£.i-Llo ct trial.

We agree.

The

test results in question were obtained pursuant to the implied

-2-

consent

statute,

litigation.

and

therefore

cannot

be

used

in

civil

McNitt v Citco Drilling Co., 397 Mich 384, 388; 245

NW2d 18 (1976).

Nevertheless, this error does not require

reversal as it has no effect on plaintiff's inability to prove
his claim against defendant Consolidated Rail Corp.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ David H. Sawyer
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ROME D I V I S I O N
ROBERT MAHONY,

as

father

and

p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of Eve
Mahony, in h i s own b e h a l f and
as n e x t of k i n and f o r t h e use
and b e n e f i t of Eve Mahony f s mother,
Barbara Mahony,

FILED IN CLEF'S OFFICE
U.S 2.C. - R;me

, ^
^* I ^ 1990

A

LUThKD.THCJJAS.Clerk . f
By;!/. V ^ / ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^
Deputy Clerk

Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION
4:88-cv-13-HLM

CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.
Defendant.
ORDER
Both sides have moved the Court to reconsider portions
of the summary judgment order decided February 6, 1990.

CSX

challenges this Court's determination that the evidence does
not show a "federal decision" with regard to warning devices
such that state law claims would be preempted by federal law,
and Plaintiff challenges this Court's determination that a
jury issue does not exist with regard to the proper speed of
the train.
Speed
In the summary judgment order, the Court found that
the regulations permitted its train to be travelling
through the intersection at 60 miles per hour, and that
the undisputed evidence is that the train was travelling
at 35 miles per hour.
In his motion to reconsider, Plaintiff contends that CSX
is obligated to travel at a "reasonable" speed regardless of

the

speed

limit,

and

that

there

is

a

question

of

fact

concerning the applicable speed limit.
As

the

Court

made

clear

in

its

prior

order,

the

"reasonableness" of the train's speed under Georgia law is
preempted by the speed set by federal regulation.

Federal lav

alone determines the "reasonable" rate of speed, even if a
factual dispute exists concerning the proper speed limit.
The sole issue is whether the speed was within the limits
set by those regulations. The parties do not dispute that the
train was traveling at a speed of 35 miles per hour when
Plaintiff's decedent was killed.

What is disputed

is the

applicable speed limit for this particular grade crossing.
Plaintiff contends that his only burden on the speed
limit issue is "to show some question of fact, or that the
movant

is

incorrect

as to the

law

alleged."

Plaintiff

interprets his burden too lightly. The Supreme Court has made
clear that the nonmovant "must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt about material facts . . .
[T]he nonmoving party must come forward with

'specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 1 "
Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986) (footnote, citations, and emphasis omitted).

In

the instant case, therefore, Plaintiff must point to evidence
showing that the train was exceeding the speed limit allowed
by federal law.
2

Defendant

claims that the track

is "Class 4," which

permits speeds up to 60 miles per hour.
see DeLong Aff. J 4.

49 C.F.R. § 213.9;

Plaintiff has shown evidence that the

track is "Class 3" due to curvature, which permits speeds up
to 40 miles per hour.

§ 213.9; see Abercrombie Dep. at 37.

Plaintiff shows further that the curve has been measured at
6 degrees.

See

Purvis Dep., Exh. A.

The

evidence

of

curvature, standing alone, is insufficient to show that the
speed limit is below 35 miles per hour because Plaintiff has
not pointed to evidence of the elevation of the outer rail.
See 49 C.F.R. § 213, Appendix A (train speed limit is measured
by the combination of degree of the curve and the elevation
of the outer rail).
Plaintiff cites further to 1 11 of Hester's affidavit,
submitted with Plaintiff's opposition to CSX's motion for
summary judgment, which reads as follows:
Our report listed a speed limit for trains of 20mph.
This information was obtained from the U.S. Department
of Transportation Crossing Inventory, which is maintained
as a part of my file. The information is provided to the
U.S. Department of Transportation by the Railroad which
sets its own timetable speeds.
The report, attached to CSX's motion to reconsider, does not
state that 2.0 miles per hour is the speed limit; rather, it
states that 30 trains crossed the intersection at a rate of
20 miles per hour.

In a deposition of Plaintiff's expert

Massie, however, Massie reviewed the inconsistency

3

in the

report and stated that "from his research in the area," he
understands that "the maximum allowable train speed over a
crossing is given by that train speed.11
The
summary

Court

finds

judgment

compliance

with

the

cannot
the

evidence
be

conflicting

entered

federal

speed

as

to

limit.

such

the

that

train's

Although

the

Plaintiff has the burden of proof, there is some evidence from
which a jury could find that the speed limit is 20 miles per
hour and therefore that the train was speeding when it crossed
the intersection at 35 miles per hour.
still

entitled

to judgment

evidence or argument

CSX is, however,

on the preemption

based on Georgia

issue:

no

law concerning

the

train's speed will be admissible at trial.
Warning Devices
CSX moves the Court to reconsider that portion of its
summary judgment order that found the evidence inconclusive
on preemption of the warning devices issue. Specifically, the
Court found that
the inconsistencies in Hester's affidavits as to whether
the DOT made a recommendation or a decision is critica.
to the preemption issue. On one hand, a "recommendation"
concerning warning devices would not be tantamount to a
"rule, regulation, order or standard," within the meaning
of § 434, which would then be adopted by the Secretary,
under 23 C.F.R. § 655.603(a), which would thereby preempt
Plaintiffs1 claim for common law negligence based on the
lack of additional warning devices. On the other hand,
a "decision" by the DOT would be such a "rule,
regulation, order or standard," and would bar Plaintiffs1
state law claim based on the need for warning devices.

4

The Court continued:
on the record as it is presently constituted, there is
no clear indication that the State of Georgia has made
a conclusive determination of the need for warning
devices at the crossing in question. The Court therefore
finds insufficient evidence that the subject matter has
been preempted as a matter of law.
Pursuant to footnote 1 of the Court's prior order finding the
DOT report itself to be admissible for the limited purpose of
determining
report.

preemption,

CSX has submitted

a copy

of

the

In pertinent part, the report reads as follows:

RECOMMENDATIONS, SUBJECT TO STATE-WIDE PRIORITY RANKING
AND AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS, ARE AS FOLLOWS:
It is recommended that the crossing not be signalized at
this time due to low ADT.
NE & SW Quadrants: Install automatic gates with flashing
lights.
Locate
15 ft.
from
track
centerline
(perpendicular) and 8 ft. from the pavement edge.
Required: Centerline, Symbolized pavement markers, and
advance warning signs.
The report then recites that it is recommended by Wendell
Hester and approved by Archie C. Burnham, Jr.
Although

the

report

lists

apparent

inconsistent

recommendations such that it is not clear which recommendation
was approved, the preemption issue is not whether or not the
federal government, through the state, has determined that
warning devices are needed —
was made.

the issue is whether a decision

The record does not explain what position Burnham

holds or what his "approval" meant.
Hester's

supervisor,

his

approval

5

For example, if he is
could

be

of

Hester's

decision concerning the proper recommendation. Alternatively,
his "approval" could be an acceptance by the state of the
recommendation.
However, Hester's affidavit, submitted by Defendant in
its reply brief, recites that after the recommendations were
made, "the Railroad Highway-Grade Crossing Section

[of the

DOT]

warning

made

devices."

a

decision

not

to

install

automatic

This statement, read along with the actual report,

reveals that a decision was made.
Plaintiff asks this Court for leave to depose Hester and
Burnham should this Court find that reconsideration of the
warning devices preemption issue is appropriate.
does

not

find

regardless

of

that

such

the

basis

further
for

discovery

their

The Court

is

needed

decisions,

the

—

only

significant fact for purposes of the preemption issue is that
a decision was made.1
In sum, the undisputed evidence shows that a decision was
made

by

the

State

which,

under

the

law,

is

a

"federal

decision" that preempts Georgia law on the adequacy of the
warning

devices.

CSX

is

therefore

entitled

to

summary

judgment on that issue such that no evidence or argument on

1

If Plaintiff believes that the testimonies of Hester and
Burnham may be relevant for another purpose, they may depose
those individuals by agreement with counsel for CSX or by
leave of Court upon proper motion.

6

the adequacy of the warning devices based on Georgia law will
be admissible at trial.
ACCORDINGLY, Plaintiff •s motion for reconsideration is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; Defendant's motion for
reconsideration is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this the

7

$4

day of April, 1990.
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the court upon defendants motion for
summary judgment challenging plaintiffs' negligence claims.
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For

the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted in
part and denied in part.
I.

FACTS
These

five

cases

arise

out

of

an

accident

in

which

defendant's train collided with the Kalthoffs1 van, killing four
of

the

five

occupants

and

seriously

injuring

the

fifth.

Plaintiffs seek recovery for defendant's alleged negligence under
a number of different theories.
that defendant was negligent

Specifically, plaintiffs claim

in its operation

negligent

in failing to make the railroad

motorists

and

negligent

per

se

in

of its train,

crossing safe for

failing

to

satisfy

its

statutory obligations in connection with the intersection.
Defendant's summary judgment motion challenges plaintiffs'
claims on three grounds.

First, defendant claims that federal

regulation of railroads under the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45
U.S.C. § 421 et sea., preempts any state statutory or common law
duty

to

ensure

that

railroad

crossings

are

safe.

Second,

defendant contends that plaintiffs' negligence per se claims must
fail either because defendant complied fully with its duty, or
because the statutory provisions cited by the plaintiffs impose
no affirmative duty on the railroad.

Finally, defendant argues

that there is no authority under statute or common law that
imposes on a railroad the duty to realign either railroad tracks
or roadways that intersect at a sharp angle.
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II.

Analysis
In deciding

defendant's motion

for summary

judgment the

court must apply the standards set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c).

The defendant bears the initial burden of informing the

court of the basis for its motion, and of identifying those
portions of the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

In

order to defeat the motion, plaintiffs must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Civ. P. 56(e).

Fed. R.

"Only disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude
the entry of summary judgment."
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

The judge*s function at the summary

judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
The Supreme

Court has stated that

Id. at 249.
summary

judgment

"is

properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but
rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which
are

designed

determination

'to
of

secure
every

the

just,

action.'"

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1) .

speedy

Celotex,

and

inexpensive

477 U.S. at 327

The court must consider not only

"the rights of persons asserting claims" but also "the rights of
persons

opposing

such claims...to

demonstrate,

in the manner

provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims have no
factual basis."

Id.

In this regard, the court must grant
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summary

judgment

ifr

reasonable jury could

on

the

find

record

before

the

court,

no

in favor of the nonmoving party.

Anderson. 477 U.S. at 250.
A.

Preemption
Defendants preemption argument is undermined by the

recent

Eighth

Circuit

case

of

Karl

v.

Railroad Co., 880 F.2d 68 (8th Cir. 1989) .

Burlington

Northern

Karl is a railroad

crossing case in which defendant argued, among other things, that
federal law preempted common law negligence claims.

In rejecting

defendants position, the court stated:
In general, state laws may be preempted if
they actually conflict with an express or
implied federal declaration, or if the state
law is in a field that is so pervasively
controlled by the federal law that no room is
left for state rule making...•
Neither
circumstance is present in this case. First,
nothing suggests that Karl was forced to
choose whether to follow federal or state
law, a traditional test of whether state and
federal laws are in actual conflict....
Additionally, Burlington Northern can point
to no case law or legislative history to
support the theory that Congress intended to
completely occupy the field of railroad
safety governance....
We conclude that
Karlfs negligence claim is not preempted by
federal law.Id, at 76 (citations omitted).
Defendant attempts to distinguish Karl on the grounds that
the Iowa transportation authority made no decision with respect
to the safety devices at the intersection.

Defendant contrasts

the actions of the Minnesota Department of Transportation, which
approved the safety devices in place at the site of the Kalthoff
accident.

This distinction

is unfounded

because the

Eighth

Circuit in Karl specifically stated that "the local agency in
- 5 -

this case approved the warning devices....11

Id.

Whether the

court1 s statement was actually true is not important.

The court

clearly assumed that a decision had been made when it rejected
the preemption
precedent

of

argument.
the

This court

Eighth

Circuit,

and

is bound to apply the
therefore

defendant's

summary judgment motion for preemption is denied.
B.

Negligence per se
Defendant

next

challenges

plaintiffs1

claims

that

defendant is per se negligent in failing to comply with Minn.
Stat. §§ 219.06, 219.19, 219.20, and 219.567.

Negligence per se

results from the breach of a statutorily defined standard of
conduct.

This

statutory

standard

replaces

the

ordinary

negligence standard of the reasonable, prudent person*s conduct
in a similar situation.

Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 810

(Minn. 1981).
The only difference between a statutorily
imposed duty of care and a duty of care under
common law is that the duty imposed by
statute is fixed, so its breach ordinarily
constitutes
conclusive
evidence of
negligence, or negligence per se. while the
measure of legal duty in the absence of a
statute is determined under common law
principles.
Zerbv v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134. 139, 210 N.W.2d 58, 62 (1973).
See also Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526, 27 N.W.2d 555
(1947) .
Violation

of

a

statute

is

negligence

per

se

if

the

plaintiffs are members of the class of persons the statute was
intended to protect, plaintiffs1 injuries are those the statute
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was intended to prevent, and violation of the statute is the
proximate cause of the injury.

Wildwood Mink Ranch v. United

States, 218 F. Supp. 67, 71 (D. Minn. 1963); Johnson v. Farmers
and Merchants State Bank, 320 N.W. 2d 892, 897

(Minn. 1982).

Applying this test to plaintiffs1 claims, the court concludes
that

plaintiffs have

negligence

failed to establish defendant's

for violation

of

Minn.

Stat.

§§

per se

219.06, 219.17,

219.19, and 219.20, and defendant's motion for summary judgment
on these claims is granted.
Minn. Stat. § 219.06 states that "[a] railroad company shall
maintain*, wherever its lines cross a public road, a proper and
conspicuous sign indicating the crossing."

It is clear from the

record that the Clear Lake crossing was protected by standard
cross buck signs.

Plaintiffs admit this.

Since defendant has

complied with the statute, there can be no negligence per se
because there has been no statutory violation.
Minn. Stat. § 219.17 provides that

lf

[t]he commissioner by

rule shall require that uniform warning signs be placed at grade
crossings."

As

defendant

correctly

points

out,

under

this

statute, an affirmative duty is imposed upon the commissioner,
not the railroad.
not

impose

an

Defendant cannot violate a statute which does

obligation upon

it.

Thus defendant

has not

violated the statute and, absent such a violation, cannot be
found negligent per se.
Minn. Stat. § 219.19 requires the commissioner to designate
those crossings which require additional warning signs.
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Once

this designation has been made, the statute provides that "the
road authority
appropriate

shall furnish and maintain uniform signs in the

places

on

the

highway....fl

Here

again,

no

affirmative duty is placed upon the railroad, but rather upon the
commissioner and the road authority.

Defendant cannot be found

per se negligent where there is no statutorily imposed duty and
thus no violation of the statute.
Minn. Stat. § 219.20 sets forth the procedure to be followed
to have stop signs placed at a crossing:
On determining, after an investigation
following a petition from a governmental
agency...or on the commissioner's own motion,
that stop signs should be install ^a at: a
crossing, the commissioner shall designate
the crossing a stop crossing and shall notify
the railway company....
The railway shall
erect the uniform stop crossing signs....
The commissioner made no such designation for the Clear Lake
crossing.

As a result, no obligations were imposed upon the

defendant.

As stated above, defendant cannot be found per se

negligent for failure to comply with a statute which imposes no
duty upon it.
Defendant has also moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs1
claim that defendant was negligent per se in failing to ring the
bell or sound the whistle on the locomotive at least 80 rods in
front of the crossing, as required by Minn. Stat. § 219.567.
This statute imposes an affirmative duty upon defendant, and
noncompliance, if proved, may establish a finding of negligence
per se.

Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Hauaan, 184 F.2d 472,

476 (8th Cir. 1950); Roth v. Swanson, 145 F.2d 262, 265 (8th Cir.
- 8 -

1944).

Defendant supports its motion for summary judgment with

the depositions of witnesses who were in a position to observe
the train as it approached the crossing.
with similar evidence.

This conflicting testimony creates a

genuine issue of material fact.
for summary

Plaintiffs counters

Therefore, defendant's motion

judgment on plaintiffs1

claim that defendant was

negligent per se in failing to comply with Minn. Stat. § 219.567
is denied.
Finally, defendant contends that

it has no duty, either

statutory or at common lawf to realign a railroad crossing that
forms an acute angle with the roadway.

The question of whether

the Clear Lake crossing was unsafe or hazardous is one of fact
for the jury to determine.

The angle of the crossing is one

factor for the jury to consider in reaching its conclusion.
C.

Other Motions
Also

partial

summary

before

court

is

plaintiffs1

motion

seeking

to

strike

defense

this

judgment

contributory negligence.

the

for
of

Defendant has withdrawn this defense

with respect to the passengers in the Kalthoff's van.

With

respect to the driver, plaintiffs1 motion is denied.
Defendant seeks bifurcation of the trial into damages
and liability phases.

Defendant claims that evidence relating to

damages will have a prejudicial

effect

on liability

issues.

Bifurcation would not solve this problem because both the damages
issue and the liability issue are supported by similar evidence.
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Nor

will

bifurcation

in

significantly to judicial economy.

this

case

contribute

Bifurcation can result in

more efficient litigation where a lengthy damage determination
can potentially be avoided by litigating liability first.
the

potential

efficiency

gains

from

bifurcation

Here,

are minimal

because neither the liability phase nor the damages phase of the
litigation should be particularly complex or protracted.

For

these reasons, defendant's motion for bifurcation is denied.
D.

Motion in Limine.
Defendant has filed

a motion

in limine to prevent

introduction of evidence relating to the erection of a stop sign
at

the

accident

site

following

the

accident.

Evidence of

subsequent remedial measures is inadmissable under Fed. R. Evid.
407.

The purpose of this rule is to prevent the threat of

admission of such evidence from discouraging and delaying the
taking of necessary remedial measures.

Therefore, defendant's

motion in limine is granted.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Defendant's

summary

judgment

motion

challenging

plaintiffs1 claims on the basis of federal preemption
is DENIED.
2.

Defendant's

summary

judgment

motion

challenging

plaintiffs' claims that defendant was negligent per se
in violating Minn. Stat. §§ 219.06, 219.17, 219.19, and
219.20 is GRANTED.
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3.

Defendant's

summary

judgment

motion

challenging

plaintiffs1 claims that defendant was negligent per se
in violating Minn. Stat. § 219.567 is DENIED.
4.

Plaintiffs1 motion for partial summary judgment motion
seeking

to

strike

the

defense

of

contributory

negligence is DENIED with respect to the driver of the
van and DENIED as moot as to the passengers.
5.

Defendant's motion

for bifurcation

of the trial is

DENIED.
6.

Defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of a
stop sign erected after the accident is GRANTED.

"H-

Dated:

dt^i

2L

, 1990.

PauiAf Hagnusoi
United States d i s t r i c t Court Judge
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FICED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
' 9* m\t O

1C5H

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BILLINGS DIVISION

MAXINE NIXON, DONALD NIXON,
DELANE NIXON, and DALLASNIXON,
Plaintiffs,

CV 85-384-BLG-JFB

vs.
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD,
a corporation,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

Defendant.

P r e s e n t l y pending before the Court i s
Motion for P a r t i a l Summary Judgment.

defendant's

For the reasons stated

below, defendant's motion i s granted.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Darrell Nixon was killed when his automobile collided
with a Burlington Northern train at a railroad c r o s s i n g
Plevna, Montana.

in

Maxine Nixon, the mother and only surviving

parent of the deceased, f i l e d this action alleging, among ozher
t h i n g s , that the defendant railroad f a i l e d to furnish proper
warning signals or safeguards, or to otherwise adequately notify
the decedent of the train's approach.
Defendant moves for p a r t i a l
plaintiff's

summary judgment on

claim as i t relates to a failure to furnish proper

warning signals or devices at the railroad crossing.

Defendant

contends that federal s t a t u t e s and r e g u l a t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g to the
installation

of c r o s s i n g warning d e v i c e s

preempt any

state

s t a t u t o r y or common law d u t i e s i t may have had with r e s p e c t

to

the warning d e v i c e s in use a t the Plevna c r o s s i n g a t the time of
the a c c i d e n t .
duties

Specificallyf

defendant

a r g u e s t h a t any

state

are preempted under t h e R a i l r o a d S a f e t y A c t , 45 U . S . C .

5 4 3 3 , and the Highway S a f e t y Act, 23 D.S.C. §401 £ i ^ s e c , , and
regulations thereunder.
DISCUSSION
The R a i l r o a d S a f e t y Act p r o v i d e s t h a t " . . . [ a ] s t a t e may
adopt or c o n t i n u e and f o r c e any law f r u l e , r e g u l a t i o n , order
standard

relating

Secretary

to r a i l r o a d

has adopted

a rule,

governing t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r
U.S.C.

§434

language
those

respect

(1976).

same

Northern , Tne, .
pertinent
regulate
Secretary.

72o

question

regulation,

the

"Railroad
federal

'subject
F.2d
here

t h e same " s u b j e c t

such

t i m e as

order,

or

is

that
only

government has acted

with

1153

whether

construed

45

S a f e t y Act preempts

matter.1

1149,

has

the

standard

of such S t a t e r e q u i r e m e n t . . . " .

l a w s where t h e

to the

until

The N i n t h C i r c u i t

t o mean t h a t

state

safety

or

Marshall v.
(9th
state

Cir.
law

Surlincton

1983).
is

trying

The
to

m a t t e r " which i s r e g u l a t e d by .the

I d . a t 1154.
This C o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n

of t h a t

issue

i s guided by

t h e Ninth C i r c u i t ' s d e c i s i o n in M a r s h a l l , which a r o s e out of t h e
D i s t r i c t of Montana.

In M a r s h a l l , t h e Court n o t e d :

2

"The Railroad Safety Act requires the Secretary
t o study and d e v e l o p s o l u t i o n s to problems
associated with railroad grade c r o s s i n g s . 45
U.S.C. S433 (1976). The Highway Safety Act of
1966, Pub.L. No. 89-564, 80 S t a t . 731 (1966) (as
amended, codified a t 23 U.S.C. S5401-404 (1982)),
d i r e c t s the S e c r e t a r y to develop uniform
s t a n d a r d s and t o approve state-designed highway
safety programs t h a t comply with them, which are
then e l i g i b l e to r e c e i v e f e d e r a l financial
assistance.
23 U . S . C . $402 ( 1 9 8 2 ) .
The
S e c r e t a r y , t h r o u g h t h e F e d e r a l Highway
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , prescribed procedures to obtain
uniformity in highway t r a f f i c control devices and
adopted t h e Manual on Uniform T r a f f i c Control
Devices on S t r e e t s and Highways, see 23 C.F.R.
S 6 5 5 . 6 0 1 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , which a l s o was adopted by
Montana, see Mont.Code Ann. $61-8-202 (1981).
The manual p r e s c r i b e s t h a t t s e s e l e c t i o n of
devices a t grade crossings and the approval for
f e d e r a l funds i s to be made by local agencies
with j u r i s d i c t i o n over the c r o s s i n g . Thus, the
S e c r e t a r y has d e l e g a t e d f e d e r a l a u t h o r i t y to
regulate grade crossings to l o c a l agencies.
M a r s h a l l . 720 F.2d at 1154.

In t h a t case, a federal

decision,

through the l o c a l i t y in charge of the crossing in question, had
n o t been made r e g a r d i n g
installed

at the c r o s s i n g .

the r a i l r o a d ' s
preempted.

the

type of warning d e v i c e to be

The Court therefore concluded

duty under t h e a p p l i c a b l e

state

that

law was n o t

The same cannot be said in t h i s c a s e .
Defendant has shown, and p l a i n t i f f

t h a t on A p r i l 1 2 , 1984, p r i o r

has not disputed,

to the decedent's accident, an

agreement was made between the State of Montana, acting through
i t s Department

of H i g h w a y s , F a l l o n

County, and

B u r l i n g t o n N o r t h e r n , wherein the p a r t i e s
flashing
crossing.

light

signals

agreed

with a u t o m a t i c g a t e s a t

defendant
to

the Plevna

(See, E x h i b i t C to d e f e n d a n t ' s Motion for
3

install

Partial

Summary Judgment)*

This agreement was the r e s u l t of an

evaluation and determination by the State Department of Highways
as t o the type of c r o s s i n g

p r o t e c t i o n warranted, and was

subsequently approved by the Federal Eighway Administration.
The determination by the S t a t e Eighway Department c o n s t i t u t e d a
federal

d e c i s i o n , reached through the s t a t e agency, on t h e

adequacy of the warning d e v i c e s at the c r o s s i n g .
d e t e r m i n a t i o n was made, any a p p l i c a b l e
statutory

d u t y upon d e f e n d a n t

Once t h a t

s t a t e common law or

became v o i d ,

as

federally

preempted.
Plaintiff

argues against preemption on the ground t h a t

t h e Manual on Uniform T r a f f i c
C.F.R.

C o n t r o l Devices, adopted a t 23

§ 6 5 5 . 6 0 1 , p r o v i d e s t h a t "the determination of need and

s e l e c t i o n of devices a t a grade crossing i s made by the public
agency with j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y . "

Plaintiff

t h e C i t y of Plevna i s t h e l o c a l agency with

contends t h a t
jurisdictional

a u t h o r i t y over i t s own s t r e e t s and c r o s s i n g s , and t h a t since

it

had n o t made an independent d e t e r m i n a t i o n as t o t h e type of
s i g n a l needed, the s t a t e law i s not preempted.

This argument i s

not p e r s u a s i v e , as a review of the r e g u l a t i o n s promulgated under
the Eighway Safety Act c l e a r l y indicates t h a t the s t a t e agency,
in t h i s case the Montana Highways Department,
agency" contemplated in the Marshall d e c i s i o n .
§646.200, e t . s e c , , and §924.100 §£.*. segdefendant,

is the

"local

See, 23 C.F.R.

As c o r r e c t l y noted by

i t i s s t a t e agencies to which the federal

authority

has been delegated, and n [w]here a p p r o p r i a t e , the processes s h a l l
4

be developed cooperatively with o f f i c i a l s of the various u n i t s of
l o c a l governments."

23 C.F.R. S924.70Q.

" l o c a l agency" in the Marshall d e c i s i o n ,

The use of the term
i n s t e a d of

"public

agency", does not serve to transfer the a u t h o r i t y so delegated
from the state to the town or municipal l e v e l # as p l a i n t i f f would
have t h i s Court r u l e .
Furthermore, the undisputed record i n d i c a t e s t h a t the
members of the Plevna town council, acting for and on behalf of
the town of Plevna, petitioned the S t a t e of Montana, Department
of Highways, to i n s t a l l ' a flashing l i g h t s i g n a l with gates a t the
crossing in question.

The record further shows t h a t the town of

Plevna agreed to share in the cost of r e p a i r i n g or replacing the
s i g n a l s i n s t a l l e d pursuant to t h a t r e q u e s t .
t h e c i t y of Plevna s p e c i f i c a l l y

Given the- fact t h a t

requested the type of device

which was eventually i n s t a l l e d , and i n i t i a t e d the process which
culminated

in a d e t e r m i n a t i o n by the s t a t e agency that a new

signal was needed, i t i s clear t h a t federal preemption applies in
this

case r e g a r d l e s s

agency".

of how one c o n s t r u e s

the term

"local

As such, defendant cannot be found negligent under the

a p p l i c a b l e s t a t e law for f a i l i n g

t o p r o v i d e a more adequate

warning device a t the crossing in question.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s

Motion for

Partial

Summary Judgment be and i s hereby g r a n t e d with r e s p e c t
plaintiff's
warning

claim t h a t defendant failed

device- a t the c r o s s i n g
5

to

to provide an adequate

in q u e s t i o n .

The Clerk

is

directed not to enter judgment until all claims against all
parties have been resolvedf pursuant t o Rule 5 4 ( b ) , F.R.Civ.P.
The C l e r k

i s further

directed

forthwith

to notify

counsel for the r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s of the making of t h i s order.
Done and dated t h i s ^

day of A p r i l , 1988.

K^J

Chief Judge

6

